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The liberalization of the energy markets in the European Union has been underway for 
quite some time now. At the beginning of the 1990s the first countries started to open up 
their electricity and natural gas markets to competition. This process was formalized on 
the EU level with the first electricity and gas directives in 1998. As deficiencies and the 
need for further market liberalization were identified, new EU legislation was 
introduced, in particular a second set of directives in 2003 and a third in 2009. At the 
time of writing, the electricity and gas markets are officially open to competition for 
almost all customers and in almost all member states. Yet many countries are still 
characterized by high concentration, low entry rates and limited competition.  
In this dissertation I study issues associated with the inadequate progress of the 
development of competition on these markets.1 In particular, I first theoretically 
investigate the liberalization process in the gas sector in a country characterized by no 
domestic production and limited upstream2 competition to find that an upstream 
monopoly may reap some of the fruits of the liberalization of the downstream market. 
Second, I extend this investigation by adding storage and discover that some storage 
structures may hinder competition and a simple separation of storage services from the 
incumbent cannot be welfare-enhancing. Third, I empirically examine the effects of the 
ownership unbundling of the electricity transmission system operator as this is one of 
the most debated measures of the latest European energy liberalization legislation. 
 The purpose of the liberalization of the monopolistic energy markets is to 
increase consumer welfare, eliminate (or at least reduce) the need for market regulation, 
provide equal opportunities for companies and enhance economic efficiency. The 
European energy markets liberalization process aims at achieving this objective by 
preserving regulation and monopoly of only those parts of the energy sector where it is 
absolutely necessary. This includes those parts that clearly exhibit the features of natural 
                                                 
1 See for example European Commission reports CEC (2001), CEC (2004), CEC (2005a), CEC (2005b), 
CEC (2007), CEC (2008), CEC (2009), EC (2007e). These references are listed in the third chapter. 
2 In this dissertation the “upstream” market is understood as the market on the production level (gas 
producers) whereas the “downstream” market is the market of suppliers who buy the product (gas) from 
the upstream level and sell it to consumers. 
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monopoly such as the transmission grid, whereas other parts of the energy business 
should be open to competition. This strategy corresponds to the basic idea of 
liberalization that one can continue to capture the economies of scale arising from a 
single grid, but can do better overall by introducing competition into generation, 
production and supply. Ultimately, the entire liberalization process should lead to lower 
prices, higher security of supply, equal opportunities for companies and markets that are 
more driven by economic circumstances and rationale, thus requiring less regulation.  
 With these objectives in mind, the legislation of the European Union gradually 
introduced measures to be implemented by the individual member states. These 
measures include the introduction of the eligibility of customers to choose their 
suppliers, the establishment of national regulatory agencies and, importantly, the 
breakup of formerly vertically integrated utilities often controlling the entire supply 
chain from production/generation to transmission, storage and supply. 
 In the three chapters of my dissertation I therefore investigate various aspects of 
the energy market liberalization process, focusing on the identification of obstacles on 
the road to efficient liberalization and an examination of the effects of market opening 
measures, in particular ownership unbundling.  
 In the first chapter, which is motivated by the slow emergence of competition 
after the natural gas market in the Czech Republic was liberalized, I theoretically 
explore the impact of upstream competition on the downstream level. I extend standard 
Cournot models to understand current and likely future developments, paying particular 
attention to the impact of market liberalization on a country characterized by a lack of 
domestic production and limited foreign upstream competition. I show that the upstream 
producer might exercise his market power to capture some of the benefits of 
liberalization and increase the wholesale price, which hinders the desired decline of the 
end-user price in the long run. This pricing change in turn makes the entry of new 
downstream players, who thus do not have access to competitively priced gas, more 
difficult in the transition period. I find that this problem might be mitigated or even 
completely reversed if upstream competition develops simultaneously with downstream 
liberalization. 
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 In the second chapter I extend the models elaborated in the first chapter by 
adding natural gas storage to explore the impact of the structure of natural gas storage 
on the development of competition and prices after market liberalization. I show that 
bundled, concentrated and unregulated control over storage does not promote 
competition. When ownership unbundling of storage is implemented simply by 
transferring the facilities to a separate company, lack of further mechanisms enables the 
storage operator to use its market power and set high prices for the storage service 
leading to a loss in consumer welfare in comparison with the pre-liberalization case. On 
the other hand, consumers might benefit from higher welfare if access to storage service 
is regulated. 
 The third chapter addresses one of the most debated issues of the third energy 
liberalization package adopted by the European Union in 2009: ownership unbundling 
of the transmission system operator. I empirically investigate the effects of market 
opening and especially full ownership unbundling of the transmission system operator 
from the supply and generation function in all EU member states on the prices of 
electricity for both industrial and household customers in those countries where it has 
been already implemented. I find that ownership unbundling does play a significant role 
in the development of prices. However, the effect is not exactly in line with the 
expectations and intentions of the legislative package and significantly differs 
depending on the level of corruption in the individual countries. In particular, in 
countries with good institutional quality, ownership unbundling is accompanied by price 
stagnation or an increase whereas a decline in electricity prices due to ownership 
unbundling can be expected only in countries with lower institutional quality. 
 In sum, I uncover some of the obstacles on the road to the efficient liberalization 
of the energy markets in the European Union that are not evident at first sight and that 
are relevant for some countries characterized by particular properties. Furthermore, I 
show that the effects of market opening and especially of ownership unbundling might 
differ across countries depending on the established institutional quality. The theoretical 
and empirical investigations consistently show that market opening should not be 
implemented uniformly across all countries of the European Union and that care has to 
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The liberalization of monopolistic markets should increase consumer welfare, eliminate 
(or at least reduce) the need for market regulation, provide equal opportunities for 
companies and enhance economic efficiency. With exactly these objectives in mind, a 
liberalization process is underway in the European Union in the markets for electricity 
and natural gas, aiming ultimately at the creation of a single liberalized internal market. 
However, the interim results are not exactly what was hoped for. In many EU member 
states, energy prices increased after deregulation and competition emerged only slowly.  
In this chapter I focus on the situation on the natural gas market in the Czech 
Republic, which has experienced an increase in prices and no entry of additional 
suppliers after the first step towards market opening in 2005 and subsequently even saw 
the re-introduction of regulation in 2006. Currently, when the market is liberalized and 
all customers are allowed to choose their supplier, the market continues to be dominated 
by the incumbent, although recently some competition has emerged.  
In light of these developments I analyze a factor that is likely to have contributed 
to the slow emergence of competition in the Czech Republic—and also other countries 
characterized by similar features—after market opening. I focus on the fact that the 
Czech Republic is almost completely dependent on foreign gas imports, which come 
from an upstream market with a very small number of producers. I extend standard 
Cournot models to understand this kind of configuration and further show how this 
problem could be mitigated.  
My models demonstrate that import dependency and limited upstream 
competition impede efficient market liberalization in the long run due to a change in 
upstream pricing after end-user price regulation is revoked. This has implications for the 
transition period, i.e. the period before the contracts concluded (and thus also the prices 
set) before liberalization by the established players expired, in which it is difficult for 
new traders to buy gas at competitive wholesale prices. These results stem from 
comparisons of the pre-liberalization steady state with long-run steady states achieved 
under various scenarios of the liberalized setup after all players adjust to the structural 
changes of the market. 
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 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 2 I describe the 
stylized facts that motivate my inquiry. Section 3 reviews the existing literature and its 
deficiencies. Section 4 explains the key models. Section 5 provides a discussion of the 
results to be gleaned from these models. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.2 The Czech Natural Gas Market 
 
Until recently the Czech natural gas industry was a state-owned and -regulated 
monopoly. This was in line with the belief that this sector exhibits features of natural 
monopoly and that it would not be economically sensible to have parallel pipelines built 
and operated by different companies. In 2002, the whole sector was privatized and the 
majority (the bundled transmission system, the storage system operator and importer 
and six out of eight distribution companies) was sold to the German company RWE.3 In 
line with EU Directive 2003/55/EC and the Czech Energy Act, the incumbent was 
forced to implement the legal unbundling of its activities, i.e. to separate physical 
transmission and import, physical distribution and sale,4 and to provide network 
services (transmission and distribution) to other gas companies on a non-discriminatory 
basis. This strategy corresponds to the basic idea of liberalization that one can continue 
to capture the economies of scale arising from a single network, but can do better 
overall by introducing competition into trading, thus eliminating the need for regulation 
of some activities and reducing the final price for consumers through competition. 
The opening of the Czech natural gas market was a stepwise process that started 
in January 2005 by letting the 35 largest consumers choose their supplier while other 
consumers continued to purchase gas from the incumbent for regulated prices. In 
January 2006 all commercial customers became “eligible”.5 Full market liberalization6 
was achieved at the beginning of 2007. 
                                                 
3 In this paper I will use the term “incumbent” to refer to the companies of the RWE Group. 
4 The joint importer and transmission system operator was obliged to unbundle starting January 1, 2006. 
The distribution companies were obliged to unbundle into distribution system operators and traders-
sellers starting January 1, 2007. 
5 An “eligible customer” is a customer who is allowed to freely choose a gas supplier. 
6 Here, the term “full market liberalization” refers to the fact that all customers became eligible, not to be 
mistaken for a fully functioning and competitive market.  
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Following the first step, natural gas prices for eligible customers increased, 
which prompted them to file complaints with the Energy Regulatory Office, which in 
turn responded by re-introducing the regulation of prices offered by the incumbent to 
eligible customers starting January 1, 2006 for the period of one year. Since 
disaggregated profit data are not publicly available, it is unclear whether natural gas 
prices increased due to the sharp parallel increase in oil prices, to which long-term 
natural gas contracts are indexed—the explanation advocated by the incumbent—or 
whether the incumbent tried to extract extra profits. While other explanations are 
possible, the response of the Czech regulator——who does have access to the 
disaggregated data—can be read as an indication that the regulator believed that the 
liberalization process was not working the way it was supposed to work. 
Indeed, had the liberalization plans worked as intended, new traders should have 
readily entered the market, a non-negligible number of consumers should have switched 
to new suppliers (or at least new consumers should purchase gas from new traders) and 
the end-user price should have declined. However, none of this happened. In 2007 the 
largest entrant (Vemex) claimed to have imported 100 million cubic meters of natural 
gas since October 2006, or approximately 1% of the annual consumption in the Czech 
Republic and less than 1.5% of the Czech winter consumption (Lidové noviny (2010)). 
Interestingly, this entrant is partially owned by the Russian upstream producer 
Gazprom, which naturally raises the question whether it was just this strategic alliance 
that enabled it to enter the market. The market share of the largest natural gas supplier 
in the Czech Republic, which was traditionally around 80%, declined to about 64% in 
mid-2009, whereas the share of the largest entrant affiliated with the Russian upstream 
producer increased to 8.5%. 2010 saw the development of further competition whereas 
the incumbent claimed that its share in the large industrial customers segment dropped 
to close to 40%, the market share borderline used by the European Commission to 
classify a company as a dominant player. On the other hand the incumbent’s share in 
the household segment remained high, over 80 % (Lidové noviny (2010)).   
In order to thoroughly understand the situation, another fact seems important. 
The Czech Republic is almost completely dependent on imports of natural gas,7 with 
                                                 
7 The Czech Republic covers approximately 1 % of its consumption by domestic production.  
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Russia being the dominant supplier providing about 75% of the domestic consumption 
and Norway providing 25%. The extent to which duopolistic competition takes place 
between these two producers is questionable, as the decision to buy gas from Norway 
was a politico-strategic decision made by the Czech government before privatization, 
notwithstanding the fact that buying gas from Russia would have been cheaper (at that 
point). Importantly, long-term take-or-pay contracts with these producers, which were 
written before liberalization, are in place; they are scheduled to expire in 2014 (Russia) 
and 2017 (Norway).  
 
1.3 Existing Literature 
 
My models below are based on the standard industrial organization models of Cournot 
and Stackelberg competition (e.g. Tirole (1988), Shy (1995)). A relevant variant of 
these models was formulated by Greenhut and Ohta (1979) who use market structure 
consisting of an upstream and downstream level—successive oligopoly—to investigate 
the effects of vertical integration.  
 The literature on energy markets, and in particular on natural gas markets, often 
uses a structure based on the two-level model of Greenhut and Ohta (1979). Various 
authors investigate this market either using numerical models to simulate a large and 
complex market or focusing on a smaller part of the market and finding closed-form 
solutions. The first and more numerous group of authors includes Golombek and 
Gjelsvik (1995), Golombek et al. (1998), Boots et al. (2004), Holz and Kalashnikov 
(2005) and Egging and Gabriel (2005), who calibrate and numerically solve simulation 
models of the market with natural gas. The most relevant paper with closed form 
solutions is Nese and Straume (2005) (and the work of Greenhut and Ohta (1979) 
which, however, is not formulated specifically for the natural gas market and therefore 
cannot be immediately applied.). 
Golombek and Gjelsvik (1995) develop a numerical model for six Western 
European countries investigating the effects of radical liberalization. After calibrating 
the model (demand elasticities, costs, etc.), in which agents compete Cournot style, and 
numerically solving it, the authors conclude that the biggest winners of liberalization 
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will be the end-users whose consumer surplus will increase significantly, while profits 
to producers, transporters and distributors will decline. However, the authors do not 
consider obstacles, such as upstream market power and storage structure, and their 
detrimental impact on post-liberalization development. 
Golombek et al. (1998) use a numerical model with Cournot competition on the 
production (upstream) level and regulated returns on lower levels, investigating in 
particular the effect of liberalization on the upstream production. The authors claim that 
after market liberalization and the break up of former monopolies it will be optimal for 
gas-producing countries to break up their producing consortia. However, no formal 
proof or closed form solutions are specified.  
Boots et al. (2004) (and their full report Boots et al. (2003)) formulate a model 
of the market for natural gas that has a structure of a successive oligopoly, i.e. they 
assume oligopolistic competition both on the side of traders as well as producers. 
Drawing on the notion of double marginalization (e.g. Tirole (1988), Spengler (1950)) 
they assume that producers anticipate the behavior of traders and maximize producer 
profits given the traders’ actions. In addition to being able to distinguish between 
countries, producers are also able to distinguish between market segments. Their 
empirical model (called GASTALE) is very ambitious in the sense that the authors 
calibrate it to capture a market including several Western European countries and use 
numerical non-linear programming solvers to obtain the results. That means that there 
are no closed form expressions presented for prices, quantities, etc. Furthermore, no 
comparison is made with the situation when gas supply on the domestic market is 
regulated. 
Holz and Kalashnikov (2005) have a similar approach to Boots et al. (2004), 
however, they consider iso-elastic demand functions. Using their own simulation model 
they analyze double marginalization and perfect competition scenarios. 
Egging and Gabriel (2005) realize how market power could be detrimental to the 
consumers and set up a model in which foreign gas producers can adjust their 
production levels to alter the end-user price. However, instead of using a successive 
oligopoly approach with traders, producers directly consider the downstream demand. 
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Storage is explicitly modeled, however, storage operators are considered perfectly 
competitive and have no market power.  
Moving to literature with closed-form solutions, Nese and Straume (2005) use a 
successive oligopoly structure with two upstream producing countries, which they 
believe has the highest relevance in particular for the European natural gas market, to 
analyze the strategic behavior of policy makers in setting taxes. Their results are 
interesting in that they show how a decision on one level influences the other level and 
the wholesale and end-user price. However, their paper, which focuses primarily on 
strategic trade policy, does not consider gas storage, downstream costs other than the 
wholesale price and a tax, or market liberalization. 
The presented natural gas market studies fail to provide a clear comparison of 
the regulated and liberalized situations using closed form solutions that would allow for 
the identification of the cause of the problems. My investigation addresses these issues 
using a full two-tier successive oligopoly structure and makes a direct comparison of the 
situation before and after liberalization, allowing me to identify and analyze problems 
associated with market opening. 
 
1.4 The Models 
 
I abstract from the more complex structure of the natural gas industry by classifying 
companies engaged in trading activities (import and sale to customers) as traders and 
the transmission and distribution system operators as a single entity providing the 
physical transportation of gas to the customers. This abstraction enables me to use 
models of successive oligopoly (e.g. Greenhut and Ohta (1979), Nese and Straume 
(2005)) that involve two levels of competition only. Approximating the relevant 
scenario for the Czech Republic, I assume the upstream segment consists of a single 
producer while the configuration of the downstream segment depends on the discussed 
scenario.8  
                                                 
8 It can be shown that in the case of an upstream duopoly the effects are similar: identical in terms of 
direction, but smaller in magnitude. See Mravec (2006).  
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In the first part of this chapter I focus on the impact of limited upstream 
competition on market liberalization while in the second part I analyze possible 
configurations that could help mitigate the identified problems. I start with a benchmark 
model of the market before liberalization. I then compare the post-liberalization 
scenarios with the benchmark case. The post-liberalization scenario models are not 
necessarily intended to capture the current situation on the market; instead, they 
describe a situation after liberalization has been achieved, e.g. after new traders have 
entered the market. The comparisons of the scenarios before and after liberalization 
provide hints for why it might be difficult to achieve the outcomes that liberalization 
was supposed to bring about.  
 I use Cournot competition in quantities to model the behavior of n players on the 
downstream market. This approach is in line with much of the literature on the 
economics of natural gas (see e.g. Nese and Straume (2005), Boots et al. (2004), Holz 
and Kalashnikov (2005), Golombek and Gjelsvik (1995)) and corresponds to the 
physical organization of the market and the way gas supply is secured. When 
purchasing gas, traders not only have to contractually arrange for the commodity, but 
they also have to book the corresponding transmission and storage capacities, which are 
often limited, in order to serve the customer. Therefore, Bertrand competition in prices 
would not be feasible since it assumes that a trader can readily sell as much quantity as 
the consumers demand at the price set by the trader. The introduction of capacity 
constraints into Bertrand competition does solve this issue, however, it leads to the 
problem of how to assign capacity limits to individual traders. Furthermore, Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983) analyze two-stage duopolistic competition with quantity 
precommitment in the first stage followed by Bertrand competition in the second stage 
and show that under fairly weak assumptions, which are satisfied by the linear 
downward sloping demand function used in this research, Bertrand competition leads to 
Cournot outcomes; hence we might as well model Cournot competition directly.  
 Following a well-established practice in the existing literature (e.g. Nese and 
Straume (2005); Boots et al. (2004); Holz and Kalashnikov (2005)), I assume that the 
upstream producer establishes, in a Stackelberg-like manner, his pricing strategies 
contingent on the downstream structure. The solution strategy is thus as follows: 
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downstream traders compete à la Cournot using the downstream market demand 
function and treating the wholesale price as fixed. The resulting quantity supplied to the 
market is expressed as a function of the wholesale price and defines the derived demand 
function for the upstream level. The upstream producer optimizes his profit using this 
derived demand function, which gives the wholesale price that can be used in 
downstream expressions to obtain the quantities and prices as a function of costs, 
number of firms, etc. 
 The basic building block of the modeling used in the majority of models is a 
Cournot market with n firms. Following much of the literature in this area (e.g., 
Golombek and Gjelsvik (1995); Golombek et al. (1998); Egging and Gabriel (2005); 
Gabriel and Smeers (2005); Nese and Straume (2005); Boots et al. (2004)), the market 
is characterized by a linear demand function  
 
bpaQ −= ,          [1] 
 
where Q is the quantity demanded, p is the price and a and b are parameters of the 
demand function. Each firm chooses a profit-maximizing quantity, treating the 
quantities supplied by other firms as given, i.e. firm i maximizes  
 
( ) )(** iiiiiii kb
qqaqkpq −−−=−= −π       [2] 
 
with respect to qi. In this expression q-i denotes the quantity supplied by all other traders 
except for trader i and ki denotes the unit cost (and also marginal cost) of firm i. Besides 
being computationally convenient, constant marginal costs can be justified empirically 
both on the downstream and the upstream level. On the upstream level, one can argue 
that even if the cost function were not linear, the overall quantity consumed on the 
downstream market in the Czech Republic is such a minor share of the overall 
production of the upstream producer that the producer acts as if it were linear. On the 
downstream level the costs consist of the commodity price charged by the upstream 
producer, who charges the same price for each unit consumed, the transmission and 
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storage cost, which is also the same for all units consumed as a result of legislative 
requirements and regulation, and administrative (transaction) costs.9  
Due to the concavity of the profit functions [2] the first order conditions yield 















i  for i = 1..n .     [3] 
 









.        [4] 
 
 Having specified the basic building block, I now proceed with the specific 
models. These are presented in section 1.4.1. where I study in particular the response of 
the upstream producer to a change on the downstream market after liberalization.  
 
Summary Table: Structure of the Individual Models  
 




(liberalized / regulated) 
Upstream market 
R-M 1 regulated 
Monopoly 
L-M N liberalized 
Monopoly 
L-D N liberalized 
Oligopoly 
L-F N liberalized 
Competitive fringe 
*  Note on the numbering of models: The letter “R” stands for “regulated” and labels a regulated model before 
liberalization. The letter “L” stands for “liberalized” and labels a model after liberalization. The second letter in 
each model name denotes the upstream structure. M stands for monopoly, D stands for duopoly and F stands for 
competitive fringe.  
 
1.4.1 Response of the Upstream to Downstream Liberalization 
 
                                                 
9 I do not explicitly consider the “portfolio effect”, however, I touch on this issue in the discussion of the 
results.  
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The basic idea of liberalization is that, rather than having a regulated monopoly, several 
firms (ideally a very large number) serve the market and compete away the formerly 
regulated margin, rendering regulation moot. As more and more companies enter the 
market the margin shrinks and the end-user price declines to the (constant) unit cost. 
Therefore the end-user price after liberalization should equal the formerly regulated 
price minus the formerly regulated margin. 
In this section I analyze what happens if there is an upstream monopoly and how 
this monopoly responds to the change in the market structure. In particular, I investigate 
whether the logic described in the previous paragraph still operates.  
 The first model (model R-M) is the benchmark case prior to the liberalization of 
the market. The second model (model L-M) captures downstream competition after 
deregulation. 
 
1.4.1.1 Model R-M 
• regulated downstream monopoly 
• upstream monopoly 
 
The following setup corresponds to the situation on the Czech natural gas market prior 
to liberalization. The economy consists of consumers characterized by [1], a single 
downstream supplier with a regulated end-user price and a single upstream 
(monopolistic) producer with an unregulated wholesale price. The downstream 
monopolist purchases goods from the upstream producer for an unregulated wholesale 
price. The downstream monopolist then sells the goods to the end-users for a regulated 
price ep  which is equal to  
 
cmpp we ++= ,         [5] 
 
where  
wp   is the wholesale unit price 
c  is the unit cost (marginal cost) of the downstream supplier and 
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m  is the margin allowed by the regulator.10 
 
The downstream supplier simply supplies the quantity equal to the demand at the given 
end-user price ep , therefore no optimization is involved on the downstream level. 
 On the other hand on the upstream level the upstream monopolistic producer is 
able to set the wholesale price to maximize its profit. Therefore the producer maximizes 
 
{ })(*)(max sppQ weprw − ,        [6] 
 
where  
Q is the domestic demand function and 
s  is the producer’s unit cost (marginal cost). 
 
Therefore the maximization problem using the demand function specification [1] is 
 
{ })(*)]([max spmcpba wwpw −++− .      [7] 
 
Since the objective function is concave, the optimal price and quantity can be computed 







.      [8] 
 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, instead of a constant, the margin may be defined as a function of the wholesale price. 
According to Peltzman (1976) a change in the wholesale price changes the total wealth to be redistributed 
by the regulator and the redistribution itself. When the regulator defines m as an increasing function of the 
wholesale price, the results (i.e. the magnitude of the difference between the wholesale prices in the 
regulated and liberalized scenario) are more pronounced. On the other hand, when m is a decreasing 
function of the wholesale price, which is a more realistic case as regulators sometimes refuse to pass on 
cost increases to consumers (or spread the cost increase over a longer time period), the results are less 
pronounced. For steeply decreasing functions m, for which ( ) ( )[ ]sppmpm www −′> , the result does not 
hold. However, when the regulated margin is a steeply decreasing function of the wholesale price, the 
regulator shifts profits from the domestic monopoly to the upstream monopolistic producer, who is 
motivated by the decreasing domestic margin to increase the wholesale price, which clearly should not be 
the objective of the domestic regulator. 
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The results are summarized in the following table: 
 














Total quantity sold MRQ −  ))((2
1 mcsbaQ MR ++−=−  
 
 
1.4.1.2 Model L-M 
• liberalized downstream 
• upstream monopoly 
 
Model L-M describes the natural gas industry after liberalization with a single upstream 
producer. Therefore the economy consists of a single upstream producer, n downstream 
suppliers and domestic end-users.  
 On the downstream level n downstream suppliers compete in quantities which 
leads to the total quantity supplied characterized by [4]. Similarly to model R-M, the 
upstream monopolist considers the downstream structure and optimizes its pricing 
strategy taking into account the quantity demanded by the downstream suppliers at 
different wholesale price levels. Therefore, using the outcome of Cournot competition 
[4] and the fact that the unit cost consists of the wholesale unit price wp  plus the 
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Since the objective (profit) function is concave, first order conditions may be used to 
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which after simplification gives the expressions summarized in the following table.  
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 It is now interesting to see how the endogeneity of the wholesale price impacts 
the market liberalization outcome. In particular, if all traders have the same unit cost (c), 
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which is higher, by 0.5 m, than the original wholesale price before liberalization. 
Therefore, by optimizing over the downstream structure the upstream producer is 
capable of capturing one-half of the price benefit brought about by a liberalized 
downstream regardless of the number of downstream traders. Moreover, this expression 
does not depend on the number of traders n, which means that the change in the pricing 
of the upstream producer does not require fully functioning liberalization with many 
traders. Instead, the wholesale price changes as soon as regulation is revoked and the 
current contracts expire. 
Nevertheless, even if the wholesale price increases, consumer may still benefit 
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which is 0.5 m lower than the price under regulation, i.e. the original margin is split 













Comparison of models R-M and L-M 
Variable Model R-M Model L-M 
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Wholesale 
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 The fact that the upstream monopoly changes its pricing strategy and increases 
the wholesale price after the liberalization of the downstream market has two serious 
consequences that impact both the downstream traders and consumers. Firstly, it shows 
that as liberalization is introduced, some of the profits formerly captured by the 
downstream monopoly (and passed on to the domestic owners if the incumbent is 
owned by domestic entities or consumers) is transferred to the upstream monopoly 
which is most likely not owned by any of the domestic entities (this holds in particular 
in the case of the Russian gas producer that supplies gas to the Czech Republic). 
Secondly, this change in the pricing strategy makes the entry of new downstream 
players on the downstream market more difficult in the transition period before the old 
long-term contracts that the producer has concluded with the incumbent expire. The 
combination of these long-term contracts and the change in the pricing strategy might 
result in a situation where entrants are offered wholesale prices above the prices for 
which the incumbent purchases gas. This unavailability of competitively priced gas may 
thus in turn prohibit the entry of new players and the development of competition. 
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1.4.2 Introducing Upstream Competition  
 
The preceding result is not very favorable to the development of competition on the 
downstream market. Some steps ought to be considered to eliminate or at last mitigate 
the problem. One step that could reverse the outcome outlined above is the development 
of upstream competition. Therefore, in this section I analyze what happens if 
competition, in particular duopoly, is introduced on the upstream level simultaneously 
with the liberalization of the downstream market.  
Let’s suppose that there are two upstream producers with marginal cost equal to 
the average cost (linear cost function) s1 and s2 and n traders compete on the 
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This is the demand function that the upstream producers face, which can be 
written as  
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This system of linear equations can be solved similarly to the downstream market 
giving the following results. 
 
Model L-D Summary and Comparison with L-M and R-M Models 
Variable Model L-D Model R-M Model L-M 
Wholesale 
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 The results of the comparison with the L-M model are not surprising. The 
difference in the wholesale price in the model with the upstream duopoly and the model 














 +−=− −−  .      [18] 
 
It can be shown that in order for the second upstream producer to supply (i.e., to have a 
positive profit) this expression must be positive. Therefore, the wholesale price in the 
model with upstream monopoly declines in comparison with the liberalized model with 
upstream monopoly. Comparing the wholesale price to the situation prior to 
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liberalization, the difference in the wholesale price in the regulated model and in the 
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Here, the first term is positive (
b
a  is the price at which the demand is zero, 1sc +  is the 
sum of the unit cost of supply, which has to be lower than the price in order for 
suppliers to supply), whereas the second (difference in the unit costs of upstream 
producers) might be positive or negative depending on the properties of the upstream 
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the wholesale price in the model with upstream duopoly L-D is lower than the 
wholesale price in the regulated model R-M.  
 Therefore, the model shows that if a second producer enters the market on the 
upstream level the problem with the change in the pricing strategy identified in the first 
pair of models is mitigated and if certain conditions ([20]) are satisfied, the wholesale 
price after liberalization declines.  
 Furthermore, assuming that the costs of both upstream suppliers are the 










1 ,         [21] 
where 
b
a  is the price of gas at which the consumer with the highest valuation starts to 
purchase gas and 1sc +  is the unit cost of supply. Thus, if this difference between the 
highest valuation and the unit cost is high enough relative to the price margin set by the 
regulator, the wholesale price should decline. It is quite likely that this condition would 
be satisfied should a second upstream supplier enter, since the margin is usually set by 
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the regulator to a few percent,11 whereas the highest valuation (e.g., of a consumer who 
cannot use any substitutes or who uses only a negligible quantity of gas) is surely 






−       [22] 
and assuming that the costs of all traders are equal and the costs of all suppliers are 





















1  ,     [23] 
where t is the share of the wholesale price that makes up the margin. Condition [23] 
does not hold for large t (e.g., for t=1) whereas it holds for t close to zero. Thus the 
benefits of a second upstream producer are the most pronounced in the case when the 




1.4.3 Introducing Upstream Competitive Fringe  
 
Oligopoly (duopoly) is not the only way to introduce competition into the upstream 
market segment. There are several smaller Asian gas producers interested in supplying 
gas to Europe. However, the transmission lines to the western markets are controlled by 
the Russian gas company Gazprom. Consequently, these producers have only indirect 
access to European markets by the means of sale of gas to the Russian monopoly that 
then markets it in European countries. Hoping that increased upstream competition 
would reduce the downstream price, recent initiatives of the European Union strive to 
ensure direct access of these Asian producers to the European market.  
 In this model I attempt to capture exactly such a development, i.e. an upstream 
segment characterized by a dominant producer and a competitive fringe. I base the 
modeling on some commonly used assumptions, however, I also introduce some 
                                                 
11 As a rough estimate, since separate accounting was not kept and published during the regulated period, 
I calculated the profit margin from the sale of natural gas for one of the distribution companies, SČP, a.s. 
See SČP (2004) for the years 2002 to 2004 (when the market was still regulated), where the profit margin 
ranged from 6.5% to 7.5%. 
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elements which are characteristic for the given situation. In particular, in line with 
Carlton and Perloff (2000) I assume that the dominant firms sets the price knowing the 
response of the competitive fringe and that competitive fringe companies act as price-
takers. However, due to transmission capacity constraints I assume that the size of the 
competitive fringe is fixed (corresponds to the dominant firm granting a certain 
transmission capacity to each firm). Consequently, instead of equating the marginal 
costs to the market price, as the competitive fringe firms would do in an unconstrained 
world, they supply a fixed amount of gas at the market price chosen by the dominant 
firm. For this to be true I also have to assume that the price is set within a “reasonable 
range”, i.e., high enough so that the competitive fringe firms would be willing to supply, 
an assumption that is very realistic. 
 Similar to the previous model, the upstream faces demand [13]. Therefore the 
profit function of the dominant firm is  
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where K is the capacity allocated to the competitive fringe. Due to the concavity of the 
profit function the first order condition yields the profit maximizing wholesale price: 
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The results for this model are summarized in the following table. 
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Model L-F Summary and comparison with L-M and R-M Models 
Variable Model L-F Model R-M Model L-M 
Wholesale 
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 The comparison of these results with the liberalized model with upstream 
monopoly is quite straightforward. The wholesale price in the competitive fringe model 







=− −− ,        [27] 
 
The term that multiplies the competitive fringe quantity K is positive, which means that 
the wholesale price is decreasing as the amount of gas supplied by the competitive 
fringe increases, which is in line with the expected results (wholesale price decreases). 
Furthermore, the effect of competitive fringe on the wholesale price is more pronounced 
when the downstream market is served by just a few traders (since n+1/n is decreasing 
in n). 
 Comparing the wholesale price in the competitive fringe model with the price in 
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nK >+1 .          [29] 
 
This condition is more likely to hold if the quantity supplied by the competitive fringe is 
large and the quantity of traders on the downstream market is small. 
 Similar to the liberalized model with upstream duopoly the problem with 
increasing wholesale price after market liberalization is mitigated or under the condition 
[29] even completely eliminated. 
 
1.5 Discussion of the Results  
 
The models above point out a major problem associated with the liberalization of the 
Czech natural gas market. In particular, models R-M and L-M outline that in an 
environment with a single upstream supplier the wholesale price is not invariant to the 
changes in the downstream market structure. Considering the organization of the 
downstream market, in particular the withdrawal of end-user price regulation, the 
upstream monopoly is capable of capturing one-half of the originally regulated margin, 
i.e., the upstream monopoly increases the wholesale price offered to downstream traders 
(for further implications of this result see below). Interestingly, the upstream producer 
does so regardless of the number of downstream traders, provided that the average unit 
cost does not change with the number of traders. Therefore, the upstream producer 
adjusts the pricing strategy immediately after both regulation is withdrawn and contracts 
that were concluded before liberalization expire even if the downstream market is 
served only by the incumbent. In such a case the magnitude of the wholesale price 
increase is one-half of the previously regulated end-user price margin. Despite the 
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increasing wholesale price, a sufficient number of traders is capable of pushing the price 
below the formerly regulated price level, thus increasing consumer surplus.12 
Therefore, looking at the first pair of models analyzed in this paper, two main 
results can be drawn: 
1)  liberalization can achieve lower end-user prices if the number of traders 
is sufficiently high and 
2)  the upstream captures some of the benefits of liberalization by changing 
its pricing strategy and increasing the wholesale price.  
 Considering the first result, it might be very difficult to achieve a sufficiently 
high number of competitors even when all traders have the same conditions. One reason 
is the fact that larger gas traders benefit from the portfolio effect, i.e. the fact that the 
aggregated demand of many customers is smoother and more stable than the demand of 
a single customer, and coping with demand fluctuations is costly. The significance of 
this reason even increases in light of the second result: in comparison with the standard 
liberalization setup, when changes in the wholesale price are not considered (i.e. the 
whole formerly regulated margin is competed away by entrants), the minimum efficient 
number of traders is higher13 when the upstream producer responds to the market 
change. 
 As for the second main result, it hints at why it might be difficult to reach the 
liberalized competitive state. It shows that the non-emergence of new traders might be 
partly caused by the fact that upstream producers, expecting a competitive liberalized 
outcome, adapt their pricing strategies to the new conditions, and thus charge a higher 
wholesale price to new traders. In turn the entrants cannot compete with the incumbent 
to whom the upstream producer(s) supply gas for a price that has been set some time 
                                                 
12 The theoretical calculations in this paper do not provide a concrete indication of what a “sufficient 
number” is. However, due to the change in the pricing of the upstream producer this number is higher 
than the number of traders required in the case of an exogenous price (e.g. in the case of perfect 
competition on the upstream level). 
13 It can be shown that the minimum efficient number of traders, defined as the minimum number of 
traders required to push the end-user price below the end-user price in the regulated pre-liberalization 





=∆ , where m is the formerly regulated margin of the incumbent and 
0
wm  is the profit margin of 
the upstream producer before market liberalization.  
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before liberalization and that cannot change until the long-term supply contracts 
between the incumbent and the producers expire.  
 As a response to the increasing wholesale price after market liberalization I 
analyze two models that could help mitigate or even completely eliminate the problem. 
Both of these models, upstream duopoly and competitive fringe, eliminate the upstream 
monopoly and show that if these kinds of structures are established together with market 
opening, the increase in the wholesale price is less pronounced or under some 
conditions even non-existent. Naturally, it might be very difficult to change the 
upstream structure and schedule such change simultaneously with the downstream 
market liberalization. However, in fact it is not necessary to actually change the 
upstream structure; instead, it is sufficient to change the behavior of the upstream 
monopoly by making it believe that the settings have changed. In particular, if the 
upstream monopoly is not able to distinguish the individual downstream markets and 
instead of optimizing over a single market it optimizes over several markets, some of 
which are served also by other upstream producers, the dominant upstream producer 
acts as if competition were introduced on the upstream level. Furthermore, if this 
merging of the downstream markets is implemented at the same time as market 
liberalization, the problem with the increasing wholesale price might be mitigated or 
even completely eliminated. Therefore, as a policy recommendation, multinational 
companies should be encouraged to operate on several similar markets14 that are served 






                                                 
14 The recommendation that the countries should be similar is quite important here. If two different 
markets with two completely different demand functions and thus also price levels merge, the resulting 
price will be somewhere in between the two original prices, which clearly does not benefit the country 
with the lower price. On the other hand, if the demand functions of two countries are identical or if the 
ratio of the intercept and the slope of the demand functions are the same, the optimization over the 
merged demand function yields the same results as the optimization over only one of the demand 




I use successive oligopoly models to analyze the Czech natural gas market with a 
special focus on the impact of the response of the upstream producer to market 
liberalization and on the organization of storage. The comparison of the benchmark pre-
liberalization model with a liberalized scenario uncovers obstacles on the path to 
efficient liberalization. The main result of the investigation is that, although a 
sufficiently high number of competitors might ultimately drive the price down below 
the pre-liberalization level sometime in the future, the outcome is hindered by the fact 
that upstream producers are capable of capturing a significant share of the formerly 
regulated price margin. This change in the price, coupled with the existence of long-
term supply contracts concluded by the established players under the old pricing 
strategy, prevents new traders from reaching a competitive gas supply and thus entering 
the market. 
However, the problem with the increasing wholesale price after market 
liberalization might be mitigated or even reversed if more competition is introduced to 
the upstream level simultaneously with market liberalization. This development of 
upstream competition does not necessarily have to be implemented by bringing in new 
upstream producers; instead, if multinational companies operate on several similar 
markets with various upstream suppliers the upstream producers cannot distinguish the 
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What Role Does Storage Play in the Liberalization of 





Focusing on the liberalization of the natural gas market in the Czech Republic, in this 
paper I explore the impact of the structure of natural gas storage on the development of 
competition and prices after market liberalization. I extend standard Cournot models to 
understand current and likely future developments, paying particular attention to the 
impact of market liberalization on a country characterized by a lack of domestic 
production, limited foreign upstream competition, and highly concentrated (and 
bundled) control over an essential input in the production of the final product: gas 
storage. I show that bundled and unregulated control over storage does not promote 
competition. When ownership unbundling of storage is implemented simply by 
transferring the facilities to a separate company, lack of further mechanisms enables the 
storage operator to use its market power and set high prices for the storage service, 
leading to a loss in consumer welfare in comparison with the pre-liberalization case. On 
the other hand, consumers might benefit from higher welfare if access to storage service 
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The liberalization of natural gas markets, which has been underway in the European 
Union for over a decade now, influences all parts of the natural gas supply chain. 
Natural gas storage, which is a crucial part of the natural gas supply chain, is also 
affected by the changes in the structure and rules of the market. In turn, the changes 
implemented for natural gas storage and its structure have a great influence on the 
functioning of the natural gas market. In this paper I analyze the impacts of various 
natural gas storage structures on the natural gas market, placing it into a setting with 
very limited upstream competition, e.g., the Czech Republic. I investigate several 
natural gas storage scenarios to determine the response of market players and examine 
which scenario is likely to benefit consumers the most. I use and further develop 
successive oligopoly models from the preceding chapter to find that the storage 
structure is crucial for the development of competition on the market and improper 
structure might prevent entry. Storage is thus one of the factors that contribute to the 
slow emergence of competition on the Czech natural gas market after its liberalization. 
In particular, I show that efficient market liberalization is inhibited by the concentrated 
ownership of the gas storage structure and a simple unbundling of ownership cannot 
overcome these impediments. These results stem from comparisons of the pre-
liberalization steady state with long-run steady states achieved under various scenarios 
of the liberalized setup after all players adjust to the structural changes of the market. 
 
 
2.2 The Czech Natural Gas Market 
 
Until recently the Czech natural gas industry was a state-owned and -regulated 
monopoly. In 2002, the whole sector was privatized and the majority (the bundled 
transmission system, storage system operator and importer and six out of eight 
distribution companies) was sold to the German company RWE.15 In line with EU 
Directive 2003/55/EC and the Czech Energy Act, the incumbent was forced to 
                                                 
15 In this paper I will use the term incumbent to refer to the companies of the RWE Group. 
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implement the legal unbundling of its activities, i.e., to separate physical transmission 
and import, physical distribution and sale,16 and to provide network services 
(transmission and distribution) to other gas companies on a non-discriminatory basis. It 
has also implemented legal unbundling of natural gas storage, which is an essential 
input for the production of the final product, used to cover seasonal and day-to-day 
fluctuations in gas consumption. The incumbent now owns six storage facilities (out of 
eight in the Czech Republic) and had long-term lease contracts for much of the 
remaining storage used for the Czech Republic immediately after market opening. 
Although there are some tools that the Czech authorities could have used and might use 
to control the storage price and access to storage, such as penalties in case the 
incumbent abuses its dominant position, there is no direct regulation mechanism 
established. Due to this the storage structure was, especially in the years immediately 
following the market opening, something between regulated access and the incumbent’s 
monopoly. 
 Despite the legal separation of storage and other measures to promote 
liberalization, which started in 2005, the emergence of new players on the market has 
been slow. In 2009 the incumbent lost only about 10% of its market share and even 
claims that some customers, who previously switched to a new supplier, are coming 
back to the incumbent (HN 2009). 2010 saw the development of further competition. 
The incumbent claimed that its share in the large industrial customers segment is 
dropping to close to 40%; on the other hand the incumbent’s share in the household 
segment remains high, over 80% (LN 2010). 
 
2.3 Existing Literature 
 
Much of the literature used in this paper is identical to the literature described in the 
preceding chapter (the influence of the upstream monopoly). The models below are 
based on standard industrial organization models of Cournot and Stackelberg 
competition (e.g., Tirole (1988), Shy (1995)). A relevant variant of these models was 
                                                 
16 The joint importer and transmission system operator was obliged to unbundle starting January 1, 2006. 
The distribution companies were obliged to unbundle into distribution system operators and trader-sellers 
starting January 1, 2007. 
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formulated by Greenhut and Ohta (1979), who use a market structure consisting of an 
upstream and downstream level—successive oligopoly—to investigate the effects of 
vertical integration. For a full review of the literature that is based on these models and 
that is relevant for the natural gas sector, please refer to the previous chapter of the 
dissertation. 
Perhaps the most relevant model is Nese and Straume (2005), who use a 
successive oligopoly structure with two upstream producing countries, which they 
believe has the highest relevance in particular for the European natural gas market, to 
analyze the strategic behavior of policy makers in setting taxes. Their results are 
interesting in that they show how a decision on one level influences the other level and 
the wholesale and end-user price. However, their paper, which focuses primarily on 
strategic trade policy, does not consider gas storage, downstream costs other than the 
wholesale price and a tax or market liberalization. 
Most of the existing literature does not capture the real existing situation in the 
storage sector (in particular in the Czech Republic) or completely misses the crucial 
component of natural gas supply, for which an empirically observed as well as 
realistically contemplated structure should be considered. Egging and Gabriel (2005) 
consider perfectly competitive and capacity-constrained storage. Golombek and 
Gjelsvik (1995) and Golombek et al. (1998) use fixed storage prices derived from the 
standard rate of return, which is common in the natural gas sector. Boots et al. (2004) 
use a similar approach. Holz and Kalashnikov (2005) and Nese and Straume (2005) do 
not consider storage at all. My investigation addresses the issue using a full two-tier 
successive oligopoly structure augmented with storage and makes a direct comparison 
of the situation before and after liberalization, allowing me to identify and analyze 
problems associated with market opening and the structure of storage.  
 
2.4 The Models 
 
The models used in this paper are based on the same building blocks as in the preceding 
chapter. I again use Cournot competition and successive oligopoly models to capture the 
natural gas market. Again, I assume the upstream segment to consist of a single 
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producer while the configuration of the downstream segment depends on the discussed 
scenario.  
However, I extend these models by introducing natural gas storage. The 
possibility to store natural gas (usually in underground storage facilities) is a very 
important aspect of the natural gas sector, which distinguishes it, e.g., from the 
electricity industry. Due to this feature it is possible to uniformly use the full capacity of 
transit pipelines all year round regardless of the seasonal fluctuations in the downstream 
demand for gas (provided that storage is close to the place of consumption).17  
 In the following section I incorporate storage into the model of the natural gas 
market described in the preceding chapter. For the sake of calculation, I simplify the 
structure as follows: Instead of considering a (possibly different) demand schedule18 for 
each firm, I split the gas year into high season (winter) and low season (summer) and 
consider a fixed ratio of consumption in high and low seasons, denoted by γ. This 
abstraction is in fact not that far from reality. Although the consumption curve of each 
firm is necessary for correctly supplying the right amount of gas each day (and in fact 
each hour), from the perspective of working gas storage capacity and the determination 
of prices of storage capacity, all that is necessary is the amount of gas that will be 
injected into the storage facility in the low season and consequently extracted from the 
storage facility in the high season, i.e., the certain volume of capacity needed to 
accommodate the consumer. Moreover, the assumption that the seasonal consumption 
ratio γ is the same throughout the economy does not necessarily mean that all firms 
have the same consumption profile but rather that all traders have the same mix of 
customers. Using equations to capture these features, a trader supplying quantity qi to 
the market will deliver iHi qq γ=  in the high season and iLi qq )1( γ−=   in the low 
season where 5.0≥γ . Therefore, if the supply of gas from producers to traders is 
                                                 
17 In fact foreign gas supply through long-distance transit pipelines is usually not absolutely uniform 
throughout the year as producers usually offer contracts with a certain band for fluctuations (e.g., +/- 
20%). However, this bandwidth is far from sufficient to cover the difference between winter and summer 
consumption. In the analysis below I abstract from this option since the only difference for my 
investigation would be lower demand for storage capacity, i.e., a lower parameter γ, which is, in the case 
of closed form solutions without numerical results, irrelevant. 
18 Instead of a simple demand curve qpD →: , consumers are best characterized by a demand function 
that transforms the price of natural gas p into a function that captures the demanded consumption for each 
day of the year.  
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uniform over the seasons and equal to 
2
iq , in the low season it is necessary to 
accumulate a volume of gas equal to the difference between the volume actually 















qqq ,        [1] 
 
which is also the required storage capacity for the given year. Having specified the basic 
principles of natural gas storage and seasonal consumption, it is now possible to 
elaborate models of the whole economy taking into account the market structure. In all 
models below I use the approach reflected in the preceding chapter (i.e., endogenous 
wholesale price), where upstream traders react to the change in the downstream 
structure, which is exactly what every profit-driven firm should do.  
I start with benchmark model 1 prior to liberalization and then I look at three 
possible market development scenarios: In model 2ab, storage is unregulated and 
controlled by the incumbent; in model 3as, storage is owned by a separate entity and 
unregulated; in model 4ar, storage is controlled by the incumbent, however, the storage 
price is regulated. 
 
2.4.1 Model 1 
• regulated downstream monopoly also owns all storage facilities 
• upstream monopoly  
 
Model 1 captures the situation on the Czech natural gas market prior to liberalization. 
The downstream segment consists of a single regulated monopolist who also owns all 
storage facilities. Denoting the unit cost (constant marginal cost) of storage capacity as 



















1γssc  instead of c in all results of model 1 gives the results summarized 
in the following table. 
 
 
Model 1 Summary Table 
Variable Expression 
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2.4.2 Model 2ab 
• liberalized downstream  
• storage controlled by incumbent 
• upstream monopoly  
 
In this model I assume that one of the downstream traders, the incumbent, controls the 
storage capacity. This model is an extreme interpretation of the situation on the Czech 
natural gas market, where the former regulated monopoly has controlled all of the 
domestic storage capacity and still controls most of it.19 In reality, the regulatory 
                                                 
19 In the Czech Republic there are eight underground gas storage facilities of which six are owned by 




authorities do have some tools to control storage; nevertheless, it is interesting to see 
what happens if storage is left unregulated.  
Intuitively, such a setup enables the incumbent to keep other traders from 
entering the market. The following section analyzes this problem.  




























11 γγπ ,  [3] 
 
which is highest when the quantity supplied by the other traders is zero. In order to 
achieve this, the trader/storage operator sets the storage prices to a sufficiently high 
level to drive away all competing traders and behaves as a monopoly on the whole 
market, i.e., the operator sets the storage price so that the unit cost of each trader (which 
includes the artificially exaggerated storage price) is higher than the monopoly end-user 
price.20  


















1 γ .      [4] 
 
This result can be used for the analysis of the behavior of the upstream producer. 
Since both the downstream trader/storage operator and the upstream producer are 
monopolists on their segments, the overall economy has a structure of a successive 
monopoly. This structure was investigated by Spengler [1950] and further developed by 
e.g., Tirole (1988, pp. 169–198) and is now known as double marginalization. Under 
this structure both monopolists successively exercise their monopolistic powers, which 
results in a situation that is worse for the consumers (higher prices and lower quantity 
supplied) than in the case of a vertically integrated monopolist.  
The upstream producer optimizes his profit 
                                                 








1γ  .  
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which gives the results summarized in the following table.  
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 The results of this model are not surprising: by controlling the storage facilities, 
an essential input in the supply of gas to end-users, the bundled trader and storage 
operator is capable of using its monopolistic power on the downstream segment to 
exploit the market. However, the extent to which this model currently applies to Czech 
natural gas is questionable—see the discussion of the results. 
 
2.4.3 Model 3as 
• liberalized downstream  
• storage owned by separate monopoly  
• upstream monopoly 
 
In this model the downstream segment consists of traders who purchase natural gas 
from the upstream monopolistic producer and storage services (storage capacity) from a 
separate monopolistic storage operator. This setup does not reflect the actual situation 
on the Czech market since Czech storage facilities are currently controlled by the 
incumbent. However, it is one of the possible scenarios of further development. In fact, 
 44 
it is a very relevant scenario as ownership unbundling is advocated by the EU as a 
liberalization-promoting measure.  
Since the unit storage cost (in the sense of the cost of storage per unit of gas 









 −= γ ,         [6]  
 
where ps is the storage price charged by the storage operator, and the profit of 
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Due to the concavity of the profit with respect to the quantity supplied, the optimal 
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1 γγγ . [9] 
 
This can now be used to define the storage operator’s problem as a simple profit 
maximization exercise where the objective profit function is 
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1 γγπ , 
[10] 
 
where ss is the unit storage cost of the storage system operator. Due to the concavity of 
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Now let’s investigate the optimal behavior of the upstream producer given the 
downstream structure. The upstream monopolistic producer maximizes his profit, which 
is defined as  
 
)(*)( sppQ ww −=Π  ,        [13] 
 




































=Π ∑ γ . [14] 
This function is again concave so FOC can be used to obtain the results. 
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 It is worth noting that the storage monopoly does not influence the wholesale 
price. The wholesale price of model 3as is similar to the wholesale price of model L-M 
in the preceding chapter, now only the storage cost is added to the trader’s unit cost. 
Consequently, it is possible to observe the same development of the wholesale price 
after market liberalization as in the models in the preceding chapter, i.e., half of the 
original margin of the regulated monopoly is captured in an unregulated environment by 
the upstream producer due to which the wholesale price increases. 
Where the monopolist structure of the storage matters is the downstream market. 
Let us therefore take a look at what happens as n gets large (the number of downstream 
traders increases). The end-user price in this case converges to the perfect competition 




















1,3 γ .      [15] 
 
In comparison with model L-M in the preceding chapter, the end-user price is now 
driven more by the demand function than the actual costs.21 
                                                 






ap compMLe , whereas in model 3as, the 






ap compase . The first term of each equation b
a  is the limit 
price, i.e., the price for which the quantity demanded is zero. 
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 Moving to a comparison with model 2ab, notice that the results of model 2ab are 
identical to the results of model 3as under perfect competition and are better from the 
perspective of the consumers than in model 3as when perfect competition is not 
achieved (i.e., the end-user price is smaller). This might seem surprising at first glance; 
however, there is a straightforward explanation. While in model 2ab there is double 
marginalization, i.e., two monopolies successively charge a markup on the costs, in 
model 3as the markup is added on three levels. By splitting the bundled trader and 
storage operator, another level is created. Even though the lowest trading level is not 
monopolistic (there are n traders), unless there is perfect competition these traders 
charge prices above the unit costs which results in “triple marginalization.” Similar to 
vertical integration being preferred by end users over two successive monopolies (as 
shown, e.g., by Tirole (1988)), two successive monopolies are preferred over a 
configuration with three levels, of which two are monopolistic and the lowest one is 
oligopolistic. In other words, although not optimal, double marginalization is preferred 
over triple marginalization. 
 
2.4.4 Model 4ar 
• liberalized downstream  
• storage owned by the incumbent 
• upstream monopoly  
• regulator sets the storage price  
 
In this model I introduce a regulator (an analogue of the Czech Energy Regulatory 
Office) who has the power to set the price of storage services. This is the polar opposite 
of model 2ab (unregulated storage controlled by the incumbent). It reflects the fact that, 
although storage prices are currently not directly regulated, the Czech Energy 
Regulatory Office can regulate (and in fact until the beginning of 2007 did regulate) 
end-user prices and both the ERO and the Czech anti-monopoly office have the power 
to impose fines on the incumbent in cases when they discover that the incumbent has 
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abused its dominant position.22 Moreover, the EU directive 2003/55/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas requires negotiated or regulated 
access to storage, therefore storage regulation should be considered as one of the two 
feasible approaches.23 
This model consists of an upstream monopoly and downstream (Cournot) 
competition with trader 1 being also the monopolistic storage operator with regulated 
prices of storage services. To solve the model I will follow the usual procedure starting 
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1γπ  for ni ,..,2= ,    [17] 
 
which is also concave with respect to qi. The maximum values of the profit are thus 
derived from the first order conditions with respect to the quantities. These form a 
system of n linear equations that can be solved to obtain the quantities and prices. The 











































ssw γγ ,  [18] 
 
while other traders supply 
                                                 
22 On 26 May 2006, the ERO imposed a fine of CZK 14.7 million on four gas companies from the RWE 
group for breaching the Act on Prices (ERO press release from May 2006). The proceedings were 
initiated after complaints of newly eligible customers concerning increasing gas prices in 2005. The 
Czech Office for the Protection of Competition (OPC, often referred to as the anti-monopoly office) 
imposed a fine of CZK 370 million on RWE Transgas on 11 August 2006 for abusing its dominant 
position (although this fine not yet been enforced, the company has filed an appeal). One of the 
mentioned reasons for the penalty was that the price of storage services for eligible customers was too 
high (OPC press release August 2006).  




































































































































Q γγ . [20] 
 
This quantity is now used by the upstream monopolist to maximize his profit. The profit 
function of the upstream monopoly is 
( ) ( ) ( )sppbncbsbbcnbpna
n



























This function is concave in the wholesale price so the first order condition gives the 
maximum profit and the results are summarized in the following table. 
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Total 
quantity 




































































































































1,4 γ  
 
 The expression for the wholesale price is very similar to previous models, in 
particular models 2ab and 3as. The main difference is that the average unit cost is not 
constant, i.e., it depends on the number of traders. Provided that the storage price is 
higher than the storage cost, the average unit cost is increasing in the number of traders 
n due to which the wholesale price is decreasing in n. As for the comparison with the 
regulated case of model 1, the results are not as straightforward as in the previous 
models. If the storage price margin is high, it might even happen that the wholesale 
price will decline after liberalization. On the other hand, a high storage price margin has 
a detrimental effect on the end-user price as it increases the average unit cost. 
Examining the effect of an extra downstream trader on the end-user price 
 













































11 γγ ,   [22] 
 
it might even happen that increased competition in combination with high storage prices 
will lead to higher end-user prices, i.e., the increase in average unit cost prevails over 
the benefits brought by a higher number of traders. This can be seen from equation [22] 
where the first part is positive (the limit price minus the total unit cost of trader i > 1), 
whereas the second part, the negative value of the storage price margin, is negative. 
Nevertheless, if the storage price is set “reasonably”, liberalization leads to lower end-
user prices and higher wholesale prices.   
It is worth noting that these results are interior solution results; if the storage 
price margin is too high, it might turn out to be optimal for trader 1 to supply the whole 
market at a price below the cost price of the other traders (i.e., if the monopoly price is 
below the unit cost of other traders). 
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Comparison of models 1, 2ab, 3as, 4ar  
Variable Model 1 Model 2ab Model 3as Model 4ar 
Wholesale 
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2.5 Discussion of the Results  
 
The models above point out some problems associated with the liberalization of the 
Czech natural gas market and the selection of the storage structure. On top of the 
models described in the preceding chapter, in model 1 I introduce storage as a necessary 
input for the supply of gas to end-users. If I were to consider storage as an input 
supplied competitively at an exogenous price, the results from models R-M and L-M 
would not change. However, the difference rests in the scarcity of this input and the 
control of its production facilities. While in model 1 there is no explicit storage price 
charged as storage facilities are owned by the monopolistic trader, two different 
scenarios are presented in models 2ab and 3as: in model 2ab storage is controlled by the 
incumbent trader and in model 3as the storage operator is a separate storage monopoly.  
 Model 2ab, whose storage structure is one extreme interpretation of the reality, 
yields the results that were expected. The bundled trader and storage operator charges 
excessively high storage prices to prohibit other traders from entering the market. The 
response of the Energy Regulatory Office to the sharp increase in end-user prices after 
the first step of market liberalization and to the non-emergence of competition suggests 
that this model is (or at least was) not completely irrelevant for the Czech Republic as it 
provides a rationalization of the fines imposed on the incumbent for abusing his 
dominant position. However, no clear straightforward conclusion can be drawn on this 
topic, as there are potential confounds to this explanation. In its press releases, the 
incumbent naturally denied the accusations of charging excessively high prices, stating 
that prices had risen only because of rising prices of natural gas substitutes (oils) and the 
price formula in contracts with foreign gas producers includes a component reflecting 
the market price of oil.24 
                                                 
24 The average monthly price of Brent oil increased from USD 44.23 per barrel in January to USD 64.12 
per barrel in August, i.e., by almost 50% (Source: International Energy Agency). 
There are two more reasons that support the opinion that the complaints are exaggerated and which might 
have contributed to the difference in the increase of prices for captive and eligible customers. One reason 
is that the price for captive customers was regulated and is adjusted on a quarterly basis as a result of 
which its development lags behind market price development. ERO was thus capable of buffering the 
effect of rising commodity prices by spreading the price increase into several periods. The second reason 
why the difference between the increase in prices for captive and eligible customers seems so high (17–
19% vs. 30–40%) is the fact that the commodity component of the final price is greater for large-volume 
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One straightforward and at first glance viable solution to the problem of bundled 
storage control is the full ownership unbundling of the incumbent, which is captured in 
model 3as. In this model there is a separate storage owner. However, since this separate 
storage operator is a monopoly in storage services, the final outcome is even worse than 
in the bundled case of model 2ab. Instead of double marginalization presented in the 
bundled model, the unbundled model exhibits triple marginalization, i.e., markups are 
successively added by domestic traders, the separate storage monopoly and the 
upstream producer. Only if perfect downstream competition is achieved are the results 
identical with the results of the bundled model 2ab. This shows that in the case of 
storage monopoly the unbundling of storage services, even though it ensures equity 
among individual traders, is from the perspective of the end-user inferior to the 
regulated model 1 as well as the bundled model 2ab with a single domestic 
monopolistic trader. This result contradicts the results of Van Koten (2006), who, in a 
different setting in which a (partially) vertically integrated auctioneer and bidder 
participate in an electricity transmission capacity auction, concludes that vertical 
integration or incomplete unbundling is from the perspective of welfare inferior to 
complete ownership unbundling. This difference in conclusions is due to the differences 
in the structures of the analyzed problems, in particular due to the fact that my analysis 
treats the storage operator as a Stackelberg leader who is able to optimize over the 
downstream, whereas in Van Koten’s work, the seller markets the capacity using 
auctions and thus his powers are relatively weaker. 
As one of the two options of the second EU gas directive (55/2006/EC), I 
introduce the regulation of access to storage to the analyzed models. This is done in 
model 4ar where the extending assumption is that storage price is set by the regulator. 
When examining this model it turns out that the wholesale price is no longer 
independent of the number of downstream traders. This is due to the asymmetricity in 
the storage costs: while trader 1 (bundled trader and storage operator) pays only the 
direct storage cost, other traders pay the regulated storage price. The wholesale price 
can be expressed as  
 
                                                                                                                                               
customers than for households. Therefore, the same increase in the commodity price will lead to a smaller 

































13 γγ ,    [23] 
 
where ms is the regulated storage price margin. In comparison to model L-M, the second 
component is new. A similar expression may be obtained for the end-user price:  
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Notice that the wholesale price is decreasing and the end-user price is increasing in the 
storage price margin. This has a serious impact for the economy. If the margin is set low 
or even negative so as to promote competition and favor new traders over the 
incumbent, the wholesale price charged by the upstream producer increases, and in the 
case of a negative storage price margin even exceeds the wholesale price of model L-M. 
On the other hand, the high regulated storage margin increases the end-user price and 
favors the incumbent, which is clearly not the desired effect of market liberalization. 
Nevertheless, if the storage margin is not too high in comparison with the formerly 













11 γ ,         [25] 
 
the wholesale price after liberalization increases similar to models R-M and L-M of the 
preceding chapter. The violation of this inequality would mean that the regulator allows 
the storage operator to earn such a high margin on storage that the end-user price under 
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This is clearly not the desired outcome of liberalization and will not be supported in the 
long-term.  
One more important observation drawn from this model concerns the timing of 
the change in the pricing strategy of the upstream producer. Similar to model L-M, the 
upstream producer does not wait to change the pricing strategy only after new traders 
enter the downstream market. The upstream producer adjusts the pricing strategy 
immediately after both regulation is withdrawn and contracts concluded before 
liberalization expire, even if the downstream market is served only by the incumbent. In 
such a case the magnitude of the wholesale price increase is, similar to models without 
storage, one-half of the previously regulated end-user price margin. 
 Similar to the comparison of the models R-M and L-M without storage 
structures from the preceding chapter, the pair of regulated/liberalized models 1 and 4ar 
shows two results. Firstly, liberalization can achieve lower end-user prices if the 
number of traders is sufficiently high; secondly, the upstream captures some of the 
benefits of liberalization by changing its pricing strategy and increasing the wholesale 
price. These two results and the feasibility of creating a competitive market are already 




I have used successive oligopoly models to analyze the Czech natural gas market with a 
special focus on the impact of the organization of storage. The comparisons of the 
benchmark pre-liberalization models with the liberalized scenarios with storage yield 
results similar to the results derived from models without storage. Namely, although a 
sufficiently high number of competitors might ultimately drive the price down below 
the pre-liberalization level sometime in the future, the outcome is hindered by the fact 
that upstream producers are capable of capturing a significant share of the formerly 
regulated price margin.  
As for the storage structure, from the perspective of the consumer, regulated 
storage outperforms both a bundled and even more significantly an unbundled storage 
monopoly. In light of these results, the ownership unbundling of storage to a single 
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company, which is left unconstrained to set the quantity (or price) of storage services 
provided on the market, should definitely be rejected as the worst alternative from the 
perspective of consumer welfare. Although the ownership unbundling to a single 
separate company considered in this paper ensures non-discriminatory access for 
traders, if it is to yield higher welfare to consumers it has to be coupled with some kind 
of mechanism, perhaps auctions legislatively established by the regulator, that would 
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Investigating the Effect of Ownership Unbundling on 






One of the most debated measures of the recently ratified third energy liberalization 
package is the ownership unbundling of the transmission system operator from the 
supply and generation function in all EU member states. In this paper I empirically 
investigate whether ownership unbundling has an effect on the prices of electricity for 
both industrial and household customers in those countries where it has been already 
implemented. I find that ownership unbundling does play a significant role in the 
development of prices. I also find that the effect of ownership unbundling differs across 
countries and in particular that it is related to the institutional quality of a country. In 
countries with good institutional quality, much of the benefit of market opening was 
realized without ownership unbundling and the more perfect separation of the 
transmission system operator is accompanied by price stagnation or increase. On the 
other hand a decline in electricity prices due to ownership unbundling may be expected 
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In September 2007 the European Commission unveiled the third energy liberalization 
package, a set of legislative proposals aimed at further promoting competition on the 
European energy markets and progressing towards a single European internal energy 
market. Motivated by the malfunctioning of the European energy market as described in 
the European Commission sector inquiry EC (2007e), the third energy liberalization 
package advocated a set of more stringent measures and raised a debate concerning its 
true effects. One of the key issues revolved, and still revolves, around the need to more 
thoroughly separate energy production and supply from transmission networks, either in 
the form of ownership unbundling, the form of an independent system operator or an 
even weaker form of an independent transmission operator. In this paper I aim to shed 
more light on what the effect of ownership unbundling of electricity transmission 
system operators (TSO) is likely to be by empirically investigating the effects of such a 
structure in countries where this arrangement has been already implemented relative to 
countries where an imperfect separation of electricity transmission and electricity 
generation and supply persists. This investigation offers evidence based on data from all 
EU member states to which the legislation applies as to whether ownership unbundling 
in fact promotes competition or whether it is a redundant measure restricting the 
ownership rights of vertically integrated utilities and leads to unnecessary restructuring 
costs. Using a system of seemingly unrelated regressions to enhance the efficiency of 
the estimates, I jointly estimate price equations for industrial customers and households. 
I use the level of the institutional quality of a country to explain the differing effect of 
ownership unbundling and market opening identified across different countries or 
regions in previous studies. 
 
3.2 The Sector Inquiry and the Third Energy Package 
 
In 2005 the European Commission launched an investigation of the competition on 
energy markets in Europe in response to complaints from consumers and new entrants. 
The final report of this inquiry, published in January 2007, identified several key 
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problems that prevented the emergence of new competitors, drove energy prices up and 
limited consumers in their choice of suppliers. Insufficient unbundling of vertically 
integrated utilities was one of the main reasons for the unsatisfactory market 
developments besides excessive concentration, lack of liquidity, little cross-border 
integration and lack of transparency, among others. 
As a follow-up to the sector inquiry, the European Commission came up with a 
set of legislative proposals, called the third energy liberalization package, which 
amended the existing gas and electricity directives and regulations.25 In order to ensure 
truly equal and non-discriminative access to networks and to foster investment into the 
construction of new transmission capacities where they are needed the most, the key 
measure of the new proposed legislation was the separation of production and supply 
from transmission applicable to both EU companies and non-EU entities wishing to 
engage in the energy business in the EU. According to the originally proposed 
legislative package this separation should have been implemented either in the form of 
ownership unbundling (strongly preferred) or in the form of legal unbundling coupled 
with the so-called Independent System Operator model, under which it is “possible for 
existing vertically integrated companies to retain network ownership, but provided that 
the assets are actually operated by a company or body completely independent from it” 
(ERPR (2007)). 
The proposals triggered a heated debate not just between EU officials and 
representatives of the business community but also among individual member states. On 
the one hand, some organizations welcomed the efforts. On the other hand, concerns 
about the effectiveness of such measures were expressed for example by representatives 
from German vertically integrated companies E.ON and RWE (Euractiv (2007)).26 
Finally, after a heated debate, all participants of the legislative process, i.e., the 
Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission 
and the Czech presidency of the European Union, agreed to a compromise that allowed 
a third option, the so-called Independent Transmission Operator, which is a weaker 
                                                 
25 For the original third energy package proposal see EC (2007a), EC (2007b), EC (2007c) and EC 
(2007d). 
26 E.ON’s concern was that unbundling doesn’t lead to lower prices while RWE’s concern was that 
unbundling would discourage investment and competition.   
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form of the ISO model.27 This compromise (EP&C (2009a), EP&C (2009b)) was finally 
ratified by the European Parliament on April 22, 2009, and officially approved by the 
Council on July 13, 2009. According to this new legislation the member states are 
obliged to implement provisions for the effective separation of transmission and 
generation by March 2012.  
 
3.3 The Pros and Cons of Ownership Unbundling  
 
Ownership unbundling is the most perfect form of the separation of companies. Article 
8 of the proposed amendment of electricity directive 2003/54/EC (EC (2007b)) and 
similarly also Article 7 of the proposed amendment of the gas directive 2003/55/EC (EC 
(2007c)) defines the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for a structure to 
qualify as ownership unbundling. The basic idea is that under ownership unbundling the 
transmission system operator is the owner of the transmission assets and is completely 
separated in terms of control from other companies that operate as suppliers or 
producers. In particular, in the least perfect case, a company (e.g., an investment fund) 
could hold minority shares in both the transmission system operator and the supply or 
generation (production) companies. However, it is forbidden for a transmission system 
                                                 
27 On June 6, 2008, the Council of the European Union, consisting of the ministers of EU member states 
responsible for energy or their deputies, met to further discuss this issue. Whereas all delegates supported 
the effective separation of supply and transmission activities, they could not reach a consensus concerning 
the actual form of this separation. Consequently, in addition to full ownership unbundling, the so-called 
“third option” (or independent transmission operator—ITO) supported by eight member states (Austria, 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia and the Slovak Republic, see EP (2008)) was 
approved by the Council, which was a somewhat weaker version of the ISO model presented by the 
European Commission (see CEU (2008)).  
The European Parliament responded to the Council’s decision separately for the electricity and the gas 
sector. On June 18, 2008, the European Parliament took a vote on the electricity directive and chose 
“ownership unbundling as the only option for electricity companies” (EP (2008)). On the other hand, at 
their plenary session on July 9, 2008, the European Parliament permitted both ownership unbundling and 
ITO as the form of separation for the gas sector (EP (2008b)). These decisions of the European 
Parliament constituted the first reading of the co-decision procedure of the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union. However, the legislative process requires a full consensus of the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in order for the laws to enter into force. In 
October 2008 the Council met again and slightly revised its position allowing three options for the 
separation of transmission for both the electricity and gas sector: ownership unbundling, ISO and ITO. In 
early 2009, representatives of the Czech presidency of the European Union, the European Parliament and 
the European Commission agreed to this compromise with the three options for the separation of the 
transmission system operator in both the electricity and gas sectors and this compromise was finally 
ratified by the European Parliament on April 22, 2009. 
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operator or its majority owner to hold any interest in a supply or generation company or 
for a supply or generation company or its majority holder to hold any interest in the 
transmission system operator. In cases when the transmission system operator is owned 
by the state and the state also owns generation or supply companies, the power to 
appoint company board members and to control the functioning of the companies 
should be clearly separated, e.g., by placing the companies under different ministries. 
The rationale for the ownership unbundling of the transmission system operator is 
based on the belief that the less-perfect separation methods leave room for practices of 
vertically integrated utilities that inhibit competition. There are several ways how 
integrated or imperfectly separated companies may use their power to hinder 
competition.  
• As evidenced by Lowe at al. (2007) on the case of an incumbent vertically 
integrated utility, integrated companies might try to inhibit non-discriminatory 
third party access. 
• Van Koten (2006) and Van Koten (2007) show that imperfect unbundling (both 
full integration and legal unbundling) of the TSO distorts the incentives in 
auctions of transmission capacity where the auctioneer and one of the bidders are 
affiliated leading to higher transmission prices and lower welfare. 
• Integrated companies might try to transfer some of the costs from the trading to 
the transmission division thus increasing the transmission price for all other 
traders. As Davies and Price (2007) note, in UK the regulator intervened in 1999 
moving one-fifth of the costs of distribution companies from the distribution to the 
trading function.  
• Transmission system operators that form a part of vertically integrated utilities 
might curtail investment that would otherwise be efficient if this benefits the 
supply or generation division of the undertaking (e.g., investment into cross border 
infrastructure that would otherwise bring in competition as evidenced by the case 
of the Italian company ENI described by Lowe at al. (2007)). 
On the other hand, there are also reasons indicating that ownership unbundling 
may not be the ideal solution to the problems described above. Any restructuring, 
including the implementation of ownership unbundling, is costly and such costs could 
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be passed on to the consumers, increasing the price of energy. Furthermore, the 
separation of transmission from other activities could lead to an efficiency loss due to 
higher transaction costs and the inability to freely share all information among the 
separated entities. Another aspect, rather political than economic, is whether investors 
could be forced to sell shares in a company. Ownership unbundling could also result in 
a decline in the value of the formerly integrated company and thus a loss to investors.  
For a more elaborate review of the benefits and drawbacks of the ownership unbundling 
of transmission systems see, e.g., Pollitt (2007). 
 
3.4 Literature Review 
 
The empirical literature that investigates the performance of the electricity (or energy) 
sector following market liberalization focuses on different aspects of the deregulation 
process. Some focus on a mixture of countries (Zhang et al. (2005), Steiner (2001), 
Hattori and Tsutsui (2005), Steiner (2004), Nagayama (2007)) , while others investigate 
a specific confined group such as the old EU member states (Nielsen et al (2005), Ernst 
and Young (2006) , Fiorio et al. (2007)) or a single country (Davies and Price (2007)). 
Zhang et al. (2005) use a panel of 36 developing and transition countries in the 
period 1985—2003 to study the impact of competition, regulation and privatization on 
the performance of the electricity industry. Although they do not directly investigate the 
effect of ownership unbundling, they show that the key to achieving higher performance 
is higher competition whereas privatization and regulation play a smaller role. Thus, if 
ownership unbundling promotes competition, it should project into the performance of 
the electricity sector. 
Steiner (2001) uses a panel of 19 OECD countries in the period 1986–1996 to 
investigate the impact of electricity market reforms on the performance of the electricity 
sector represented also by the price of electricity for industrial customers and the ratio 
of electricity prices for industrial customers and households. One of the investigated 
aspects is the separation of generation from transmission. In the regressions she 
distinguishes only two categories: the presence or absence of any kind of unbundling. In 
her paper even accounting unbundling qualifies as unbundling. The impact of 
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unbundling on the price and the price ratio is consistently negative, however, it is not 
statistically significant.  
Hattori and Tsutsui (2005) build on Steiner 2001, using a panel of the same 19 
OECD countries but extending the time series to 1999. Similar to Steiner 2001, they 
estimate the impact of reforms on the price of electricity for industrial customers and the 
ratio of the prices for industrial customers and households. As one of the independent 
variables they include the unbundling of generation and transmission. However, they 
consider a company unbundled if there is at least legal unbundling. They found no 
statistically significant evidence of the benefits of unbundling.  
Steiner (2004) further develops her model in order to account for the possible 
endogeneity of the regulatory reform variables. She simultaneously estimates both the 
electricity sector performance equation (i.e., how does energy sector performance 
respond to regulatory changes such as unbundling) and the regulatory reform selection 
equation (i.e., the equation capturing the choice of the regulatory reform) for 29 
countries in the period 1986–1998. Similarly to her previous work she again defines 
unbundling as a separation of the activities at least on the accounting level. She shows 
that the impact of restructuring is overall good (price decrease) for industrial customers 
and bad (price increase) for households, however, it varies for various groups of 
countries from a decreasing effect on industrial and household customers in English-
speaking and Scandinavian countries to an increasing effect on industrial customers in 
South American countries. However, this paper does not disentangle the effects of 
market opening and unbundling, so the presented results in fact capture the effect of the 
entire restructuring in countries that have implemented ownership unbundling. 
Furthermore, the differing effects across different country groups beg the question what 
is driving the differences between the groups of countries. 
Nagayama (2007) uses a panel of 83 countries in the period 1985–2002 to 
investigate the effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity sector on prices for 
industrial customers and households. However, unbundling is not clearly defined as 
ownership unbundling (it seems to best correspond to legal unbundling). The paper 
claims that ownership unbundling on its own might lead to price increases and only 
when implemented along with other reforms can a price decline be expected.  
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Then there are also studies that focus more specifically on the European Union. 
Nielsen et al. (2005) investigate the effect of market opening in eight network 
industries, including the electricity and gas sector, in the EU-15 states in the period 
1990–2003. They find that unbundling is crucial for proper market opening of the 
electricity sector leading to lower prices and higher productivity, however, unbundling 
is not rigorously defined in the paper. They present a general methodology for the 
selection of a model (a static or dynamic panel model), but they do not show the 
specific results and equations. 
Another study, by Ernst and Young (2006) for the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry, again uses the EU-15 states, plus Norway, to investigate the development of 
electricity and gas prices upon reforms. However, the unbundling of the TSO (which is 
again not rigorously defined) is examined only for the gas sector in which case the 
authors claim that the presence of a TSO may lead to a 15% decline in gas prices. 
Conversely, Fiorio et al. (2007) come to a different conclusion for the EU-15 
states. In their investigation of the impact of the electricity market reform on electricity 
prices for households they find that countries with larger electricity sector disintegration 
(i.e., more perfect unbundling captured on a scale of 0 to 6) exhibit higher prices of 
electricity for households.  
Besides panels of different countries, some studies focus on a particular country, 
empirically investigating issues associated with unbundling in the country. Similar to 
the country panel studies, the results are again mixed. Davies and Price (2007) 
investigate the impact of the ownership unbundling of electricity distribution companies 
in the United Kingdom on the development of the market share of the incumbent in 
each region. They distinguish vertically integrated and separated (i.e., ownership 
unbundling) retail and distribution functions and find that the market share of integrated 
companies declines less than the market share of those incumbents who divested their 
physical distribution business. Thus they provide evidence that ownership unbundling 
fosters competition on the distribution level under the conditions of the UK market. 
However, the question of what the effect of ownership unbundling would be on the 
transmission level across several countries remains unanswered. 
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The conclusions reached by Iimi (2003) for the Vietnamese electricity sector 
contradict the results of Davies and Price (2007). The author investigates whether 
vertical integration of generation and transmission is more efficient than the separation 
of these two activities. Based on the estimated degree of economies of scale the author 
concludes that due to double marginalization the two functions should be owned by a 
single entity. 
Nillesen and Pollitt (2008) provide yet another country-specific paper, in this 
case focused on the ownership unbundling of electricity distribution in New Zealand. 
Some of their results seem to support the findings of Iimi (2003). In particular they 
claim that ownership unbundling in New Zealand did not lead to lower prices and 
brought about high one-off costs, network quality improvements, and a decline in 
operational costs, which however resulted in higher margins and not lower prices. 
Furthermore, the good effect of ownership unbundling was only temporary as the 
former vertically integrated supply/network companies were replaced by integrated 
generation/supply companies. 
It is clear from the literature above that despite the existence of studies aiming to 
investigate the effect of unbundling on the performance of the electricity sector, the 
results are very mixed and do not provide a clear answer for what the expected effect of 
ownership unbundling is. There are no studies of the impacts of the ownership 
unbundling of the transmission system operator that would focus on all countries that 
are subject to the legislation of the European Union and that capture the differences in 
the impacts of the reforms on different customer groups. This gap begs for further 
investigation with the most recent data, with a focus on EU member states and 
rigorously using the definition of unbundling according to the provisions of the 
applicable ratified legislation. This is exactly why I focus in this paper on all EU 
countries to which the third energy liberalization package applies and apply the 
framework of the third energy liberalization legislative package. Furthermore, noticing 
that differences in the results for various countries or country groups have been 
identified in previous papers, I use the institutional quality of a country as a variable 
that might determine the success or failure of the implementation of ownership 
unbundling and help explain the differences across countries. 
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3.5 The Model 
3.5.1 General Approach 
 
The basic method used for the identification of the effect of ownership unbundling is to 
use panel data econometric methods to regress the electricity market performance 
variable (price of electricity for industrial customers or households) on regulatory 
reform variables R plus a set of control variables X, which is the approach taken by 
Steiner (2001), Hattori and Tsutsui (2005), Zhang et al. (2005), Davies and Price 
(2007), Nielsen et al. (2005), Nagayama (2007) and Fiorio et al. (2007):  
 
tititiiti XRI εγββ +++= 0 ,   [1] 
 
where Iti is either the price for industrial customers or the price for households,28 Rti are 
regulatory reform variables and Xti are control variables. In line with most of the 
literature I treat the reforms as exogeneous unlike Steiner (2004), where the reforms are 
treated as endogeneous. I believe that this is a more proper approach given the set of 
countries that I am using and the investigated period. Whereas Steiner (2004) used a 
diverse set of countries from various parts of the world in the period 1986–1998, where 
the reform actions might be driven by various incentives and developments that are 
endogeneous in the particular country, I focus on EU member states throughout the 
period when market opening and ownership unbundling is requested by the EU 
legislation, and is thus exogeneous. 
 However, instead of running the regressions separately, I believe that it is more 
proper to treat the equations for the price for industrial customers and for the price of 
households as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions. Therefore, I use the 
methodology of Zellner (1962) and apply iterated feasible generalized least squares to 
estimate the pair of equations at the same time.29 To account for the panel data 
                                                 
28 To be consistent with Steiner (2001), Steiner (2004), Hattori and Tsutsui (2005) and Nagayama (2007), 
and to check the robustness of the results the sensitivity analysis section also includes estimates of 
equations where the ratio of the electricity prices for industrial customers and households is used as the 
dependent variable. 
29 This is the way I obtain maximum likelihood estimates; see Oberhofer and Kmenta (1974). 
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properties of the sample, I also use dummy variables to capture country-specific fixed 
effects (i.e., a least squares dummy variable estimation combined with SUR estimation). 
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where the superscripts I and H denote industrial customers and households, 
respectively, and Ii0β  and 
H
i0β are the country-specific fixed effects.  
As an alternative method to check the results of the straightforward price 
regressions and to test for the significance of ownership unbundling, in the sensitivity 
analysis section 3.7.1 I investigate also the development of the ratio of the electricity 
price for industrial customers over the electricity price for households. By subtracting 
[3] from [2] I receive 
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Unfortunately, since equation [4] is a linear combination of equations [2] and [3], the 
covariance matrix in the SUR estimation of all three equations is singular and a system 
of the three equations cannot be estimated at the same time. Therefore, I estimate the 
equations in pairs. In particular, I use the pair of price equations [2] and [3] as the base 
model and estimate also the ratio equation [4] each time with either equation [2] or [3] 
to check the robustness of the results. Since in the estimation of the ratio equation [4] 
together with either of the price equations the regressors on the price equation form a 
subset of the regressors of the ratio equation, SUR does not yield any extra efficiency 
for the price equation compared to the standard standalone least squares estimation of 
the price equation. Therefore, when I estimate the system with the ratio equation I report 
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only the estimates of the ratio equation and use them to check the consistency of the 
base model estimates. 
 
3.5.2 Choice of Regulatory Reform Variables 
 
The regulatory reform variables capture the development of the electricity market 
reform in each particular country. I focus in particular on two important components: 
market opening and ownership unbundling.  
In terms of market opening, I use dummy variables for the opening of the market 
for each particular customer group. The approach somewhat differs from other studies. 
For example, Nielsen et al (2005) and Ernst & Young (2006) use a continuous variable 
for the percentage of the eligible market. Nagayama (2007) uses a dummy variable 
equal to unity if at least some of the customers are eligible to choose their power 
supplier. Steiner (2001) uses the eligibility threshold as an independent variable. Unlike 
these studies, I match each customer category in each country with the exact date when 
this particular customer group became eligible. I believe that this approach better 
captures the underlying process since the prices for a particular customer group should 
change the most when the market is liberalized for that particular customer group. 
Ideally, after the opening of the market the price of electricity for the liberalized 
customer group should decline, which should be exhibited in the estimated coefficients 
for the dummy variables.  
To capture the impact of ownership unbundling, I use ownership unbundling 
dummies for those periods and countries when the TSO is separated in terms of the 
ownership from other electricity market activities. However, since ownership 
unbundling as such cannot achieve greater competition in markets that are not 
liberalized, I interact this dummy with the market opening for the particular investigated 
customer group. Therefore, I investigate the impact of ownership unbundling on the 
price of electricity for a particular customer group only after this customer group has 
become eligible to switch to a different supplier. 
To see how the price develops in the individual years before and after the reform 
I use several year-ahead and year-after dummies for both market opening and ownership 
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unbundling. This use of dummies for individual years of the reform is motivated for 
example by the development of prices in Sweden after market opening (where 
ownership unbundling was implemented) as described by the Sweden 2000 Report of 
the International Energy Agency: the prices rose immediately after market opening in 
1996 and declined to the original level in 1999 (IEA (2000)). Such a development can 
be justified for example by the one-off restructuring costs required for the unbundling or 
by the time required for competition to develop. 
To allow for a difference between new and old member states, I also include 
separate dummies for new member states. 
Moreover, I interact the reform dummies with the corruption perceptions index 
provided by Transparency International. This is motivated for example by Van Koten 
and Ortmann (2008), who find that the level of corruption plays a role in the selection of 
the unbundling regime, and thus it may also affect the quality of the implementation of 
the reforms and the differences in the price data between the old and new member states 
identified in preliminary estimations. Furthermore, Nagayama (2007) hints that 
unbundling (although general unbundling is considered instead of ownership 
unbundling) implemented on its own may lead to price increases, whereas when 
coupled with other regulatory reforms a negative decline can be expected. The use of 
the institutional quality level may also help to explain the differences across different 
regions identified by Steiner (2004). In this spirit, the institutional quality could play an 
important role in the determination of the effect of ownership unbundling on prices. 
However, it is not clear beforehand what effect of the institutional quality should be 
expected. On the one hand, countries with low institutional quality could exhibit a high 
potential (high original price level) for a price decline due to reform. On the other hand, 
in countries with high corruption levels, the reforms might be imperfectly implemented 
as the various state institutions are likely to be more prone to the influence of the 
vertically integrated incumbent.  
The details of the construction of the regulatory reform dummies are presented 
in Appendix No. 1. 
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3.5.3 Choice of Control Variables 
 
Various control variables were selected to account for the development of the price 
independent of the regulatory reform. These include the costs for electricity generation 
(e.g., the price of natural gas for industrial customers) as well as indicators describing 
the general development of the economy, in particular the gross domestic product at 
market prices expressed using a Euro-based price index and a consumer price index 
without the impact of energy. The control variables used are in general similar to those 
used in previous studies. Following Hattori and Tsutsui (2005) and Steiner (2004) I 
include the share of electricity produced in hydroelectric power plants and nuclear 
power plants to account for the differences in the generation costs. Similar to Hattori 
and Tsutsui (2005), Steiner (2004) and Davies and Price (2007) I use a trend coefficient 
to account for a possible unexplained exponential trend in the price series. Instead of the 
input fuel index used in Steiner (2004), I use the price of gas and the price of oil. Since 
the sample of countries that I am investigating is much less heterogeneous and more 
affected by the common EU legislation than the samples used in other studies, I do not 
include some other controls, such as telecom privatization and neighbor restructuring as 
used, e.g., in Steiner (2004), to account for the differences in the legislative framework 
and the surrounding environment of a more diverse set of countries.  
 
3.6 The Data 
 
For the investigation I use data published by Eurostat (electricity prices, gas prices, 
GDP, CPI, share of nuclear and hydro power plants), the European Commission 
(unbundling and market opening), national energy regulators (unbundling and market 
opening), the Energy Information Administration (oil prices), the International Energy 
Agency (unbundling and market opening) and Transparency International (corruption 
perceptions index). The used data has a half-yearly frequency, spans from 1996 to 2007 
and covers the 25 member states of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
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Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The remaining 
two states, Cyprus and Malta, are not included in the analysis due to the fact that they 
have a derogation from the energy market liberalization legislation since they are 
considered small isolated systems. 
 
3.6.1 Ownership Unbundling Data 
 
There is no single source of data that can be used to obtain precise information about the 
state of unbundling in individual member states. The general procedure that I used is as 
follows: I first consulted the benchmarking reports of the Directorate-General Transport 
and Energy of the European Commission on the progress in creating internal gas and 
electricity markets from 2000 to 2008 (CEC (2001), CEC (2003), CEC (2004), CEC 
(2005a), CEC (2005b), CEC (2007), CEC (2008), CEC (2009)) for a basic indication of 
the unbundling regime. Then I looked at the websites of the national regulators, 
transmission system operators and the International Energy Agency for the particular 
dates of the changes in the unbundling regime (i.e., the time when ownership 
unbundling was implemented in a particular country) and to verify the unbundling 
regime. 
The criteria that I use to assess whether ownership unbundling is properly 
implemented in a particular country are based on the definition of ownership 
unbundling as specified in the proposal of the European Commission (EC 2007 a-d) and 
as described in section 3.3. However, I am not as strict in cases when a) the 
transmission system operator is owned by the state or b) when a power generator/supply 
company owns a relatively small share of the transmission system operator.  
In the case of state ownership I do not rigorously require the transmission system 
operator and the generator/supply company to fall within the jurisdiction of different 
ministries. I believe that since ownership unbundling has yet not been required on the 
EU level, countries that opted for ownership unbundling, albeit state owned, really 
strive to make the market competitive and do not exercise joint control over the 
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companies to inhibit competition.30 Despite this more lenient definition of ownership 
unbundling I do not find any countries that would not have ownership unbundling 
according to the DGTREN benchmarking reports and would be classified as ownership 
unbundled according to this relaxed definition. 
The case of minority shares in the transmission system operator held by a power 
company active in supply or generation applies only to the case of Spain, where such 
minority share was limited by law in 1997 to 10% and in 2005 to 3% (add reference to 
the laws). In line with the DGTREN benchmarking reports and Energy I classify the 
Spanish transmission operator as unbundled in terms of ownership.  
Although, as I mention above, I have not changed the classification of any country from 
the DGTREN benchmarking reports that did not qualify for ownership unbundling, 
there were three countries for which I had to reject the reported ownership unbundling 
status. The first one of them is Finland where, however, according to the annual report 
of the Finnish transmission system operator Fingrid (Fingrid (2008)) there are two 
shareholders with over 25% of the shares each and over 33% of the voting rights each 
which are power generators/supply companies31. The second country which I believe 
that is incorrectly reported in DGTREN reports as unbundled in terms of ownership is 
Lithuania. Besides transmission services, the Lithuanian transmission system operator 
engages also in electricity trading, export and generation and thus cannot be assessed as 
a transmission system operator complying with ownership unbundling regulations32. 
The third country where I disagree with the DGTREN reports is Ireland, where the 
operator Eirgrid only leases the grid from the power company ESB that also owns 
generation assets and supplies electricity33. 
 
                                                 
30 To be clear, I consider a state-owned transmission system operator unbundled in terms of ownership 
only when it is a separate company engaged only in transmission and not a subsidiary of any other power 
market participant. 
31 Fortum Power and Heat Oy and Pohjolan Voima Oy each have a share of 25.08 % and 33.44% of the 
votes.   
32 According to the 2007 annual report of the Lithuanian TSO Lietuvos Energija in 2007 the company 
generated 7 % of the total electricity generated in Lithuania and revenues from transmission services 
accounted only for 30% of the total revenues of the company whereas 50% of the revenues was generated 
by sale of electricity on the domestic wholesale market and a significant share came from exports. 
33 For more see the EirGrid and ESB websites www.eirgrid.ie and www.esb.ie.  
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3.6.2 Market Opening Data 
 
The procedure for the collection of market opening data is somewhat similar to the 
procedure used for ownership unbundling data. I started with national reports published 
by the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) and the European Regulator’s 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG). These are reports that have been elaborated for 
the years 2005 to 2008 by national energy regulatory agencies and that are published on 
the joint CEER-ERGEG website.34 In particular, the 2005 reports contain some basic 
data on market opening for each country. This data was further refined using sources 
such as the national regulatory agency websites, transmission system operator websites, 
national legislation and International Energy Agency reports. I focused on market 
opening data for two particular customer classes for which Eurostat provides the most 
data on prices: class Ie industrial customers,(industrial customers with annual 
consumption of 2000 MWh, maximum demand 500 kW and annual load 4000 hours) 
and households. 
A detailed specification of the sources of both unbundling and market opening 
data for each country is provided in Appendix No. 2 – Data Sources. Figure 1 provides 
information on ownership unbundling and market opening in a graphical format. 
 
Figure 1 (next page): Information about market opening and ownership unbundling. The figure 
illustrates the time of market opening for industrial customers (industrial customer with annual 
consumption of 2000 MWh, maximum demand 500 kW) depicted in light gray and marked 
MOI, the time of market opening for households depicted in darker gray and marked MOH and 
the time of ownership unbundling (if present) depicted in black and marked OU. 
 
                                                 
34 http://www.energy-regulators.eu/  
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    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Belgium  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Bulgaria  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                Czech 
Republic  
MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Denmark  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Estonia  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Finland  MOI 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
France  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Germany  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Greece  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Hungary  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Ireland  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Italy MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Latvia  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Lithuania  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Luxembourg MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                                
Netherlands  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Poland  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Portugal  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Romania  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Slovakia  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Slovenia  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Spain  MOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                
Sweden  MOI 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                                United 
Kingdom  
MOI 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MO
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OU 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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3.6.3 Corruption Perceptions Index  
 
The Corruption Perceptions Index data is provided by Transparency International with 
annual frequency. Therefore, for each observation I use the latest Corruption 
Perceptions Index that is valid in the current year. Moreover, before multiplying the 
regulatory reform dummies by the Corruption Perceptions Index to get the interaction 
terms I adjust it to simplify the interpretation of the coefficient as described in 
Appendix No. 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index 1995 -– 2007 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
Country Mean Min Max 
Austria 7.95 7.50 8.70 
Belgium 6.62 5.25 7.60 
Bulgaria 3.77 2.90 4.10 
Czech Republic 4.52 3.70 5.37 
Denmark 9.62 9.33 10.00 
Estonia 5.94 5.50 6.70 
Finland 9.63 9.05 10.00 
France 6.90 6.30 7.50 
Germany 7.88 7.30 8.27 
Greece 4.61 4.20 5.35 
Hungary 5.06 4.80 5.30 
Ireland 7.63 6.90 8.45 
Italy 4.85 3.42 5.50 
Latvia 3.81 2.70 4.80 
Lithuania 4.58 3.80 4.80 
Luxembourg 8.64 8.40 9.00 
Netherlands 8.86 8.60 9.03 
Poland 4.17 3.40 5.57 
Portugal 6.51 6.30 6.97 
Romania 3.05 2.60 3.70 
Slovakia 4.01 3.50 4.90 
Slovenia 5.97 5.20 6.60 
Spain 6.54 4.31 7.10 
Sweden 9.27 9.00 9.50 






3.7 The Results 
 
The main idea behind the investigation is quite simple. If ownership unbundling of 
transmission system operators really does matter, this should be captured in the existing 
data on the performance of the electricity sector, in particular the price of electricity for 
industrial customers and the price of electricity for households. The electricity 
performance patterns exhibited by countries where TSO is separated in terms of 
ownership from the supply and generation company should differ from countries where 
such ownership unbundling has not taken place.  
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the estimation of the equations which are 
estimated jointly as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions. Table 4 shows the 
tests of joint significance of the estimates belonging to the same variable group (e.g. 
dummies for market opening, dummies for ownership unbundling, dummies for the 
interaction of ownership unbundling and institutional quality, etc.). I particularly focus 
on the following questions: Does market opening in general play a role and what are the 
differences in individual countries due to the institutional quality? Does ownership 
unbundling of the TSO play a role and what are the differences across individual 
countries due to institutional quality? Naturally, these questions apply to both industrial 
and residential customers.35  
The question of whether ownership unbundling plays any role at all can be 
formally captured in the form of a test of the null hypothesis that the ownership 
unbundling coefficient estimates are jointly equal to zero (ownership unbundling does 
not matter) against the alternative hypothesis that ownership unbundling does play a 
role (the ownership unbundling coefficient estimates are not jointly equal to zero). The 
second part of the question concerning the effect size, direction and differences across 
different customer categories, country groups and institutional quality levels can then be 
                                                 
35 Even though I present the coefficient estimates and calculated percentage changes in the price of 
electricity, the values should be considered cautiously and should not be used to claim that the reforms 
have exactly these quantifiable effects. As described in the sensitivity analysis section and the discussion 
section, the values of the estimates might vary depending on the specification and the results shall be used 
only to uncover the general principles and directions in the development of the price after market opening 
and ownership unbundling and possibly the order of magnitude of these effects. 
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investigated less formally by looking at the values of the various parameters and 
interpreting the results. 
Due to the structure of the reform variables the basic effect of the reform 
(market opening or ownership unbundling) captured in the particular estimated 
coefficient for the regulatory reform dummy variable applies to countries with perfect 
institutional quality (Corruption Perceptions Index = 10).36 In addition to this effect, the 
reform dummies interacted with the adjusted corruption perceptions index capture a 
change relative to the base effect due to a lower corruption rating (lower Corruption 
Perceptions Index). Therefore, for each aspect of the reform I first report the effect for 
countries without corruption and then how the effect changes due to lower institutional 
quality.37 
                                                 
36 There is no country with Corruption Perception Index equal to 10 throughout all years in the sample, 
therefore, the reform dummy interacted with the corruption perceptions is applicable to at least some 
extent to all countries. However, the best performing countries are very close to scoring straight tens (e.g., 
Denmark and Finland, see table 1). 
37 I use the methodology of Kennedy (1981) to calculate the percentage changes in the price due to the 
dummy variables. 
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Table 2: Estimation results for industrial customers from SUR estimation of the price equation 
for industrial customers and the price equation for households. The asterisk next to the 
coefficient estimate denotes the statistical significance of the estimate (*** means significant at 
1%, ** means significant at 2%, * means significant at 10%). 
 





 Market opening Market opening x  New member state 
Market opening x  
corruption perc. 
index 
Year Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE 
-6+ 0.3597 *** (0.049)       
-5 0.2925 *** (0.051)   0.0231  (0.111) 
-4 0.2125 *** (0.048) 0.0476  (0.070) 0.1942 * (0.101) 
-3 0.1603 *** (0.047) -0.0063  (0.061) 0.3323 *** (0.109) 
-2 0.0858 * (0.048) 0.0010  (0.059) 0.3988 *** (0.123) 
-1 0.0190  (0.049) -0.0238  (0.056) 0.4942 *** (0.133) 
0       0.4750 *** (0.135) 
1 -0.0329  (0.044) -0.0167  (0.053) 0.4311 *** (0.139) 
2 -0.0074  (0.047) -0.0016  (0.056) 0.2919 ** (0.145) 
3+ -0.0906 * (0.047) 0.0111  (0.063) 0.5225 *** (0.149) 
 Ownership unbundling 
Ownership 
unbundling x  
new member state 
Ownership 
unbundling x  
Corruption Perc. 
Index 
 Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE 
-6+ -0.1866 *** (0.057) 0.2930 *** (0.088)   
-5 -0.0926  (0.060) 0.1945 ** (0.088)    
-4 -0.0466  (0.057) 0.1914 ** (0.080)   
-3 -0.0109  (0.065) 0.1681 ** (0.078) -0.1017  (0.142) 
-2 -0.0171  (0.064) 0.1266 * (0.073) -0.0626  (0.154) 
-1 0.0295  (0.061) 0.0552  (0.068) -0.0113  (0.165) 
0       0.1901  (0.171) 
1 0.1389 *** (0.053) 0.1937 *** (0.073) -0.3262  (0.207) 
2 0.0495  (0.060) 0.4184 *** (0.127) -0.3312  (0.309) 
3+ 0.1465 ** (0.060) 0.6101 *** (0.126) -0.6715 ** (0.307) 
 Coeff.  SE     
log(gdp) 0.4120 *** (0.135)     
log(cpi) 0.6179 ** (0.240)     
log(price of gas) 0.1772 *** (0.038)     
log(price of oil) 0.0120  (0.029)     
hydro share -0.0197  (0.200)     
nuclear share 1.0271 ** (0.398)     
trend 0.0014  (0.003)     
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Table 3: Estimation results for household customers from SUR estimation of the price equation 
for industrial customers and the price equation for households. The asterisk next to the 
coefficient estimate denotes the statistical significance of the estimate (*** means significant at 
1%, ** means significant at 2%, * means significant at 10%). 
 





 Market opening Market opening x  new member state 
Market opening x  
corruption perc. 
index 
Year Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE 
-6+ 0.0585 ** (0.023) -0.1117 ** (0.046)   
-5 -0.0249  (0.034) -0.0965  (0.066) 0.1168  (0.102) 
-4 -0.0266  (0.034) -0.0877  (0.065) 0.0742  (0.103) 
-3 -0.0079  (0.037) -0.0224  (0.050) 0.0342  (0.116) 
-2 0.0150  (0.031) 0.0421  (0.048) 0.0098  (0.107) 
-1 -0.0017  (0.033) -0.0069  (0.050) -0.0547  (0.119) 
0       0.0386  (0.050) 
1 0.0117  (0.036) 0.4367 *** (0.119) 0.0778  (0.181) 
2 0.0595 * (0.033)   0.0495  (0.161) 
3+ 0.0467  (0.034)    0.0609  (0.173) 
 Ownership unbundling 
Ownership 
unbundling x  
new member state 
Ownership 
unbundling x  
corruption perc. 
index 
 Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE Coeff.  SE 
-6+ -0.0219  (0.026) 0.0136  (0.056)    
-5 0.0244  (0.047) 0.0162  (0.082) -0.0965  (0.138) 
-4 0.0958 ** (0.045) 0.1390  (0.086) -0.2460 * (0.142) 
-3 0.0784 * (0.046) 0.1307 * (0.071) -0.3105 ** (0.153) 
-2 0.0915 ** (0.041) 0.0290  (0.066) -0.2825 ** (0.139) 
-1 0.1102 ** (0.044) 0.0946  (0.071) -0.2908 * (0.158) 
0       0.0673  (0.067) 
1 0.2227 *** (0.051)   -1.0800 *** (0.324) 
2 0.3589 *** (0.045)    -2.0720 *** (0.263) 
3+ 0.2243 *** (0.046)   -1.3159 *** (0.251) 
 Coeff.  SE     
log(gdp) 0.4486 *** (0.096)     
log(cpi) 0.2149  (0.166)     
log(price of gas) 0.1027 *** (0.028)     
log(price of oil) -0.0295  (0.021)     
hydro share -0.3766 ** (0.148)     
nuclear share 0.5777 ** (0.283)     
trend -0.0024  (0.002)     
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Table 4: F-tests for the joint significance of estimates of the same indicator group.  
 







Market opening  Market opening  
F(9, 343) 9.85 F(9, 344) 2.4 
p-value 0.0000 p-value 0.0120 
    
Market opening difference 
in NMS 
 Market opening difference in 
NMS 
 
F(7, 343) 0.22 F(7, 344) 3.28 
p-value 0.9816 p-value 0.0022 
    
Market opening x CPI  Market opening x CPI  
F(7, 343) 3.28 F(9, 344) 0.34 
p-value 0.0008 p-value 0.9611 
    
Ownership unbundling  Ownership unbundling  
F(9, 343) 4.80 F(9, 344) 8.33 
p-value 0.0000 p-value 0.0000 
    
Ownership unbundling 
difference in NMS 
 Ownership unbundling 
difference in NMS 
 
F(9, 343) 4.99 F(6, 344) 1.10 
p-value 0.0000 p-value 0.3619 
    
Ownership unbundling x 
CPI 
 Ownership unbundling x 
CPI 
 
F(7, 343) 2.07 F(9, 344) 9.28 




For industrial customers, market opening as such seems to lead to a significant 
decline in the prices of electricity for countries that perform the best in terms of 
corruption both in old and new member states. This effect is both immediate (in fact it 
starts already before the market opens) and persistent, and may be over 40% over the 
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course of ten years.38 The fact that the decline starts already several years before market 
opening might seem striking at first, however, there is a good explanation for such 
estimates. The dummies used in the estimation capture the time when the market was 
actually opened for the particular customer group. However, some market reforms and 
restructuring started taking place several years ahead in preparation of the opening and 
other larger customer groups became eligible to choose the supplier up to several years 
before this particular customer group. This gradual decline in the price of electricity 
several years ahead of the market opening for the particular customer groups shows that 
it is the overall reforms and restructuring of the electricity market rather than just the 
eligibility of the customers to choose their supplier that has a good effect on the price 
developments on the market.   
This fairly large decline in prices applies only to countries with perfect 
institutional quality and is weaker or even non-existent in countries that are more 
corrupt.39 Whereas the 95% confidence intervals of estimates six and more years before 
market opening and three or more years after market opening do not overlap for the 
mean corruption case in old member states, in the case of maximum corruption in the 
old member states the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates overlap. However, 
these estimates are still different at the significance level of p = 0.012. In new member 
states the situation is similar. However, this time the 95% confidence intervals of the 
first estimate and the last estimate40 overlap regardless of the corruption level, but yet 
again, the difference between these estimates is statistically significant even in the worst 
case (maximum corruption) at p=0.035.  
                                                 
38 This is the aggregate effect of market opening net of the development of inflation, GDP, etc., not to be 
mistaken for the actual development of the price on the market.   
39 Countries with perfect institutional quality (the “best” countries) are hypothetical countries scoring 10 
on the corruption perception index in all years. The mean country is a hypothetical country with a 
corruption perceptions index equal to the mean of the corruption perceptions indexes across all countries 
at the time that corresponds to the particular year before, of or after reform. The worst country in terms of 
institutional quality is a hypothetical country with a corruption perceptions index equal to the lowest 
rating across all countries in the particular year before, of or after the reform. The best, mean and worst 
countries are only hypothetical: they do not refer to particular countries since the rating, and consequently 
the order, changes over time. 
40 I.e., the first is four years before market opening and the last is three or more years after market 
opening. Due to the lack of data for new member states the market opening dummies start 4 years before 
market opening whereas for old member states it is 6 years before market opening. 
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Figure 1: Development of prices for industrial customers due to market opening. The graphs 
show how the price of electricity develops with respect to market opening in both old and new 
member states depending on different levels of institutional quality (corruption). The horizontal 
axis shows the individual years before, of (0) and after market opening. The vertical axis shows 
the percentage change in the price. The benchmark year (level 0) is in each case the year of the 
reform (market opening) in the no-corruption case. The percentages are calculated by summing 
up the appropriate estimates from the estimated regressions, multiplying them by the 
corresponding corruption level, calculating the standard errors of these sums and products and 
then applying the methodology of Kennedy (1981) to calculate the percentages. Estimates that 
are statistically significant at least at the 10% level are shaded in black, changes that are not 
statistically significant with respect to the base level are shaded in gray. Clearly, inspecting the 
graphs from top to bottom, the decline in prices is less and less pronounced as more corruption 
is present. 
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 Whereas for industrial customers the results showed a decline in prices in the 
years around market opening, the estimates for the electricity price for households are 
very different. They show no clear trend or change in the electricity prices with respect 
to market opening, which applies similarly both to old and new member states. 
Furthermore, the institutional quality of the individual countries does not seem to play a 
role in this case. There is no statistically significant difference in the prices six or more 
years before the market opening and two or more years after the market opening for the 
old member states. In the results for the new member states there is a large spike one 
year after the reform, which, however, can be attributed to a lack of data since market 
opening was implemented for households in new member states later than for other 
categories and many of the years and countries lie in this case out of the sample. 
Consequently, there are only two non-zero observations for the one-year-after-market-
opening dummy for households and new member states in the sample based on which it 




















Figure 2: Development of prices for household customers due to market opening. The graphs 
show how the price of electricity develops with respect to market opening in both old and new 
member states depending on different levels of institutional quality (corruption). The horizontal 
axis shows the individual years before, of (0) and after market opening. The vertical axis shows 
the percentage change in the price. The benchmark year (level 0) is in each case the year of the 
reform (market opening) in the no-corruption case. The percentages are calculated by summing 
up the appropriate estimates from the estimated regressions, multiplying them by the 
corresponding corruption level, calculating the standard errors of these sums and products and 
then applying the methodology of Kennedy (1981) to calculate the percentages. Estimates that 
are statistically significant at least at the 10% level are shaded in black, changes that are not 
statistically significant with respect to the base level are shaded in gray. The graphs show no 
clear trend for the effect of corruption on the electricity price for households.  
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 Now it is interesting to look at what happens to the price of electricity if 
ownership unbundling is implemented. First, the hypothesis that ownership unbundling 
has no effect on the electricity market, i.e., the ownership unbundling dummies are 
jointly statistically not significant, is rejected for both industrial and household 
customers (the p-value is in both cases 0.0000), as table 4 shows (line marked 
“ownership unbundling”).  
Looking first at the price for industrial customers, the price developments are 
portrayed on graphs on figure 3 again for old and new member states for the case with 
no corruption, mean corruption and maximum corruption. In old member states that 
exhibit no corruption, the price of electricity for industrial customers rises after 
ownership unbundling is implemented. The top-left graph on figure 3 shows that the 
price level stays about the same for about four years before ownership unbundling up to 
the year of ownership unbundling. Then one year after the implementation of ownership 
unbundling the price increases (positive and statistically significant price change in year 
1) and this effect is permanent and equal to approximately 15% (positive and 
statistically significant price change in year 3+). The effect of corruption on this 
development of the price in old member states is shown on the middle-left and the 
bottom-left graphs of figure 3. These graphs show that in old member states with larger 
corruption there is no statistically significant increase in the prices of electricity for 
industrial customers. The bottom-left graph even suggests that ownership unbundling 
might be accompanied by a decrease in the prices of electricity for industrial customers 
in old member states with the weakest institutional quality. Although the 95% 
confidence intervals of the estimates for year 0 and years 3+ overlap, these estimates 
differ at the p=0.003 significance level. 
 The development of the price of electricity for industrial customers in the new 
member states follows a similar pattern. One year after the introduction of ownership 
unbundling the prices start to rise. This increase is the largest in countries without any 
corruption and persist also in countries with mean as well as maximum corruption. 
Nevertheless, even in new member states with the worst institutional quality the prices 
increase after the introduction of ownership unbundling. However, it is questionable 
how representative these results are, in particular as regards the unbelievably large 
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magnitude of the estimates especially for the last two years, as similar to the results for 
market opening for households in new member states the number of positive 

























Figure 3: Development of prices for industrial customers due to ownership unbundling. The 
graphs show how the price of electricity develops with respect to ownership unbundling in both 
old and new member states depending on different levels of institutional quality (corruption). 
The horizontal axis shows the individual years before, of (0) and after ownership unbundling. 
The vertical axis shows the percentage change in the price. The benchmark year (level 0) is in 
each case the year of the reform (ownership unbundling) in the no-corruption case. The 
percentages are calculated by summing up the appropriate estimates from the estimated 
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regressions, multiplying them by the corresponding corruption level, calculating the standard 
errors of these sums and products and then applying the methodology of Kennedy (1981) to 
calculate the percentages. Estimates that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level are 
shaded in black, changes that are not statistically significant with respect to the base level are 
shaded in gray. The graphs show an increasing trend around ownership unbundling that is 
mitigated or even reversed in countries with lower institutional quality. 
 
 
Moving to the development of prices of electricity for households in the years 
around the introduction of ownership unbundling, the results seem to be similar to 
industrial customers in particular in the old member states. In old member states with 
the best institutional quality, the prices increase starting one year after the introduction 
of ownership unbundling. It is interesting that the data in the top-left graph of figure 4 
first shows a decline in the price in the year when ownership unbundling is 
implemented followed by an increase. Therefore, year –1 should be used to compare 
with the years after the reform. When such a comparison is made, it shows that the 
estimate for year –1 is different from the estimate for year 3+ at the p=0.024 
significance level, which supports the hypothesis that there is an increase in the price of 
electricity for households in old member states with the best institutional quality. Again, 
as the institutional quality declines, this price development changes. While there is no 
clear price trend in countries with mean institutional quality, in countries with the worst 
institutional quality the prices of electricity for households decline after ownership 
unbundling. This decline is quite considerable as the difference between the price three 
years before ownership unbundling and three and more years after ownership 
unbundling is around 10%. 
It is more difficult to assess the results of the estimation of the price of electricity 
for households in new member states due to lack of data. In particular, there are no 
positive observations that could be used to assess the price development one or more 
years after the introduction of ownership unbundling. Therefore, the issue of the 
household electricity price development in new member states after ownership 































Figure 4: Development of prices for household customers due to ownership unbundling. The 
graphs show how the price of electricity develops with respect to ownership unbundling in both 
old and new member states depending on different levels of institutional quality (corruption). 
The horizontal axis shows the individual years before, of (0) and after ownership unbundling. 
The vertical axis shows the percentage change in the price. The benchmark year (level 0) is in 
each case the year of the reform (ownership unbundling) in the no-corruption case. The 
percentages are calculated by summing up the appropriate estimates from the estimated 
regressions, multiplying them by the corresponding corruption level, calculating the standard 
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errors of these sums and products and then applying the methodology of Kennedy (1981) to 
calculate the percentages. Estimates that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level are 
shaded in black, changes that are not statistically significant with respect to the base level are 
shaded in gray. The graphs show an increasing trend after ownership unbundling in old member 
states, which is mitigated or even reversed in countries with lower institutional quality. Lack of 
data prohibits any conclusions concerning new member states. 
 
3.7.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
I have used several other estimation alternatives to check the sensitivity and the 
robustness of the results of the base equation presented above. The results of these 
alternative estimations are presented below. 
 
Price Ratio Equations 
 
Besides the base estimation, whose results are presented in the previous section, the 
price ratio equation was also estimated within a SUR system with either the electricity 
price for industrial customers or households being the other efficiency-enhancing 
equation. In these two pairs of equations the regressors of the price equation (either the 
price for industrial customers or the price for households) form a subset of the 
regressors of the price ratio equation due to which there is no efficiency gain provided 
by SUR to the price equation. Moreover, the error term of the ratio equation is, 
according to the theoretical model, equal to the difference between the error term of the 
price equation for industry and the error term of the price equation for households due 
to which some information is also lost. Therefore, I use the results of the estimation of 
the price ratio equation, which has twice as many dummy variables as the base equation, 
only to check whether the results generally agree with the results of the base estimation. 
The full results of the estimation are presented in Appendix No. 3. They show that the 
estimation of the price ratio equation does not in either of the two cases contradict the 
results of the base estimation and they are in particular robust as regards the increase in 
the price for both industrial customers and households due to ownership unbundling and 






The weighting of observations is another matter that has to be considered within the 
analysis. The obvious question is whether small countries, e.g., Luxembourg, should be 
given the same weight as large countries, e.g., Germany, in the estimation. Perhaps from 
the perspective of the overall economic welfare of the European Union the contribution 
of each country to the European economy should be taken into account. Furthermore, 
perhaps some more information can be obtained from the regressions if countries in 
which the prices are more prone to international influence, i.e., very small countries, are 
given less weight in the regressions. Therefore, I have estimated the same regressions 
using the gross domestic product as the weight and the full results plus the graphs are 
presented in Appendix No. 4.  
Let us now point out some of the differences between the results of the base 
estimation and the weighted estimation. The basic effect (with perfect institutional 
quality) and the effect of corruption differ somewhat in particular for ownership 
unbundling for industrial customers. Whereas the base regression shows an increase in 
the price of electricity for industrial customers in old member states after ownership 
unbundling (i.e., in countries with perfect institutional quality), and this increase is 
smaller, non-existent or even reversed in countries with lower institutional quality, the 
weighted regression identifies stagnation with respect to ownership unbundling and an 
unclear effect of the corruption level (it seems to be a rise followed by a decline in the 
price). In terms of the price of electricity for households, the base regression shows a 
stagnation after market opening whereas the weighted regression shows a small increase 
with a very small change due to institutional quality; the results for ownership 
unbundling for households from the weighted regression do not contradict the results 
from the base regression. 
Nevertheless, one important observation is that in each investigated combination 
of countries and reforms (i.e., the total of eight investigated combinations characterized 
by the three binary variables: reform type [ownership unbundling or market opening], 
member state [old member state or new member state] and customer [industrial or 
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household]) the effect of reforms tends to be for each of these combinations similar at 
least for one institutional quality level. 
The results of the base estimation and the weighted estimation do not directly 
contradict each other, there is no estimate that would be positive and statistically 
significant in one estimation and statistically significant and negative in the other 
estimation, and a closer look at the weights and the underlying variables shows why 
there are such differences. It might well be that the weighted regression is unable to 
distinguish the effects of the institutional quality level due to the high regression 
weights (largest GDP) assigned to countries with institutional quality close to the mean 
institutional quality, and on the other hand very low weights assigned to countries that 
are at or close to the poles of the corruption perceptions index scale. This fact is 
illustrated in table A1 in Appendix no. 4, which shows that out of the five countries that 
are given the most weight in the regression summing up to over 70% of the total weight, 
the highest rank in terms of the distance from the mean corruption perceptions index is 
UK at rank 10 (1 denoting the most polar country with the largest distance from the 
overall mean corruption perceptions index and 25 denoting the country that is the 
closest to the overall mean corruption perceptions index). On the other hand, countries 
that are very close to the poles of the scale and thus are able to influence the 
institutional quality estimates the most are given much lower weights in the order of a 
magnitude of percentages or even below one percent, e.g., small countries with very bad 
institutional quality like Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and small countries with 
very high institutional quality like Finland, Denmark or Sweden. Due to this reason I 
believe that in order to properly capture the effect of institutional quality it is more 
appropriate to use the unweighted regressions, which is also more representative of the 
spirit of the European Union. 
 
Additional Controls  
 
I also considered the use of additional control variables, in particular the share of the 
largest electricity generator, which could be statistically significant as suggested by the 
estimation of Van Koten and Ortmann (2008), albeit in a different setting. However, the 
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problem with this variable is the availability of reliable data. The Eurostat dataset has 
many missing values, which substantially reduces the total number of usable 
observations (from 425 to 254). Moreover, the coefficient for the share of the largest 
generator is not statistically significant for both industrial customers or households.41 
There are no significant systematic differences between the estimated coefficients from 
the regression with the largest share included and excluded if the same observations 
(254) are used. Therefore, instead of sacrificing almost 200 valuable observations I 
decided not to include the share of the largest power generator as an explanatory 
variable. The results of the regressions with and without the largest share are presented 




Another method that I used to check the robustness of the results and identify influential 
countries is the jack-knife method, used to look at how the estimates change when one 
of the countries is excluded from the estimation. The full results are presented in 
Appendix No. 6 separately for industrial customers and households. These results are 
robust in particular for the industrial customers both in terms of the changes in the price 
with respect to market opening and ownership unbundling. In some cases, the omission 
of a country changes the statistical significance of the estimates, however, there is no 
country whose omission would drastically change the results, e.g., from a statistically 
significant positive estimate to a statistically significant negative estimate or vice versa.  
As far as the price for households is concerned, the general effect of market 
opening is supported while in few cases the effect of the institutional quality changes. 
Whereas the base case has not identified any significant impact of the institutional 
quality on prices, when Denmark or Portugal is omitted market opening seems to lead to 
a slight price increase in countries with poor institutional quality. Conversely, when 
Finland or Germany are omitted, the effect of corruption is the opposite and in countries 
with worse institutional qualities the price decline is greater than in less corrupt 
countries. The results for ownership unbundling exhibit much smaller changes. Only the 
                                                 
41 The p-value of the estimate of the coefficient for the share of the largest generator is 0.469 and 0.486 
for industrial customers and households, respectively. 
 97 
omission of Finland changes the general effect of ownership unbundling from 
increasing to stationary, nevertheless, the impact of institutional quality remains 
unchanged (i.e., ownership unbundling works better in countries with poor institutional 
quality). Therefore, this robustness check shows that in particular the results for 




In order to address the concern whether the estimation is capable of separating the 
effects of market opening and ownership unbundling, since these two reforms often 
took place simultaneously or almost simultaneously, I ran the same regressions with 
only those countries that did not implement ownership unbundling. If the base 
estimation is successful in separating these two effects, the estimates from the 
regression with only those countries that did not implement ownership unbundling 
should not differ significantly from the base estimation. The full results are presented in 
Appendix No. 7 and indeed they show no systematic difference between the estimates 
especially for industrial customers. As far as households are concerned the reduced 
estimation shows a greater decreasing effect of the institutional quality, however, the 
basic stagnating trend around market opening for countries with high institutional 
quality is the same. This casts some doubt on the effect of corruption on the 
development of prices for households around ownership unbundling and suggests that 
this effect from the base equation (i.e., a mitigating or offsetting effect) might be 
smaller. Nevertheless, due to the differences in the size of the institutional quality effect 
in the base estimation for ownership unbundling and in the reduced estimation for 
market opening (coefficient estimates -1.08, -2.07 and -1.3 for years +1, +2 and +3 of 
the base equation versus 0.6, 0.78 and 0.67 for years +1, +2 and +3 of the reduced 
equation), it seems that the latter estimates are not strong enough to offset the estimates 
from the base equation. 
 
Estimation Using EC Classification 
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In my estimation I used regulatory reform data, which I have acquired from various 
sources (see Section 3.6 and Appendix No. 2 for the description) and which I believe 
are more accurate than the data presented in the benchmark reports of the European 
Commission. This concerns the question of whether Finland, Lithuania and Ireland 
conform to the definition of ownership unbundling claimed by the EC reports. 
Consequently, I estimated the same equations using the classification provided by the 
EC to see how the results might change. The results do not significantly change for the 
estimates for market opening for industrial customers and the change for households 
consists of a small increasing trend after market opening and a mitigating effect of the 
institutional quality. As expected, the impact of this classification on the ownership 
unbundling estimates are larger. The prices for industrial customers exhibit a smaller 
increase or even stagnation after ownership unbundling in old member states, the 
increase in new member states is also smaller and consequently the offsetting effect of 
the institutional quality is also smaller or even nonexistent. The price for households 
follows a stagnating trend with no long-term effect of the institutional quality. The full 
results are presented in a table in Appendix No. 8. 
 
3.7.2 Discussion of the Results 
 
The results of the estimation unveil some important relationships that drive the 
development of the prices of electricity for both industrial customers and households 
after market opening and ownership unbundling. Not only do they illustrate that prices 
change due to the opening of the market in electricity; they also show that ownership 
unbundling plays a significant role in this process. Moreover, the institutional quality of 
a particular country, as captured by the corruption perceptions index, helps explain the 
price developments when regulatory reforms are implemented.  
Looking at the parameter estimates for the market opening variables for 
industrial customers, there is a clear relationship between the price change and the 
corruption perception index:  
TICPIbap MOMOMO *+=∆ , 
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where MOp∆  is the change in the price of electricity due solely to market opening, MOa  
is negative, MOb  is positive and TICPI is the corruption perceptions index published by 
Transparency International adjusted using the transformation defined in Appendix No. 1 
(i.e., higher TICPI means higher corruption). Even for countries with the highest 
corruption the price change is negative (i.e., price decrease). This relationship seems to 
hold for the price for industrial customers in both old and new member states, however, 
it is not valid for the price of households for which the estimation has identified no 
significant effect of market opening. 
On the other hand, the effect of ownership unbundling seems to work in exactly 
the opposite direction relative to the corruption perceptions index for both industrial 
customers and households:  
 
TICPIbap OUOUOU *+=∆ , 
 
where OUp∆  is the change in the price of electricity for industrial customers due to 
ownership unbundling, OUa  is positive and OUb  is negative. This relationship holds for 
both industrial customers and households in the old member states and the term 
capturing the lower institutional quality seems to be strong enough to offset the basic 
price increase due to ownership unbundling. In the new member states this relationship 
seems to hold only for industrial customers whereas the corruption term is not strong 
enough to offset the price increase due to ownership unbundling. Concerning the 
electricity prices for households in new member states it is difficult to make any 
conclusions due to lack of data. 
The two relationships above imply that countries with good institutional quality, 
i.e., with a high corruption perceptions index, did a better job in the first place when 
they were implementing the market opening even without ownership unbundling. In 
particular, in these countries the benefits of market opening are realized for industrial 
customers already without ownership unbundling and ownership unbundling as such 
only leads to an increase in the price of electricity for both industrial customers and 
households. There are several possible explanations of such a price increase after 
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ownership unbundling. Firstly, the separation of the transmission system operator from 
the generator/supplier requires some restructuring costs, which are projected into the 
price of electricity, despite the fact that this effect should be only temporary. Then there 
are also some long-term effects such as possibly lower efficiency resulting from more 
complicated information transfer between the generators/suppliers and the transmission 
system operator. Another possibility might be that despite the fact that ownership 
unbundling provides a fairer environment for competition, the number of players on the 
market might not be sufficient yet and it might take some more time for competition to 
develop, so this competition  is not yet captured in the existing data.42 
However, the situation differs for countries with poor institutional quality, where 
market opening without ownership unbundling leads to a smaller reduction in the price 
of electricity for industrial customers. In these countries with lower institutional quality 
the costs of ownership unbundling are offset by the benefits brought about most likely 
by a more competitive environment on the electricity market. This is in particular true in 
the old member states. Therefore, in countries with low institutional quality, ownership 
unbundling seems to be a competition-enhancing measure that eliminates the problems 





In this chapter I studied the effect of electricity market liberalization—in particular the 
effect of market opening and the ownership unbundling of the transmission system 
operator—in the member states of the European Union on the prices of electricity for 
both industrial customers and households. This research was motivated by the recent 
debate of the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union resulting in the introduction of new energy legislation requiring a 
stricter form of the separation of transmission system operation from other activities, 
whereas ownership unbundling is the most stringent of the available options. In my 
                                                 
42 The construction of a new power plant takes years or even decades in the case of a nuclear power plant 
from the first initiation to completion. 
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estimation I find that ownership unbundling plays a role in the development of prices of 
electricity, however, this effect differs depending on the institutional quality of the 
individual countries. I find that countries that are the least corrupt do not benefit at all 
from ownership unbundling. On the contrary, in these countries ownership unbundling 
brings only extra costs, most likely since market opening was implemented well in the 
first place given the high institutional quality. On the other hand, the results of the 
estimation show that in countries with more corruption market opening still leaves some 
potential for a price decline and the ownership unbundling of the electricity 
transmission system operator might help to improve the situation. 
Therefore, considering the above-mentioned results, which differ based on the 
institutional quality of various countries, the new package of energy liberalization 
legislation, which allows several options for a more perfect separation of the 
transmission system operator from the generator/supplier, is a good idea. It gives the 
countries with high institutional quality, where market opening as such seems to work 
best especially for industrial customers, the choice not to fully separate the transmission 
system operator since ownership unbundling would bring only extra costs. On the other 
hand, ownership unbundling is one of the options of the new legislation and it should be 
the preferred option especially for old member states with poor institutional quality. 
According to the results of the estimation, in these states ownership unbundling could 
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Appendix 1 – Construction of Regulatory Reform Variables  
 
For each of the two regulatory reform aspects, market opening and ownership 
unbundling, I define up to six dummies corresponding to the years before the reform 
and up to three dummies corresponding to the years after the reform. The first and the 
last dummies include also all the years before/after the period covered by the other 
dummies. The base group (no dummy) is the year of the reform. In some cases I do not 
include the whole range of dummies due to lack of data (e.g., for ownership unbundling 
for households in new member states). These dummies are also interacted with the new 
member state variable to account for possible differing effects in new and old member 
states. 
Moreover, I interact these reform dummies with the corruption perceptions index 
provided by Transparency International. In this case I also include an interaction term 
for the year of the reform, to account for the effect of institutional quality in the year of 
the reform, and I omit the first dummy, i.e., six years and more ahead, which should not 
be statistically significant. Before multiplying the regulatory reform dummies by the 
corruption perceptions index to get the interaction terms I adjust it to simplify the 








=  . 
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Appendix 2 – Description of Data Sources 
 
Data on market opening and unbundling 
Data on market opening and ownership unbundling is unfortunately not available from a 
single source. Therefore, many different sources differing depending on the country 
concerned were used. In general, the basic information was obtained from 
Benchmarking Reports of the Commission of the European Communities on the 
progress in the development of internal energy markets (see the list below). However, 
the data was often incomplete (short time series) or imprecise. Another general source 
of information on market opening consisted of National Reports provided by the 
European Energy Regulators CEER & ERGEG at their website http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS, originally 
submitted by the member states to the European Commission. The data from these two 
general sources was then compared with information obtained from national regulators, 
energy companies, ministries, etc. Therefore, the data for individual countries comes 
from disparate sources that are listed for each country in the table below.  
   
Benchmarking Reports 
Commission of the European Communities: First Benchmarking Report on the 
Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas market, Brussels, December 3, 2001, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/benchmarking_report
s/2001_report_bencmarking.pdf 
Commission of the European Communities: Second Benchmarking Report on the 




Commission of the European Communities: Third Benchmarking Report on the 




Commission of the European Communities: Report from the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, and its technical annex, 





Commission of the European Communities: Report on Progress in Creating the Internal 





Commission of the European Communities: Prospects for the Internal Gas and 





Commission of the European Communities: Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and 




Commission of the European Communities: Report on Progress in Creating the Internal 












Table of Data Sources 
The following table presents information about the sources of information on 
unbundling and market opening used in this chapter. Where applicable, the table also 
provides the web address and the date when the data was extracted from this address.  
Country Source 
Location 
Date of extraction 
Austria The Austrian energy act EIWOG 1998, its amendment from 2000 
www.e-control.at 
November 18, 2008 
Belgium Activity Report of the Belgian TSO Elia for 2001, Activity Report of the 
Belgian TSO Elia for 2007 
http://www.elia.be/repository/pages/89a8087f9f8141268d3656cf1827474c.aspx
# 
January 23, 2009 
 
Website of the power company Centrica 
http://www.centrica.com/index.asp?pageid=39&newsid=67 
January 23, 2009 
Bulgaria Peter Ganev : Bulgarian Electricity Market Restructuring,  
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria, CCP Working Paper 08-8 
www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104661!ccp08-8.pdf 
 




February 28, 2009 
Czech 
Republic 






Website of ČEZ  
http://www.cez.cz/cs/o-spolecnosti/cez/struktura-akcionaru.html 
November 7, 2008 
 
Czech Energy Act, 
http://www.eru.cz 
November 7, 2009 
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Denmark Act no. 1384 of December 20, 2004 – Act on Energinet Danmark 
http://www.energinet.dk/NR/rdonlyres/276B7459-243C-4A83-BE5F-
0FCFFC1BC0CF/0/Act_on_Energinetdk.pdf 
January 23, 2009 
 
Energy supply act 375 of june 2, 1999 
http://www.juraportal.dk/links/010/010/040/020/?lang=en 
January 23, 2009 
Estonia Website of the Estonian TSO OÜ Põhivõrk 
http://www.pohivork.ee/index.php?id=286&L=1 
November 17, 2008 
Finland Annual report of the Finish TSO Fingrid 2007 
http://www.fingrid.fi/attachments/en/investors/reports/financial/fingrid_tp_07_e
n.pdf 
January 29, 2009 
 
Website of the Energy Market Authority 
http://www.energiamarkkinavirasto.fi/data.asp?articleid=230&pgid=127 
January 29, 2009 
 
Eurostat: Customer switching and renegotiating in the electricity market in 
Finland, 2001, Contract number 200245501007 
http://www.energia.fi/en/publications/customerswitchingandrenegotiating.pdf 
January 29, 2009 
France  
Germany German Energy Act Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG) 1998 and  
Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG) 2005 
http://www.energieverbraucher.de/de/Allgemein/Service/Gesetze/site__452/ 
November 18, 2008 
Greece Ekaterini Iliadou: Electricity Sector Reform in Greece, CCP Working Paper 08-
9 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104662!ccp08-9.pdf 
February 28, 2009 
Hungary Annual report of the Hungarian TSO FGSZ for 2006,  
http://www.fgsz.hu/en/documents/documents/annual-reports.html 
February 28, 2009 
Ireland Website of the power company Electicity Supply Board  
http://esb.ie/main/home/index.jsp 
November 20, 2008 
 
Website of the Irish TSO EirGrid  
http://www.eirgrid.com 
November 20, 2008 
Italy Annual report of the Italian TSO Terna for 2001, 
http://www.terna.it/default/home_en/investor_relations_en/reports/reports_2001.
aspx 
February 28, 2009 
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Latvia Annual report of the power company Latvenergo 2005 
http://www.latvenergo.lv/portal/page?_pageid=80,304750&_dad=portal&_sche
ma=PORTAL 
November 18, 2008 
 
Euroelectric-UCTE: 3rd systint report, 2006. 
http://www.ucte.org/resources/publications/otherreports/ 
November 18, 2008 
Lithuania 2007 annual report of Lietuvos Energia AB 
http://www.lpc.lt/repository/ataskaitos/ANG_2007_ataskaita.pdf 
November 18, 2008 
 
Lithuanian Law on Electricity, 20 July, 2000, No. VIII –1881 as amended by 26 
June, 2001, No. IX-408 
http://www.regula.lt/index.php?750663183 
November 18, 2008 
Luxembour
g 
International Energy Agency: Energy policies of IEA countries, Luxembourg 
review 2004 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1471 
March 1, 2009 
Netherlands Annual report of the Dutch TSO TenneT for 2001 
http://www.tennet.org/english/tennet/publications/annual_report/annual_report_
2001.aspx 
March 1, 2009 
 
Act of 2 July 1998 Providing Rules in Relation to the Production, Transmission 
and Supply of Electricity 
http://www.nma-dte.nl/images/Electricity%20act%201998_tcm7-10720.pdf 
March 1, 2009 
 
Website of the Dutch Office of Energy Regulation Eneriekamer 
http://www.energiekamer.nl 
March 1, 2009 
Poland Annual reports of the Polish TSO, PSE-Operator for 2004 and 2006 
http://www.pse-operator.pl/index.php?modul=10&gid=116 
November 17, 2008 
 
Laurent Jouret: Electricity Market in Poland – Changes on the Horizon, ING 
Bank, April 2006,  
http://www.ingbank.pl/_itemserver/wholesale/raporty/ING_Raport_Energetyczn
y_eng.pdf 
November 17, 2008 
 
Website of the energy market agency Agencja Rynku Energii S.A.  
http://polishenergy.cire.pl/market.html 
November 17, 2008 
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Portugal Website of the Portugese TSO REN 
http://www.ren.pt/vEN/RENGroup/ShareholderStructure/Pages/grupo-
ren_shareholder-structure.aspx 
March 1, 2009 
 
International Energy Agency, Energy policies of IEA countries, Portugal 2000 
review, Portugal 2004 review 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1148 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1470 
March 1, 2009 
Romania Annual report of the Romanian TSO Transelectrica for 2003 
http://www.transelectrica.ro/en.php 
February 28, 2009 
Slovakia Website of the Slovak TSO SEPS 
http://www.sepsas.sk/seps/ 
November 7, 2008 
 
Public notice of the Ministry of Economy 562/2001 
www.okonet.sk/Vseobecna%20legislativa/562-2001.pdf 
November 7, 2008 
 
Public notice of the Ministry of Economy 548/2002 
www.okonet.sk/Vseobecna%20legislativa/548-2002.pdf 
November 7, 2008 
 
Act no. 656/2004 
http://www.zse.sk/contents/documents/zakon_656_2004.pdf 
November 7, 2008 
Slovenia Website of the power company Gen Energija 
http://www.gen-energija.si/strani.php?page_id=104 
November 17, 2008 
Spain Annual reports of the Spanish TSO REE for 1998, 2000 
http://www.ree.es/ingles/accionistas/informe_anual_1998.asp 
http://www.ree.es/ingles/accionistas/pdf/resultados_ree_0106_eng.pdf 
March 1, 2009 
 
International Energy Agency, Energy policies of IEA countries, Spain 2005 
review, Spain 2001 review 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1570 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1123 
March 1, 2009 
Sweden International Energy Agency, Energy policies of IEA countries, Sweden 1994 








Website of the TSO National Grid  
http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/About/history/ 
December 15, 2008 
 
Website of EnergyLinx, a price comparison company 
http://www.energylinx.co.uk/uk_energy_industry.htm 
December 15, 2008 
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Appendix 3 – Estimation of the Price Ratio Equation 
System of 
equations 
SUR for industry and 
households (BASE) 
SUR for industry and price 
ratio 
SUR for households and 
price ratio 
Equation Industry Households Ratio Ratio 
Customer  Industry Households Industry Households Industry Households 
R2 0.8355 0.9337 0.8819 0.8819 0.8969 0.8969 
Obs 425 425 425 425 425 425 








 -6+ 0.3597 *** 0.049 0.0585 ** 0.023 0.3288 *** 0.053 -0.0251  0.027 0.3503 *** 0.059 0.0161  0.038 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.051 -0.0249  0.034 0.2761 *** 0.054 -0.1056 *** 0.036 0.2688 *** 0.058 -0.1249 ** 0.051 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.048 -0.0266  0.034 0.1998 *** 0.051 -0.0872 ** 0.036 0.1874 *** 0.055 -0.1299 ** 0.051 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.047 -0.0079  0.037 0.1580 *** 0.048 -0.0603  0.039 0.1179 ** 0.050 -0.1034 * 0.055 
-2 0.0858 * 0.048 0.0150  0.031 0.0968 ** 0.049 -0.0014  0.034 0.0475  0.052 -0.0081  0.047 
-1 0.0190  0.049 -0.0017  0.033 0.0167  0.050 0.0063  0.035 -0.0290  0.053 0.0079  0.050 
1 -0.0329  0.044 0.0117  0.036 -0.0101  0.047 0.0552  0.034 0.0126  0.052 0.1208 ** 0.048 
2 -0.0074  0.047 0.0595 * 0.033 0.0257  0.049 0.0671 ** 0.033 0.0875  0.055 0.1885 *** 0.046 













 -6+    -0.1117 ** 0.046    0.1809 *** 0.053    0.1031  0.074 -5    -0.0965  0.066    -0.0386  0.060    -0.0284  0.085 
-4 0.0476  0.070 -0.0877  0.065 0.2935 *** 0.073 -0.0750  0.059 0.1669 ** 0.079 -0.0717  0.084 
-3 -0.0063  0.061 -0.0224  0.050 0.2000 *** 0.065 0.0118  0.046 0.1137  0.071 0.0622  0.066 
-2 0.0010  0.059 0.0421  0.048 0.0336  0.060 -0.0323  0.045 -0.0074  0.063 0.0199  0.063 
-1 -0.0238  0.056 -0.0069  0.050 -0.0423  0.056 -0.0457  0.047 -0.0778  0.058 0.0425  0.067 
1 -0.0167  0.053 0.4367 *** 0.119 -0.0780  0.053    -0.0792  0.056 -0.1815  0.165 
2 -0.0016  0.056    -0.0355  0.056    -0.0344  0.059    

















-5 0.0231  0.111 0.1168  0.102 0.0112  0.110 0.2753 *** 0.098 0.0826  0.103 0.3426 ** 0.139 
-4 0.1942 * 0.101 0.0742  0.103 0.1955 ** 0.100 0.2235 ** 0.107 0.2585 *** 0.094 0.3063 ** 0.151 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.109 0.0342  0.116 0.3257 *** 0.109 0.1838  0.118 0.4245 *** 0.111 0.1813  0.167 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.123 0.0098  0.107 0.4929 *** 0.126 0.0876  0.110 0.5666 *** 0.134 0.0063  0.155 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.133 -0.0547  0.119 0.6641 *** 0.140 -0.0994  0.121 0.7276 *** 0.154 -0.1746  0.170 
0 0.4750 *** 0.135 0.0386  0.050 0.6554 *** 0.138 0.0293  0.052 0.5836 *** 0.147 0.0294  0.073 
1 0.4311 *** 0.139 0.0778  0.181 0.5628 *** 0.143 -0.1687  0.175 0.4620 *** 0.154 -0.1426  0.247 
2 0.2919 ** 0.145 0.0495  0.161 0.3593 ** 0.150 -0.0612  0.159 0.2207  0.162 0.0210  0.225 












-6+ -0.1866 *** 0.057 -0.0219  0.026 -0.1142 * 0.066 -0.0253  0.049 -0.2515 *** 0.076 -0.1282 * 0.070 
-5 -0.0926  0.060 0.0244  0.047 -0.0452  0.064 -0.0326  0.057 -0.1543 ** 0.070 -0.0540  0.080 
-4 -0.0466  0.057 0.0958 ** 0.045 -0.0037  0.060 -0.0046  0.051 -0.0866  0.065 0.0165  0.073 
-3 -0.0109  0.065 0.0784 * 0.046 0.0101  0.067 -0.0226  0.055 -0.0502  0.073 -0.0167  0.077 
-2 -0.0171  0.064 0.0915 ** 0.041 -0.0659  0.066 -0.0559  0.051 -0.1281 * 0.071 -0.0474  0.072 
-1 0.0295  0.061 0.1102 ** 0.044 0.0194  0.063 0.0427  0.047 -0.0357  0.069 0.0359  0.066 
1 0.1389 *** 0.053 0.2227 *** 0.051 0.1064 ** 0.053 0.0936 * 0.049 0.0567  0.056 0.1350 * 0.070 
2 0.0495  0.060 0.3589 *** 0.045 0.0085  0.061 0.2207 *** 0.045 -0.0503  0.064 0.3051 *** 0.063 













 -6+ 0.2930 *** 0.088 0.0136  0.056 0.4288 *** 0.111 0.0312  0.081 0.6396 *** 0.135 0.2129 * 0.114 -5 0.1945 ** 0.088 0.0162  0.082 0.3941 *** 0.108 0.1175  0.086 0.5645 *** 0.128 0.1965  0.122 
-4 0.1914 ** 0.080 0.1390  0.086 0.3279 *** 0.092 0.2074 ** 0.085 0.4465 *** 0.105 0.2702 ** 0.120 
-3 0.1681 ** 0.078 0.1307 * 0.071 0.2302 *** 0.080 0.1577 ** 0.070 0.3014 *** 0.084 0.1531  0.098 
-2 0.1266 * 0.073 0.0290  0.066 0.2067 *** 0.073 0.1131 * 0.064 0.2312 *** 0.076 0.0281  0.090 
-1 0.0552  0.068 0.0946  0.071 0.0827  0.069 0.0610  0.069 0.0730  0.071 -0.0225  0.098 
1 0.1937 *** 0.073    0.2226 *** 0.073    0.2290 *** 0.073    
2 0.4184 *** 0.127    0.3504 *** 0.128    0.2853 ** 0.128    

















-5    -0.0965  0.138    -0.0487  0.135    -0.0966  0.191 
-4    -0.2460 * 0.142    -0.1063  0.143    -0.1946  0.202 
-3 -0.1017  0.142 -0.3105 ** 0.153 -0.0301  0.144 -0.2211  0.165 -0.0078  0.151 -0.1398  0.233 
-2 -0.0626  0.154 -0.2825 ** 0.139 0.1291  0.157 -0.0575  0.154 0.2168  0.169 0.0874  0.217 
-1 -0.0113  0.165 -0.2908 * 0.158 0.1525  0.168 -0.0570  0.166 0.2721  0.177 0.0229  0.234 
0 0.1901  0.171 0.0673  0.067 0.3450 ** 0.172 0.0459  0.068 0.3013 * 0.174 -0.0344  0.096 
1 -0.3262  0.207 -1.0800 *** 0.324 -0.1253  0.209 -0.2903  0.307 -0.0962  0.216 -0.9389 ** 0.434 
2 -0.3312  0.309 -2.0720 *** 0.263 0.0618  0.312 -1.2205 *** 0.258 0.1582  0.319 -2.5855 *** 0.365 
3+ -0.6715 ** 0.307 -1.3159 *** 0.251 -0.2004  0.319 -0.8703 *** 0.251 -0.4781  0.348 -1.7325 *** 0.355 




   0.0996  (0.105
 
   -0.0240  (0.103




   0.2289  (0.195
 
   0.2163  (0.194




   0.0878 *** (0.029
 
   0.1025 *** (0.028




   0.0318  (0.022
 
   0.0454 ** (0.022




   0.2857 * (0.149
 
   0.2907 ** (0.146




   0.4632  (0.319
 
   0.4348  (0.318




   0.0036  (0.003
 
   0.0026  (0.003
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Appendix 4 – Weighted Estimation 
 
System of 
equations SUR for industry and households 
Weighted SUR for industry and 
households 
Equation Industry Households Industry Households 
Customer group Industry Households Industry Households 
R2 0.8355 0.9337 0.7793 0.9113 
Obs 425 425 425 425 








 -6+ 0.3597 *** 0.049 0.0585 ** 0.023 0.2497 *** 0.053 0.0166  0.019 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.051 -0.0249  0.034 0.1225 ** 0.060 -0.0800 * 0.043 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.048 -0.0266  0.034 0.0916  0.056 -0.0645  0.040 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.047 -0.0079  0.037 0.0927 * 0.051 0.0263  0.040 
-2 0.0858 * 0.048 0.0150  0.031 -0.0103  0.050 0.0102  0.035 
-1 0.0190  0.049 -0.0017  0.033 -0.0674  0.049 0.0244  0.037 
1 -0.0329  0.044 0.0117  0.036 -0.0663  0.047 0.0846 * 0.043 
2 -0.0074  0.047 0.0595 * 0.033 -0.0742  0.053 0.1037 *** 0.040 













 -6+   -0.1117 ** 0.046   -0.1260  0.104 -5   -0.0965  0.066   -0.1223  0.131 
-4 0.0476  0.070 -0.0877  0.065 -0.0556  0.134 -0.0763  0.127 
-3 -0.0063  0.061 -0.0224  0.050 -0.0775  0.121 -0.0066  0.101 
-2 0.0010  0.059 0.0421  0.048 -0.0929  0.114 0.0408  0.098 
-1 -0.0238  0.056 -0.0069  0.050 -0.0921  0.098 0.0543  0.098 
1 -0.0167  0.053 0.4367 *** 0.119 -0.0830  0.099 0.3082 ** 0.153 
2 -0.0016  0.056   -0.0442  0.111   



















-5 0.0231  0.111 0.1168  0.102 0.1628  0.118 0.2538 ** 0.123 
-4 0.1942 * 0.101 0.0742  0.103 0.1582  0.101 0.1274  0.130 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.109 0.0342  0.116 0.1602  0.120 -0.0784  0.142 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.123 0.0098  0.107 0.3350 ** 0.136 -0.0545  0.133 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.133 -0.0547  0.119 0.3802 ** 0.149 -0.2519 * 0.142 
0 0.4750 *** 0.135 0.0386  0.050 0.0246  0.155 -0.0358  0.062 
1 0.4311 *** 0.139 0.0778  0.181 0.0251  0.164 -0.1700  0.192 
2 0.2919 ** 0.145 0.0495  0.161 -0.1648  0.180 -0.1493  0.172 












-6+ -0.1866 *** 0.057 -0.0219  0.026 -0.1145 * 0.064 -0.0288  0.023 
-5 -0.0926  0.060 0.0244  0.047 0.0648  0.066 0.0122  0.052 
-4 -0.0466  0.057 0.0958 ** 0.045 0.0809  0.063 0.1689 *** 0.050 
-3 -0.0109  0.065 0.0784 * 0.046 -0.0261  0.076 -0.0180  0.051 
-2 -0.0171  0.064 0.0915 ** 0.041 -0.0712  0.072 0.0188  0.047 
-1 0.0295  0.061 0.1102 ** 0.044 0.0405  0.069 0.0767 * 0.046 
1 0.1389 *** 0.053 0.2227 *** 0.051 0.0171  0.051 0.0944 * 0.052 
2 0.0495  0.060 0.3589 *** 0.045 0.0019  0.062 0.1996 *** 0.046 













 -6+ 0.2930 *** 0.088 0.0136  0.056 0.2872  0.187 0.0139  0.117 -5 0.1945 ** 0.088 0.0162  0.082 0.1065  0.173 0.0266  0.150 
-4 0.1914 ** 0.080 0.1390  0.086 0.2316  0.145 0.2313  0.166 
-3 0.1681 ** 0.078 0.1307 * 0.071 0.1138  0.128 0.1196  0.121 
-2 0.1266 * 0.073 0.0290  0.066 0.0577  0.125 0.0449  0.116 
-1 0.0552  0.068 0.0946  0.071 -0.0086  0.111 0.0369  0.114 
1 0.1937 *** 0.073   0.1943  0.122   
2 0.4184 *** 0.127   0.2666  0.168   



















-5   -0.0965  0.138   -0.1863  0.147 
-4   -0.2460 * 0.142   -0.5125 *** 0.155 
-3 -0.1017  0.142 -0.3105 ** 0.153 0.2935 ** 0.149 -0.1378  0.170 
-2 -0.0626  0.154 -0.2825 ** 0.139 0.4747 *** 0.162 -0.1158  0.162 
-1 -0.0113  0.165 -0.2908 * 0.158 0.4291 ** 0.174 -0.0403  0.169 
0 0.1901  0.171 0.0673  0.067 0.6516 *** 0.181 0.1887 ** 0.089 
1 -0.3262  0.207 -1.0800 *** 0.324 0.4699 ** 0.217 -0.2946  0.275 
2 -0.3312  0.309 -2.0720 *** 0.263 0.6458 ** 0.305 -1.0328 *** 0.244 
3+ -0.6715 ** 0.307 -1.3159 *** 0.251 0.2042  0.336 -0.2920  0.226 
log(gdp) 0,4120 *** 0.135 0.4486 *** 0.096 0.0861  0.137 -0.0434  0.093 
log(cpi) 0,6179 ** 0.240 0.2149  0.166 1.8327 *** 0.386 0.8706 *** 0.267 
log(price of gas) 0,1772 *** 0.038 0.1027 *** 0.028 0.2687 *** 0.037 0.1693 *** 0.026 
log(price of oil) 0,0120  0.029 -0.0295  0.021 0.0545 * 0.028 -0.0416 ** 0.020 
hydro share -0,0197  0.200 -0.3766 ** 0.148 0.3065  0.541 0.2685  0.363 
nuclear share 1,0271 ** 0.398 0.5777 ** 0.283 0.9909  0.820 1.3634 *** 0.512 
trend 0,0014  0.003 -0.0024  0.002 -0.0143 *** 0.004 -0.0105 *** 0.003 
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Country GDP weight 
Corruption 
perceptions index 
Order according to the 
polarity of the mean CPI 
Germany 22.03% 7.88 16 
United Kingdom 17.65% 8.55 10 
France 15.58% 6.9 20 
Italy 12.76% 4.85 17 
Spain 7.04% 6.54 24 
Netherlands 4.47% 8.86 7 
Sweden 2.93% 9.27 4 
Belgium 2.73% 6.62 23 
Austria 2.25% 7.95 15 
Poland 2.08% 4.17 11 
Denmark 1.86% 9.62 3 
Greece 1.59% 4.61 14 
Finland 1.45% 9.63 2 
Portugal 1.29% 6.51 25 
Ireland 1.20% 7.63 19 
Czech Republic 0.72% 4.52 12 
Hungary 0.59% 5.06 18 
Romania 0.51% 3.05 1 
Slovakia 0.27% 4.01 8 
Slovenia 0.24% 5.97 22 
Luxembourg 0.24% 8.64 9 
Bulgaria 0.17% 3.77 5 
Lithuania 0.16% 4.58 13 
Latvia 0.11% 3.81 6 
Estonia 0.08% 5.94 21 
 
Table A1: GDP and Polarity of the Corruption Perceptions Index 
This table shows the approximate weights assigned to individual countries 
(Mean GDP over the investigated period), the mean corruption 
perceptions index over the investigated period and the ranking of the 
country in terms of the polarity of the corruption perceptions index. 
Polarity is defined here as the distance of the index for a particular 
country from the mean index value across all the countries. The countries 




Appendix 5 – Estimation with and without the share of the largest generator  
System of 
equations 
SUR for industry and 
households 
SUR for industry and 
households with share of 
largest generator 
SUR for industry and 
households with the same 
254 observations 
Equation Industry Households Industry Households Industry Households 
Customer 
 
Industry Households Industry Households Industry Households 
R2 0.8355 0.9337 0.8549 0.9616 0.8539 0.9617 
Obs 425 425 254 254 254 254 








 -6+ 0.3597 *** 0.049 0.0585 ** 0.023 0.3503 *** 0.098 0.0568 ** 0.024 0.3417 *** 0.097 0.0564 ** 0.024 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.051 -0.0249  0.034 0.4595 *** 0.161 0.0106  0.061 0.4852 *** 0.161 0.0146  0.061 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.048 -0.0266  0.034 0.2840 *** 0.103 -0.1122 *** 0.034 0.2830 *** 0.103 -0.1137 *** 0.034 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.047 -0.0079  0.037 0.2055 ** 0.090 -0.1038 ** 0.051 0.1953 ** 0.090 -0.1112 ** 0.051 
-2 0.0858 * 0.048 0.0150  0.031 0.1628 ** 0.067 -0.0667  0.044 0.1656 ** 0.067 -0.0763 * 0.043 
-1 0.0190  0.049 -0.0017  0.033 0.0508  0.066 -0.1050 ** 0.045 0.0510  0.066 -0.1102 ** 0.045 
1 -0.0329  0.044 0.0117  0.036 0.0078  0.068 0.0373  0.036 0.0135  0.068 0.0321  0.036 
2 -0.0074  0.047 0.0595 * 0.033 0.0008  0.095 0.0697 * 0.037 -0.0018  0.096 0.0684 * 0.037 













 -6+    -0.1117 ** 0.046    -0.0152  0.044    -0.0148  0.044 -5    -0.0965  0.066    -0.0085  0.057    -0.0049  0.057 
-4 0.0476  0.070 -0.0877  0.065 -0.0664  0.090 -0.0346  0.055 -0.0553  0.090 -0.0458  0.054 
-3 -0.0063  0.061 -0.0224  0.050 -0.0538  0.080 -0.0250  0.045 -0.0525  0.080 -0.0281  0.045 
-2 0.0010  0.059 0.0421  0.048 -0.0447  0.076 0.0195  0.045 -0.0293  0.076 0.0193  0.045 
-1 -0.0238  0.056 -0.0069  0.050 -0.0042  0.064 -0.0326  0.050 0.0004  0.065 -0.0276  0.050 
1 -0.0167  0.053 0.4367 *** 0.119 0.0082  0.059    0.0048  0.060    
2 -0.0016  0.056    0.0582  0.078    0.0479  0.078    

















-5 0.0231  0.111 0.1168  0.102 -0.3545  0.391 -0.0498  0.153 -0.4481  0.388 -0.0568  0.153 
-4 0.1942 * 0.101 0.0742  0.103 -0.0257  0.272 0.2374 ** 0.093 -0.0553  0.272 0.2440 *** 0.093 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.109 0.0342  0.116 0.1689  0.244 0.2047  0.132 0.1704  0.245 0.2202 * 0.132 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.123 0.0098  0.107 0.1279  0.222 0.1937  0.126 0.0947  0.221 0.2118 * 0.125 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.133 -0.0547  0.119 0.3324  0.234 0.1447  0.134 0.3151  0.234 0.1502  0.134 
0 0.4750 *** 0.135 0.0386  0.050 0.3651  0.234 0.1122  0.157 0.3490  0.234 0.0957  0.156 
1 0.4311 *** 0.139 0.0778  0.181 0.2525  0.256 0.1616  0.290 0.2212  0.254 0.1899  0.290 
2 0.2919 ** 0.145 0.0495  0.161 0.1676  0.322 0.2177  0.266 0.1585  0.323 0.2361  0.266 












-6+ -0.1866 *** 0.057 -0.0219  0.026 -0.4346 *** 0.136 0.0426  0.032 -0.4525 *** 0.135 0.0476  0.032 
-5 -0.0926  0.060 0.0244  0.047 -0.3255 ** 0.135 0.0900  0.068 -0.3321 ** 0.136 0.1006  0.068 
-4 -0.0466  0.057 0.0958 ** 0.045 -0.2743 ** 0.129 0.1009 * 0.060 -0.2791 ** 0.130 0.1144 * 0.059 
-3 -0.0109  0.065 0.0784 * 0.046 -0.1593  0.134 0.2110 *** 0.064 -0.1619  0.135 0.2161 *** 0.064 
-2 -0.0171  0.064 0.0915 ** 0.041 -0.1131  0.127 0.0907 * 0.049 -0.1229  0.127 0.1005 ** 0.048 
-1 0.0295  0.061 0.1102 ** 0.044 0.0909  0.077 0.0742  0.047 0.0944  0.077 0.0831 * 0.047 
1 0.1389 *** 0.053 0.2227 *** 0.051 0.1921 ** 0.087 0.0975 * 0.052 0.1615 ** 0.081 0.1148 ** 0.049 
2 0.0495  0.060 0.3589 *** 0.045 -4.9302 * 2.982 0.1399 ** 0.056 -4.7502  2.995 0.1439 ** 0.056 













 -6+ 0.2930 *** 0.088 0.0136  0.056 0.2041  0.142 -0.1375 ** 0.056 0.2153  0.142 -0.1427 ** 0.056 -5 0.1945 ** 0.088 0.0162  0.082 0.1631  0.138 -0.0258  0.078 0.1589  0.138 -0.0327  0.078 
-4 0.1914 ** 0.080 0.1390  0.086 0.0054  0.117 0.0090  0.073 0.0081  0.118 0.0118  0.073 
-3 0.1681 ** 0.078 0.1307 * 0.071 0.0819  0.114 0.0793  0.063 0.0875  0.114 0.0819  0.063 
-2 0.1266 * 0.073 0.0290  0.066 0.0828  0.095 0.0001  0.065 0.0867  0.095 -0.0001  0.065 
-1 0.0552  0.068 0.0946  0.071 0.0087  0.080 0.0494  0.069 0.0110  0.081 0.0446  0.069 
1 0.1937 *** 0.073    0.2242  0.153    0.2349  0.153    
2 0.4184 *** 0.127    -3.3285  2.272    -3.1802  2.281    

















-5    -0.0965  0.138    -0.1561  0.174    -0.1697  0.173 
-4    -0.2460 * 0.142    -0.1514  0.154    -0.1665  0.153 
-3 -0.1017  0.142 -0.3105 ** 0.153 -0.4757 ** 0.231 -0.4718 *** 0.166 -0.4817 ** 0.232 -0.4829 *** 0.166 
-2 -0.0626  0.154 -0.2825 ** 0.139 -0.5222 ** 0.260 -0.2321 * 0.141 -0.5050 * 0.260 -0.2505 * 0.140 
-1 -0.0113  0.165 -0.2908 * 0.158 -0.8987 *** 0.315 -0.1192  0.157 -0.8926 *** 0.316 -0.1315  0.156 
0 0.1901  0.171 0.0673  0.067 -0.6947 ** 0.344 0.0714  0.175 -0.6720 * 0.345 0.0932  0.173 
1 -0.3262  0.207 -1.0800 *** 0.324 -1.4287 *** 0.454 -0.5455  0.398 -1.3350 *** 0.442 -0.6395  0.391 
2 -0.3312  0.309 -2.0720 *** 0.263 15.5227  10.073 -1.1129 *** 0.374 14.9391  10.117 -1.1441 *** 0.373 
3+ -0.6715 ** 0.307 -1.3159 *** 0.251 -0.7335  1.055 -0.8715 ** 0.341 -0.7213  1.059 -0.8777 ** 0.341 
log(gdp) 0.4120 *** 0.135 0.4486 *** 0.096 0.4827 * 0.246 0.7382 *** 0.115 0.4559 * 0.246 0.7367 *** 0.115 
log(cpi) 0.6179 ** 0.240 0.2149  0.166 -0.4144  0.536 0.5805 ** 0.266 -0.3557  0.536 0.5791 ** 0.266 
log(price of gas) 0.1772 *** 0.038 0.1027 *** 0.028 0.0765  0.049 0.0034  0.030 0.0804 * 0.049 -0.0002  0.029 
log(price of oil) 0.0120  0.029 -0.0295  0.021 -0.0139  0.043 -0.0312  0.024 -0.0083  0.043 -0.0317  0.024 
hydro share -0.0197  0.200 -0.3766 ** 0.148 -1.4302  0.943 0.8982 * 0.537 -1.4320  0.937 0.9225 * 0.529 
nuclear share 1.0271 ** 0.398 0.5777 ** 0.283 0.4135  0.522 0.4389  0.282 0.2651  0.491 0.4797 * 0.270 
trend 0.0014  0.003 -0.0024  0.002 0.0211 *** 0.005 -0.0009  0.004 0.0203 *** 0.005 -0.0009  0.004 
largest 
 
      -0.1513  0.209 0.0834  0.120       
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Appendix 6 – Jack-knife 
Country 
Base Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Industry 
R2 0.8355 0.8425 0.8320 0.8290 0.8335 0.8421 0.8322 0.8268 0.8406 0.8380 
Obs 425 408 401 417 409 401 416 402 401 402 









-6+ 0.3597 *** 0.3541 *** 0.3874 *** 0.3571 *** 0.3414 *** 0.4004 *** 0.3676 *** 0.3755 *** 0.3312 *** 0.3946 *** 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.2771 *** 0.2992 *** 0.2901 *** 0.2768 *** 0.3218 *** 0.2975 *** 0.2973 *** 0.2791 *** 0.3093 *** 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.1928 *** 0.2231 *** 0.2103 *** 0.1968 *** 0.2251 *** 0.2182 *** 0.2196 *** 0.1983 *** 0.2303 *** 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.1392 *** 0.1719 *** 0.1592 *** 0.1454 *** 0.1320 ** 0.1654 *** 0.1593 *** 0.1519 *** 0.1677 *** 
-2 0.0858 * 0.0797 * 0.0863 * 0.0834 * 0.0731  0.0877  0.0896 * 0.0929 * 0.0858 * 0.0734  
-1 0.0190  0.0155  0.0196  0.0160  0.0019  0.0256  0.0220  0.0154  0.0176  0.0052  
1 -0.0329  -0.0139  -0.0442  -0.0347  -0.0383  -0.0313  -0.0315  -0.0139  -0.0373  -0.0156  
2 -0.0074  0.0269  -0.0248  -0.0085  -0.0168  -0.0625  -0.0053  0.0262  -0.0129  0.0249  













 -4 0.0476  0.0375  0.0393  0.0435  -0.0084  0.0048  0.0536  0.0671  0.0481  0.0392  
-3 -0.0063  -0.0105  -0.0077  -0.0153  -0.0065  -0.0724  -0.0020  0.0118  -0.0075  -0.0092  
-2 0.0010  -0.0069  0.0088  0.0032  -0.0066  -0.0553  0.0016  0.0018  -0.0014  0.0035  
-1 -0.0238  -0.0296  -0.0273  -0.0185  -0.0328  -0.0511  -0.0229  -0.0226  -0.0231  -0.0309  
1 -0.0167  -0.0233  -0.0021  -0.0149  -0.0570  -0.0362  -0.0174  -0.0137  -0.0164  -0.0257  
2 -0.0016  -0.0020  0.0187  -0.0013  -0.0622  -0.0382  -0.0035  0.0093  -0.0056  -0.0224  

















-5 0.0231  0.0246  0.0755  0.0221  0.0193  0.0456  0.0185  0.0422  0.0081  0.0861  
-4 0.1942 * 0.1953 * 0.2332 ** 0.1923 * 0.1894 ** 0.2497 ** 0.1823 * 0.2039 ** 0.1996 * 0.2494 ** 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.3337 *** 0.3527 *** 0.3271 *** 0.3239 *** 0.5060 *** 0.3173 *** 0.3650 *** 0.3313 *** 0.4156 *** 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.3787 *** 0.4244 *** 0.3980 *** 0.3896 *** 0.4867 *** 0.3848 *** 0.4408 *** 0.3911 *** 0.5240 *** 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.4652 *** 0.5231 *** 0.4974 *** 0.4914 *** 0.5620 *** 0.4779 *** 0.5634 *** 0.4816 *** 0.6456 *** 
0 0.4750 *** 0.4264 *** 0.4988 *** 0.4683 *** 0.4010 *** 0.5467 *** 0.4603 *** 0.5477 *** 0.4677 *** 0.6067 *** 
1 0.4311 *** 0.3567 ** 0.4486 *** 0.4315 *** 0.3818 *** 0.5101 *** 0.4081 *** 0.4614 *** 0.4388 *** 0.5575 *** 
2 0.2919 ** 0.1788  0.3012 ** 0.2901 ** 0.2674 * 0.5520 *** 0.2629 * 0.2848 * 0.3132 ** 0.4262 *** 












-6+ -0.1866 *** -0.1641 *** -0.1930 *** -0.1865 *** -0.1952 *** -0.4263 *** -0.1820 *** -0.2330 *** -0.1836 *** -0.1942 *** 
-5 -0.0926  -0.0708  -0.0879  -0.0921  -0.1027 * -0.2939 *** -0.0877  -0.1412 ** -0.1020 * -0.0970  
-4 -0.0466  -0.0286  -0.0388  -0.0467  -0.0579  -0.2595 *** -0.0415  -0.0972  -0.0572  -0.0573  
-3 -0.0109  -0.0078  -0.0013  -0.0115  -0.0385  -0.1501  -0.0108  -0.0372  -0.0172  -0.0052  
-2 -0.0171  -0.0349  -0.0059  -0.0158  -0.0521  -0.2333 ** -0.0188  -0.0464  -0.0253  -0.0207  
-1 0.0295  0.0252  0.0295  0.0307  0.0018  -0.1172  0.0300  0.0317  0.0250  0.0267  
1 0.1389 *** 0.1378 *** 0.1500 *** 0.1408 *** 0.1286 ** 0.0226  0.1369 ** 0.1059 ** 0.1388 ** 0.1385 *** 
2 0.0495  0.0549  0.0706  0.0516  0.0170  0.0131  0.0480  0.0010  0.0488  0.0507  













-6+ 0.2930 *** 0.3044 *** 0.3269 *** 0.2972 *** 0.3089 *** 0.2214 ** 0.2896 *** 0.2486 *** 0.2769 *** 0.2539 *** 
-5 0.1945 ** 0.2083 ** 0.2161 ** 0.1922 ** 0.1865 ** 0.0870  0.1940 ** 0.1541 * 0.1880 ** 0.1397  
-4 0.1914 ** 0.1984 ** 0.2091 *** 0.1900 ** 0.1433 * 0.0992  0.1917 ** 0.1644 ** 0.1865 ** 0.1434 * 
-3 0.1681 ** 0.1624 ** 0.1794 ** 0.1707 ** 0.1681 ** 0.1434 * 0.1692 ** 0.1500 * 0.1664 ** 0.1368 * 
-2 0.1266 * 0.1196 * 0.1348 * 0.1251 * 0.1487 ** 0.0779  0.1260 * 0.1149  0.1286 * 0.1044  
-1 0.0552  0.0624  0.0581  0.0527  0.0672  0.0250  0.0558  0.0582  0.0569  0.0445  
1 0.1937 *** 0.1961 *** 0.1815 ** 0.1940 *** 0.1784 ** 0.1889 ** 0.1898 ** 0.1941 *** 0.1978 *** 0.2166 *** 
2 0.4184 *** 0.4391 *** 0.4037 *** 0.4213 *** 0.3417 *** 0.4813 *** 0.4178 *** 0.4004 *** 0.4278 *** 0.4438 *** 
3+ 0.6101 *** 0.6009 *** 0.6184 *** 0.6102 *** (droppe
 
















x -3 -0.1017 
 -0.0599  -0.0949  -0.0991  -0.0547  -0.3520 * -0.0890  -0.1668  -0.1159  -0.1688  
-2 -0.0626  0.0208  -0.0526  -0.0653  0.0162  -0.1469  -0.0453  -0.1300  -0.0837  -0.1255  
-1 -0.0113  0.0257  0.0393  -0.0153  0.0538  -0.3046  0.0012  -0.1627  -0.0451  -0.1039  
0 0.1901  0.2180  0.2528  0.1884  0.1737  -0.4730 ** 0.2050  0.0334  0.1446  0.0576  
1 -0.3262  -0.2910  -0.2657  -0.3357  -0.3462 * -0.7611 *** -0.3030  -0.4162 * -0.3845 * -0.4916 ** 
2 -0.3312  -0.3365  -0.2594  -0.3408  -0.2445  -1.1364 *** -0.3150  -0.3734  -0.4083  -0.5097 * 
3+ -0.6715 ** -0.6323 ** -0.6542 ** -0.6864 ** -0.6671 ** -1.1048 *** -0.6560 ** -0.7685 ** -0.6914 ** -0.8952 *** 
log(gdp) 0.4120 *** 0.3857 *** 0.3460 ** 0.4054 *** 0.4070 *** 0.5147 *** 0.4368 *** 0.4279 *** 0.3731 *** 0.3401 ** 
log(cpi) 0.6179 ** 0.5635 ** 0.7881 *** 0.6194 ** 0.7878 *** 0.3180  0.6594 *** 0.5735 ** 0.5234 ** 0.4663 * 
log(price of 
 
0.1772 *** 0.1545 *** 0.1862 *** 0.1776 *** 0.1812 *** 0.1842 *** 0.1766 *** 0.2058 *** 0.1978 *** 0.1959 *** 
log(price of oil) 0.0120  0.0217  0.0122  0.0119  0.0064  0.0191  0.0145  0.0133  0.0016  0.0114  
hydro share -0.0197  0.0384  -0.1084  -0.0243  0.0508  -0.2294  0.0035  -0.0843  0.0518  -0.0974  
nuclear share 1.0271 ** 1.0918 *** 1.1526 *** 1.0000 ** 0.6071  1.0151 ** 1.0664 *** 1.0180 ** 1.0840 *** 0.9118 ** 





Base Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg 
Netherlan
ds Poland Industry 
R2 0.8355 0.8351 0.8341 0.8355 0.8212 0.8270 0.8339 0.8347 0.8422 0.8295 
Obs 425 401 411 409 402 417 417 403 408 411 









-6+ 0.3597 *** 0.4265 *** 0.3559 *** 0.3637 *** 0.3223 *** 0.3434 *** 0.3611 *** 0.3291 *** 0.3979 *** 0.3496 *** 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.3538 *** 0.2865 *** 0.2783 *** 0.2732 *** 0.2837 *** 0.2922 *** 0.2761 *** 0.3698 *** 0.2713 *** 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.2667 *** 0.2103 *** 0.1963 *** 0.1958 *** 0.2064 *** 0.2150 *** 0.2278 *** 0.2806 *** 0.1889 *** 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.1863 *** 0.1598 *** 0.1604 *** 0.1344 *** 0.1563 *** 0.1615 *** 0.1848 *** 0.2131 *** 0.1514 *** 
-2 0.0858 * 0.0948 * 0.0870 * 0.0843 * 0.0686  0.0762  0.0851 * 0.0946 * 0.1395 *** 0.0775  
-1 0.0190  0.0232  0.0184  0.0194  0.0336  0.0112  0.0179  0.0158  0.0486  0.0158  
1 -0.0329  -0.0110  -0.0306  -0.0345  -0.0459  -0.0458  -0.0316  -0.0447  -0.0173  -0.0377  
2 -0.0074  0.0341  -0.0004  -0.0062  -0.0283  -0.0122  -0.0086  -0.0299  -0.0203  -0.0188  













 -4 0.0476  0.1186  0.1428 * 0.0509  -0.0085  0.0636  0.0166  0.0324  0.0373  0.1150  
-3 -0.0063  0.0245  0.0634  -0.0072  -0.0390  0.0118  -0.0254  -0.0127  -0.0034  -0.0267  
-2 0.0010  0.0011  0.0437  0.0031  0.0062  0.0156  -0.0128  -0.0006  0.0199  -0.0436  
-1 -0.0238  -0.0265  -0.0035  -0.0218  0.0101  -0.0043  -0.0461  -0.0265  -0.0118  -0.0370  
1 -0.0167  0.0273  -0.0503  -0.0130  -0.0294  0.0081  -0.0224  -0.0226  -0.0123  -0.0273  
2 -0.0016  0.0863  -0.0179  0.0000  -0.0364  0.0268  -0.0017  -0.0057  -0.0174  -0.0083  

















-5 0.0231  0.0323  0.0315  0.0612  -0.0043  0.0038  0.0339  -0.0103  -0.0766  0.0728  
-4 0.1942 * 0.2384 ** 0.1945 * 0.2243 ** 0.1473  0.1670 * 0.2072 ** 0.0924  0.1024  0.2593 ** 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.5046 *** 0.3321 *** 0.3374 *** 0.2806 ** 0.2950 *** 0.3554 *** 0.1944  0.2672 ** 0.3644 *** 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.6464 *** 0.4091 *** 0.4015 *** 0.2758 ** 0.3812 *** 0.4281 *** 0.2736 ** 0.3090 ** 0.4591 *** 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.7397 *** 0.5181 *** 0.4885 *** 0.2676 * 0.4700 *** 0.5246 *** 0.3897 *** 0.4649 *** 0.5498 *** 
0 0.4750 *** 0.7208 *** 0.4965 *** 0.4656 *** 0.3341 ** 0.4151 *** 0.4935 *** 0.3557 ** 0.5160 *** 0.5308 *** 
1 0.4311 *** 0.5498 *** 0.4486 *** 0.4126 *** 0.3340 ** 0.4225 *** 0.4419 *** 0.3317 ** 0.4316 *** 0.5172 *** 
2 0.2919 ** 0.2813  0.2916 ** 0.2654 * 0.2313  0.2484 * 0.3078 ** 0.1990  0.3738 ** 0.4035 *** 












-6+ -0.1866 *** -0.1673 *** -0.1794 *** -0.1758 *** -0.1793 *** -0.1609 *** -0.1889 *** -0.1954 *** -0.1696 *** -0.1715 *** 
-5 -0.0926  -0.0856  -0.0854  -0.0791  -0.1890 *** -0.0647  -0.0939  -0.0958  -0.0273  -0.0816  
-4 -0.0466  -0.0335  -0.0389  -0.0347  -0.1171 * -0.0196  -0.0462  -0.0482  -0.0097  -0.0334  
-3 -0.0109  0.0097  -0.0039  -0.0032  -0.0345  0.0000  -0.0190  -0.0235  0.0674  -0.0237  
-2 -0.0171  -0.0086  -0.0178  -0.0071  -0.0327  -0.0038  -0.0347  -0.0172  0.1091  -0.0246  
-1 0.0295  0.0313  0.0366  0.0336  0.0164  0.0505  0.0178  0.0356  0.1018  0.0300  
1 0.1389 *** 0.1344 ** 0.1273 ** 0.1380 *** 0.1431 *** 0.1561 *** 0.1354 ** 0.1404 *** 0.1396 *** 0.1422 *** 
2 0.0495  0.0360  0.0452  0.0492  0.0505  0.0591  0.0401  0.0553  0.0491  0.0493  













-6+ 0.2930 *** 0.3232 *** 0.1935 * 0.2924 *** 0.1958 * 0.2938 *** 0.3573 *** 0.3463 *** 0.2792 *** 0.2506 ** 
-5 0.1945 ** 0.2340 ** 0.1207  0.1917 ** 0.2053 * 0.1984 ** 0.2430 *** 0.2406 *** 0.1315  0.0935  
-4 0.1914 ** 0.2205 ** 0.1393  0.1928 ** 0.1630 * 0.1843 ** 0.2158 *** 0.2311 *** 0.1582 ** 0.1398  
-3 0.1681 ** 0.2058 ** 0.1404 * 0.1701 ** 0.2208 ** 0.1529 * 0.1763 ** 0.1823 ** 0.1489 * 0.1831 ** 
-2 0.1266 * 0.1530 ** 0.1140  0.1216 * 0.1522  0.1012  0.1268 * 0.1441 * 0.1406 * 0.1187  
-1 0.0552  0.0612  0.0481  0.0547  0.0643  0.0419  0.0553  0.0626  0.0638  0.0327  
1 0.1937 *** 0.1831 ** 0.2014 *** 0.1953 *** 0.2675 *** 0.1769 ** 0.2087 *** 0.2030 *** 0.2002 *** 0.1664 ** 
2 0.4184 *** 0.3751 *** 0.4311 *** 0.4187 *** 0.4551 *** 0.3739 *** 0.4136 *** 0.4122 *** 0.4368 *** 0.3286 ** 
















x -3 -0.1017 
 -0.1567  -0.0999  -0.0907  -0.3337 * -0.0503  -0.0818  -0.0441  -0.2257  -0.0209  
-2 -0.0626  -0.0705  -0.0388  -0.0421  -0.2534  -0.0216  -0.0136  -0.0305  -0.3010 * -0.0062  
-1 -0.0113  0.0543  -0.0035  0.0198  -0.1877  0.0135  0.0385  0.0305  -0.1639  0.0429  
0 0.1901  0.2759  0.2343  0.2342  -0.0247  0.2747  0.2138  0.2568  0.1778  0.2356  
1 -0.3262  -0.1951  -0.2262  -0.2835  -0.7121 ** -0.2995  -0.3031  -0.2748  -0.3428  -0.2996  
2 -0.3312  -0.0851  -0.2557  -0.2780  -0.6612 * -0.2309  -0.2591  -0.2405  -0.3670  -0.2100  
3+ -0.6715 ** -0.4940  -0.5661 * -0.6125 ** -1.0001 *** -0.5844 * -0.6344 ** -0.4503  -0.4654  -0.5787 * 
log(gdp) 0.4120 *** 0.3663 *** 0.4834 *** 0.4056 *** 0.4151 *** 0.3849 *** 0.3130 ** 0.3533 ** 0.4403 *** 0.4282 *** 
log(cpi) 0.6179 ** 0.8061 *** 0.3599  0.6618 *** 0.6796 *** 0.7477 *** 0.7243 *** 0.7890 *** 0.5311 ** 0.3702  
log(price of 
 
0.1772 *** 0.1643 *** 0.1576 *** 0.1744 *** 0.1709 *** 0.1779 *** 0.1825 *** 0.1610 *** 0.1601 *** 0.2016 *** 
log(price of oil) 0.0120  0.0159  0.0155  0.0224  0.0115  0.0137  0.0105  0.0248  0.0117  0.0036  
hydro share -0.0197  -0.0344  -0.0304  0.0071  0.0249  0.0343  -0.0409  0.9431 * -0.1260  -0.0665  
nuclear share 1.0271 ** 1.0545 ** 0.9056 ** 1.0289 ** 1.1421 *** 1.0732 *** 1.5304 ** 1.1509 *** 0.8069 ** 1.1152 *** 




Base Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom Industry 
R2 0.8355 0.8305 0.8339 0.8322 0.8331 0.8498 0.8490 0.8642 
Obs 425 412 419 417 409 402 403 402 









-6+ 0.3597 *** 0.3625 *** 0.3488 *** 0.3616 *** 0.3506 *** 0.3340 *** 0.3191 *** 0.3878 *** 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.2878 *** 0.2805 *** 0.2936 *** 0.2618 *** 0.2771 *** 0.2572 *** 0.3066 *** 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.2127 *** 0.1995 *** 0.2146 *** 0.1898 *** 0.2002 *** 0.1832 *** 0.2196 *** 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.1579 *** 0.1484 *** 0.1619 *** 0.1396 *** 0.1475 *** 0.1423 *** 0.1592 *** 
-2 0.0858 * 0.0831 * 0.0747  0.0860 * 0.0668  0.0798  0.0860 * 0.0820 * 
-1 0.0190  0.0148  0.0076  0.0205  0.0067  0.0165  0.0305  0.0133  
1 -0.0329  -0.0197  -0.0496  -0.0315  -0.0442  -0.0411  -0.0222  -0.0651  
2 -0.0074  0.0077  -0.0268  -0.0105  -0.0275  -0.0215  0.0260  -0.0445  













 -4 0.0476  0.0658  0.0597  0.0460  -0.1203  0.0318  0.0368  -0.0006  
-3 -0.0063  0.0154  -0.0100  -0.0096  -0.1006  -0.0077  -0.0003  -0.0457  
-2 0.0010  0.0072  -0.0061  -0.0052  -0.1122 * 0.0202  0.0202  -0.0224  
-1 -0.0238  -0.0044  -0.0273  -0.0361  -0.1073 * -0.0205  -0.0083  -0.0360  
1 -0.0167  -0.0144  -0.0322  -0.0170  -0.0574  -0.0163  -0.0100  -0.0078  
2 -0.0016  0.0091  -0.0175  -0.0015  -0.0577  -0.0061  -0.0028  -0.0026  

















-5 0.0231  0.0447  0.0271  0.0241  0.1026  -0.0040  0.0409  0.0315  
-4 0.1942 * 0.2086 ** 0.2053 ** 0.1924 * 0.2591 *** 0.1502  0.2042 ** 0.2124 ** 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.3469 *** 0.3373 *** 0.3325 *** 0.4106 *** 0.2913 ** 0.3310 *** 0.3614 *** 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.4339 *** 0.4010 *** 0.4042 *** 0.5049 *** 0.3288 ** 0.3684 *** 0.4034 *** 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.5075 *** 0.4931 *** 0.4964 *** 0.5928 *** 0.4441 *** 0.4602 *** 0.4816 *** 
0 0.4750 *** 0.5159 *** 0.4293 *** 0.4840 *** 0.5392 *** 0.4153 *** 0.4844 *** 0.4323 *** 
1 0.4311 *** 0.4442 *** 0.4510 *** 0.4360 *** 0.5459 *** 0.4003 *** 0.4347 *** 0.4491 *** 
2 0.2919 ** 0.2911 ** 0.3212 ** 0.3118 ** 0.4429 *** 0.2667 * 0.2674 * 0.3363 ** 












-6+ -0.1866 *** -0.1746 *** -0.2196 *** -0.1863 *** -0.1534 *** -0.2121 *** -0.1433 *** -0.1871  
-5 -0.0926  -0.0641  -0.1251 ** -0.0924  -0.0635  -0.1118 * -0.0489  -0.0891  
-4 -0.0466  -0.0301  -0.0827  -0.0459  -0.0182  -0.0725  0.0018  -0.0503  
-3 -0.0109  0.0046  -0.0481  -0.0119  -0.0130  -0.0079  0.0551  -0.0054  
-2 -0.0171  -0.0066  -0.0466  -0.0146  -0.0149  0.0023  0.0482  -0.0010  
-1 0.0295  0.0411  -0.0034  0.0370  0.0389  0.0348  0.0721  0.0387  
1 0.1389 *** 0.1417 *** 0.0923 * 0.1375 *** 0.1480 *** 0.1619 *** 0.1472 *** 0.1900 *** 
2 0.0495  0.0566  -0.0277  0.0454  0.0556  0.1044  0.0850  0.0574  













-6+ 0.2930 *** 0.2955 *** 0.2724 *** 0.2915 *** 0.4285 *** 0.3428 *** 0.2791 *** 0.2898  
-5 0.1945 ** 0.1836 ** 0.1787 ** 0.1934 ** 0.3637 *** 0.2304 ** 0.1759 ** 0.1838 ** 
-4 0.1914 ** 0.1941 ** 0.1926 ** 0.1889 ** 0.4410 *** 0.2311 *** 0.1667 ** 0.1783 ** 
-3 0.1681 ** 0.1408 * 0.1774 ** 0.1652 ** 0.2429 ** 0.1884 ** 0.1483 ** 0.1525 ** 
-2 0.1266 * 0.1345 * 0.1225 * 0.1240 * 0.2313 ** 0.1405 * 0.1200 * 0.1114  
-1 0.0552  0.0699  0.0486  0.0368  0.1161  0.0539  0.0575  0.0539  
1 0.1937 *** 0.1930 ** 0.1837 ** 0.1958 ** 0.2361 ** 0.1599 * 0.1926 *** 0.1425 * 
2 0.4184 *** 0.3996 *** 0.3573 *** 0.3903 *** 0.3995 *** 0.5742 ** 0.4744 *** 0.4529 *** 
















x -3 -0.1017 
 -0.0596  -0.0892  -0.0995  -0.0186  -0.1396  -0.1589  -0.1292  
-2 -0.0626  -0.0656  -0.0716  -0.0704  0.0161  -0.0977  -0.1294  -0.1179  
-1 -0.0113  -0.0273  -0.0181  -0.0364  0.0619  0.0335  -0.0262  -0.0854  
0 0.1901  0.2192  0.0677  0.1910  0.2981 * 0.2581  0.2796 * 0.1231  
1 -0.3262  -0.2904  -0.2687  -0.3212  -0.2529  -0.2363  -0.2492  -0.4203 ** 
2 -0.3312  -0.2646  -0.0655  -0.3020  -0.1749  -0.5776  -0.3680  -0.5189 * 
3+ -0.6715 ** -0.5861 * -0.6036 ** -0.6426 ** -0.4258  -0.7539  -0.9326 *** -0.9075 *** 
log(gdp) 0.4120 *** 0.4050 *** 0.4984 *** 0.4032 *** 0.4421 *** 0.3464 ** 0.4474 *** 0.6971  
log(cpi) 0.6179 ** 0.6044 ** 0.5714 ** 0.6048 ** 0.3104  0.7425 *** 0.7621 *** 0.1642  
log(price of 
 
0.1772 *** 0.1743 *** 0.1801 *** 0.1759 *** 0.1936 *** 0.1858 *** 0.1634 *** 0.1268  
log(price of oil) 0.0120  0.0096  0.0043  0.0125  0.0044  0.0022  0.0215  -0.0009  
hydro share -0.0197  -0.0122  -0.0202  -0.0434  -0.0763  -0.1378  -0.0216  -0.0387  
nuclear share 1.0271 ** 1.0616 *** 1.1944 *** 1.1124 *** 1.1034 ** 0.5294  0.8225 ** 0.7511  




Country BASE  Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Households 
R2 0.9337 0.9357 0.9309 0.9292 0.9296 0.9427 0.9308 0.9378 0.9359 0.9289 
Obs 425 408 401 417 409 401 416 402 401 402 









-6+ 0.0585 ** 0.0449 * 0.0543 ** 0.0577 ** 0.0565 ** 0.0556 ** 0.0542 ** 0.0338  0.0601 ** 0.0531 ** 
-5 -0.0249  -0.0409  -0.0200  -0.0245  -0.0288  0.0132  -0.0279  -0.0526  -0.0178  -0.0430  
-4 -0.0266  -0.0315  -0.0275  -0.0270  -0.0261  -0.0295  -0.0275  -0.0443  -0.0179  -0.0515  
-3 -0.0079  -0.0033  0.0060  -0.0058  0.0019  0.0118  -0.0089  -0.0797 * 0.0012  -0.0213  
-2 0.0150  0.0292  0.0233  0.0150  0.0176  0.0275  0.0151  -0.0316  0.0225  0.0175  
-1 -0.0017  0.0219  0.0142  0.0004  0.0022  -0.0382  -0.0016  -0.0381  0.0005  0.0092  
1 0.0117  0.0255  0.0080  0.0130  0.0219  -0.0507  0.0135  0.0793  0.0053  0.0180  
2 0.0595 * 0.0595 * 0.0506  0.0597 * 0.0793 ** -0.0409  0.0609 * 0.1651 *** 0.0529  0.0612 * 













 -6+ -0.1117 ** -0.1016 ** -0.1129 ** -0.1193 ** -0.1072 ** -0.1077 ** -0.1091 ** -0.0828 * -0.1146 ** -0.1091 ** 
-5 -0.0965  -0.0855  -0.0999  -0.0984  -0.0810  -0.0686  -0.0962  -0.0900  -0.0955  -0.0850  
-4 -0.0877  -0.0746  -0.0972  -0.0880  -0.0727  -0.0542  -0.0856  -0.0717  -0.0914  -0.0808  
-3 -0.0224  -0.0073  -0.0205  -0.0311  0.0029  0.0162  -0.0222  -0.0411  -0.0229  -0.0116  
-2 0.0421  0.0498  0.0335  0.0420  0.0302  0.0722  0.0422  0.0330  0.0365  0.0436  
-1 -0.0069  0.0078  -0.0392  -0.0129  -0.0133  -0.0274  -0.0076  -0.0124  -0.0106  -0.0078  


















-5 0.1168  0.1230  0.1108  0.1157  0.1306  -0.0133  0.1199  0.1595  0.1020  0.1314  
-4 0.0742  0.0613  0.0850  0.0772  0.0702  0.0349  0.0706  0.0824  0.0632  0.1101  
-3 0.0342  -0.0042  0.0140  0.0294  -0.0083  -0.0515  0.0355  0.2028  0.0169  0.0383  
-2 0.0098  -0.0300  0.0083  0.0153  0.0036  -0.0629  0.0103  0.1168  0.0069  0.0040  
-1 -0.0547  -0.1232  -0.0207  -0.0587  -0.0696  0.0476  -0.0531  0.0214  -0.0522  -0.0671  
0 0.0386  0.0438  0.0547  0.0520  0.0309  0.0396  0.0422  0.0190  0.0453  0.0623  
1 0.0778  0.0116  0.1319  0.0795  0.0458  0.3463 * 0.0821  -0.1841  0.0989  0.0395  
2 0.0495  0.0440  0.0808  0.0605  0.0007  0.4457 ** 0.0563  -0.3421 * 0.0683  0.0251  












-6+ -0.0219  -0.0121  -0.0201  -0.0229  -0.0249  0.0527 ** -0.0211  0.0013  -0.0125  -0.0127  
-5 0.0244  0.0266  0.0145  0.0218  0.0144  0.0456  0.0258  0.0861 * 0.0250  0.0255  
-4 0.0958 ** 0.0884 ** 0.0914 ** 0.0956 ** 0.1139 ** 0.1709 ** 0.0957 ** 0.1380 *** 0.0979 ** 0.0927 ** 
-3 0.0784 * 0.0710  0.0590  0.0756  0.0697  0.0546  0.0785 * 0.1562 *** 0.0822 * 0.0774  
-2 0.0915 ** 0.0968 ** 0.0813 * 0.0915 ** 0.0772 * 0.0687  0.0916 ** 0.1451 *** 0.0944 ** 0.0925 ** 
-1 0.1102 ** 0.0884 ** 0.0984 ** 0.1086 ** 0.0995 ** 0.1200 ** 0.1091 ** 0.1329 *** 0.1094 ** 0.0993 ** 
1 0.2227 *** 0.1945 *** 0.2220 *** 0.2218 *** 0.2277 *** 0.2302 *** 0.2203 *** 0.1733 *** 0.2271 *** 0.2149 *** 
2 0.3589 *** 0.3482 *** 0.3634 *** 0.3586 *** 0.3535 *** 0.3912 *** 0.3585 *** 0.2884 *** 0.3592 *** 0.3562 *** 














-6+ 0.0136  0.0070  0.0188  0.0207  0.0614  -0.0690  0.0118  -0.0285  0.0112  0.0063  
-5 0.0162  0.0076  0.0271  0.0165  -0.0086  -0.0741  0.0178  0.0067  0.0130  -0.0026  
-4 0.1390  0.1274  0.1607 * 0.1408  0.0885  0.0681  0.1387  0.1208  0.1435  0.1328  
-3 0.1307 * 0.1142  0.1505 ** 0.1401 * 0.1158  0.0189  0.1308 * 0.1398 ** 0.1297 * 0.1210 * 
-2 0.0290  0.0303  0.0467  0.0292  0.0430  -0.0512  0.0303  0.0404  0.0339  0.0253  


















-5 -0.0965  -0.0759  -0.0876  -0.0918  -0.0815  0.0184  -0.1016  -0.2221  -0.0824  -0.0690  
-4 -0.2460 * -0.2074  -0.2562 * -0.2497 * -0.3357 ** -0.2730  -0.2434 * -0.3115 ** -0.2470 * -0.2276  
-3 -0.3105 ** -0.2611 * -0.3057 ** -0.3041 ** -0.2929 * -0.0974  -0.3098 ** -0.4761 *** -0.3139 ** -0.2916 * 
-2 -0.2825 ** -0.2915 ** -0.2887 ** -0.2895 ** -0.2458 * -0.1062  -0.2831 ** -0.4009 *** -0.2986 ** -0.2817 ** 
-1 -0.2908 * -0.2199  -0.3282 ** -0.2871 * -0.2586 * -0.2853  -0.2888 * -0.3154 * -0.2965 * -0.2526  
0 0.0673  0.0673  0.0523  0.0568  0.0616  0.0747  0.0670  0.1011  0.0570  0.0533  
1 -1.0800 *** -0.9268 *** -1.1144 *** -1.0790 *** -1.1195 *** -0.9882 *** -1.0735 *** -0.8654 ** -1.0997 *** -1.0325 *** 
2 -2.0720 *** -2.0066 *** -2.0972 *** -2.0755 *** -2.1040 *** -2.0753 *** -2.0646 *** -1.7822 *** -2.0747 *** -2.0524 *** 
3+ -1.3159 *** -1.3890 *** -1.2168 *** -1.3166 *** -1.3173 *** -1.3994 *** -1.2898 *** -0.9783 *** -1.2973 *** -0.7001 ** 
log(gdp) 0.4486 *** 0.4409 *** 0.4281 *** 0.4425 *** 0.3469 *** 0.4087 *** 0.4384 *** 0.4409 *** 0.4194 *** 0.4184 *** 
log(cpi) 0.2149  0.1919  0.1318  0.2084  0.3938 ** 0.3049 * 0.2276  0.3356 ** 0.1561  0.1876  
log(price of 
 
0.1027 *** 0.0972 *** 0.1048 *** 0.1034 *** 0.0869 *** 0.1379 *** 0.1085 *** 0.1378 *** 0.1104 *** 0.1029 *** 
log(price of oil) -0.0295  -0.0197  -0.0291  -0.0303  -0.0288  -0.0304  -0.0325  -0.0334  -0.0325  -0.0238  
hydro share -0.3766 ** -0.3710 ** -0.3347 ** -0.3792 ** -0.3461 ** -0.4544 *** -0.3753 ** -0.4217 *** -0.3454 ** -0.3948 *** 
nuclear share 0.5777 ** 0.6676 ** 0.5547 * 0.5830 ** 0.1766  0.4578 * 0.5797 ** 0.4992 * 0.6239 ** 0.6058 ** 




Country BASE  Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg 
Netherlan
ds Poland Households 
R2 0.9337 0.9268 0.9349 0.9343 0.9222 0.9346 0.9347 0.9346 0.9356 0.9336 
Obs 425 401 411 409 402 417 417 403 408 411 









-6+ 0.0585 ** 0.0847 *** 0.0478 ** 0.0675 *** 0.0787 *** 0.0542 ** 0.0681 *** 0.0640 ** 0.0666 *** 0.0532 ** 
-5 -0.0249  -0.0175  -0.0345  -0.0226  0.0041  -0.0267  -0.0179  -0.0110  -0.0222  -0.0278  
-4 -0.0266  -0.0191  -0.0338  -0.0257  0.0027  -0.0296  -0.0215  -0.0169  -0.0455  -0.0260  
-3 -0.0079  -0.0015  -0.0125  -0.0048  0.0037  -0.0040  0.0068  -0.0033  -0.0192  0.0029  
-2 0.0150  0.0151  0.0144  0.0071  0.0203  0.0162  0.0173  0.0092  0.0197  0.0178  
-1 -0.0017  0.0156  -0.0030  -0.0016  -0.0009  -0.0023  -0.0002  -0.0093  -0.0249  0.0017  
1 0.0117  0.0199  0.0136  0.0123  -0.0001  0.0162  0.0068  0.0089  0.0118  0.0122  
2 0.0595 * 0.0588 * 0.0613 * 0.0601 * 0.0398  0.0598 * 0.0504  0.0522  0.0537  0.0576 * 













 -6+ -0.1117 ** -0.1298 *** -0.0961 *** -0.1264 *** -0.1246 *** -0.1125 ** -0.1285 *** -0.1138 ** -0.1192 *** -0.0851 * 
-5 -0.0965  -0.1388 * -0.0864  -0.1010  -0.0841  -0.1008  -0.0963  -0.0941  -0.0968  -0.1036  
-4 -0.0877  -0.1162  0.0546  -0.0932  -0.0904  -0.0881  -0.0870  -0.0895  -0.0883  -0.0799  
-3 -0.0224  -0.0442  -0.0140  -0.0335  -0.0130  -0.0436  0.0129  -0.0243  -0.0306  -0.0073  
-2 0.0421  0.0189  0.0604  0.0601  0.0477  0.0168  0.0548  0.0340  0.0450  0.0429  
-1 -0.0069  0.0167  -0.0018  -0.0056  -0.0009  0.0208  -0.0298  -0.0165  -0.0208  -0.0077  


















-5 0.1168  0.1944  0.1263  0.1158  0.0548  0.1162  0.1177  0.0873  0.1182  0.1230  
-4 0.0742  0.1195  0.0830  0.0748  0.0457  0.0729  0.0738  0.0554  0.1154  0.0696  
-3 0.0342  0.0661  0.0384  0.0432  0.0000  0.0129  -0.0049  0.0402  0.0680  -0.0049  
-2 0.0098  0.0533  -0.0004  -0.0130  -0.0070  0.0034  -0.0022  0.0412  -0.0033  -0.0021  
-1 -0.0547  -0.1355  -0.0608  -0.0568  -0.0806  -0.0596  -0.0640  -0.0166  0.0126  -0.0584  
0 0.0386  0.0388  0.0062  0.0353  0.0132  0.0336  0.0394  0.0408  0.0365  0.0526  
1 0.0778  0.0102  0.0512  0.0599  0.0731  0.0573  0.0597  0.1181  0.0657  0.1101  
2 0.0495  0.0207  0.0162  0.0344  0.0588  0.0523  0.0359  0.1087  0.0395  0.1059  












-6+ -0.0219  -0.0370  -0.0214  -0.0277  -0.0746 ** -0.0201  -0.0337  -0.0600 ** -0.0001  -0.0296  
-5 0.0244  0.0023  0.0207  0.0281  -0.0566  0.0246  -0.0022  0.0015  0.0725  0.0052  
-4 0.0958 ** 0.0779  0.0952 ** 0.1071 ** 0.0175  0.1000 ** 0.0809 * 0.0795 * 0.0528  0.0938 ** 
-3 0.0784 * 0.0641  0.0769 * 0.0789 * 0.0227  0.0695  0.0586  0.0583  0.1343 *** 0.0572  
-2 0.0915 ** 0.0908 ** 0.0903 ** 0.0983 ** 0.0432  0.0873 ** 0.0625  0.0684  0.1125 *** 0.0717 * 
-1 0.1102 ** 0.0913 * 0.1096 ** 0.1086 ** 0.0780 * 0.1108 *** 0.0944 ** 0.0964 ** 0.1329 *** 0.1029 ** 
1 0.2227 *** 0.2083 *** 0.2156 *** 0.2233 *** 0.1813 *** 0.2178 *** 0.2116 *** 0.1828 *** 0.2114 *** 0.2196 *** 
2 0.3589 *** 0.3467 *** 0.3517 *** 0.3570 *** 0.3264 *** 0.3565 *** 0.3337 *** 0.3131 *** 0.3493 *** 0.3573 *** 














-6+ 0.0136  0.0301    0.0274  0.0714  0.0164  0.0722  0.0657  -0.0100  0.0181  
-5 0.0162  0.0359    0.0279  -0.0098  0.0306  0.0675  0.0742  -0.0113  0.0553  
-4 0.1390  0.1638 *   0.1481 * 0.0871  0.1463 * 0.1649 * 0.1749 ** 0.0916  0.1506 * 
-3 0.1307 * 0.1564 * 0.1167  0.1427 ** 0.0748  0.1449 ** 0.0945  0.1526 ** 0.1408 ** 0.1351 * 
-2 0.0290  0.0648  0.0054  0.0182  0.0037  0.0503  0.0126  0.0378  0.0182  0.0455  


















-5 -0.0965  -0.0911  -0.0827  -0.1124  0.1078  -0.0994  -0.0573  -0.1429  -0.1448  -0.0619  
-4 -0.2460 * -0.2501  -0.2424 * -0.2684 * -0.0166  -0.2600 * -0.2358 * -0.2758 * -0.1011  -0.2710 * 
-3 -0.3105 ** -0.3275 * -0.3010 ** -0.3269 ** -0.1127  -0.2741 * -0.2945 ** -0.3208 ** -0.4212 *** -0.2766 * 
-2 -0.2825 ** -0.3466 ** -0.2671 * -0.2709 * -0.1571  -0.2648 ** -0.2355 * -0.2595 * -0.2969 ** -0.2448 * 
-1 -0.2908 * -0.2246  -0.2784 * -0.2798 * -0.2141  -0.2817 * -0.2460  -0.2432  -0.3340 ** -0.2957 * 
0 0.0673  0.0578  0.1017  0.0722  0.0510  0.0657  0.0752  0.0943  0.0664  0.0174  
1 -1.0800 *** -1.0091 *** -1.0215 *** -1.0627 *** -0.9357 *** -1.0511 *** -0.9158 *** -0.8107 ** -1.0196 *** -1.1177 *** 
2 -2.0720 *** -2.0158 *** -2.0059 *** -2.0487 *** -1.9701 *** -2.0572 *** -1.7899 *** -1.7240 *** -2.0006 *** -2.1441 *** 
3+ -1.3159 *** -1.2350 *** -1.2561 *** -1.2657 *** -1.2645 *** -1.2828 *** -1.1683 *** -0.9654 *** -1.2561 *** -1.4488 *** 
log(gdp) 0.4486 *** 0.4248 *** 0.4839 *** 0.4438 *** 0.4682 *** 0.4723 *** 0.2673 *** 0.4092 *** 0.4780 *** 0.4526 *** 
log(cpi) 0.2149  0.2672  0.0263  0.1595  0.2479  0.2062  0.4192 ** 0.3179 * 0.1721  0.2778  
log(price of 
 
0.1027 *** 0.0961 *** 0.0845 *** 0.0927 *** 0.1045 *** 0.1080 *** 0.1077 *** 0.0841 *** 0.0937 *** 0.1100 *** 
log(price of oil) -0.0295  -0.0243  -0.0260  -0.0276  -0.0247  -0.0368 * -0.0279  -0.0272  -0.0352  -0.0313  
hydro share -0.3766 ** -0.3734 ** -0.3901 *** -0.3802 ** -0.3509 ** -0.3614 ** -0.3621 ** 0.8612 ** -0.4527 *** -0.3711 ** 
nuclear share 0.5777 ** 0.6546 ** 0.5117 * 0.5891 ** 0.7189 ** 0.6212 ** 2.1097 *** 0.7725 *** 0.4766 * 0.6564 ** 
trend -0.0024  -0.0017  -0.0012  -0.0014  -0.0014  -0.0024  -0.0016  -0.0024  -0.0015  -0.0037  
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Country BASE  Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom Households 
R2 0.9337 0.9287 0.9337 0.9328 0.9363 0.9477 0.9448 0.9489 
Obs 425 412 419 417 409 402 403 402 









-6+ 0.0585 ** 0.0592 ** 0.0598 *** 0.0570 ** 0.0568 ** 0.0515 ** 0.0460 ** 0.0742 *** 
-5 -0.0249  -0.0292  -0.0219  -0.0267  -0.0278  -0.0127  -0.0296  -0.0106  
-4 -0.0266  -0.0291  -0.0231  -0.0277  -0.0208  -0.0104  -0.0204  -0.0180  
-3 -0.0079  -0.0154  -0.0010  -0.0093  0.0107  -0.0018  -0.0110  -0.0003  
-2 0.0150  0.0151  0.0137  0.0137  0.0204  0.0158  0.0047  0.0044  
-1 -0.0017  0.0072  -0.0007  -0.0039  0.0089  -0.0044  -0.0032  -0.0124  
1 0.0117  -0.0093  0.0124  0.0131  0.0139  0.0130  0.0302  -0.0034  
2 0.0595 * 0.0315  0.0727 ** 0.0607 * 0.0627 * 0.0635 ** 0.0766 ** 0.0591 * 













 -6+ -0.1117 ** -0.1020 ** -0.1107 ** -0.1131 ** -0.1165 ** -0.1159 *** -0.1040 ** -0.1377 *** 
-5 -0.0965  -0.1053  -0.0957  -0.0982  -0.0991  -0.0869  -0.0905  -0.1217 * 
-4 -0.0877  -0.0895  -0.0851  -0.0935  -0.0784  -0.0882  -0.0773  -0.1048 * 
-3 -0.0224  -0.0437  -0.0183  -0.0226  0.0361  -0.0228  -0.0161  -0.0140  
-2 0.0421  0.0149  0.0341  0.0405  0.0537  0.0367  0.0490  0.0469  
-1 -0.0069  0.0315  -0.0083  -0.0091  -0.0117  -0.0150  -0.0038  -0.0026  


















-5 0.1168  0.1543  0.1120  0.1200  0.1270  0.0493  0.1071  0.0932  
-4 0.0742  0.0926  0.0666  0.0760  0.0523  0.0290  0.0392  0.0591  
-3 0.0342  0.0889  0.0118  0.0394  -0.0402  0.0310  0.0245  0.0132  
-2 0.0098  0.0565  0.0210  0.0156  -0.0276  0.0308  0.0257  0.0240  
-1 -0.0547  -0.1493  -0.0544  -0.0452  -0.0917  -0.0343  -0.0485  -0.0364  
0 0.0386  0.0140  0.0450  0.0427  0.0221  0.0270  0.0372  0.0193  
1 0.0778  0.4309 * 0.0812  0.0749  0.0976  0.0431  0.0198  0.1092  
2 0.0495  0.4001 * -0.0085  0.0437  0.0561  -0.0151  0.0273  0.0067  












-6+ -0.0219  -0.0267  -0.0238  -0.0225  -0.0272  -0.0574 ** -0.0057  -0.0042  
-5 0.0244  0.0277  0.0210  0.0248  0.0009  0.0008  0.0521  0.0436  
-4 0.0958 ** 0.0839 * 0.1063 ** 0.0962 ** 0.1069 ** 0.0803 * 0.1387 *** 0.1318 *** 
-3 0.0784 * 0.0801 * 0.0737  0.0783 * 0.0513  0.0870 ** 0.1235 ** 0.1059 ** 
-2 0.0915 ** 0.0918 ** 0.0905 ** 0.0878 ** 0.0850 ** 0.1152 *** 0.1388 *** 0.1077 *** 
-1 0.1102 ** 0.1009 ** 0.1168 *** 0.1127 ** 0.1169 *** 0.1245 *** 0.1445 *** 0.1252 *** 
1 0.2227 *** 0.2377 *** 0.2220 *** 0.2226 *** 0.2338 *** 0.2889 *** 0.2382 *** 0.2715 *** 
2 0.3589 *** 0.3841 *** 0.3447 *** 0.3581 *** 0.3687 *** 0.5177 *** 0.3816 *** 0.4075 *** 














-6+ 0.0136  0.0119  0.0089  0.0206  -0.0786  0.0405  -0.0101  -0.0008  
-5 0.0162  0.0544  0.0149  0.0232  -0.0951  0.0556  -0.0026  0.0236  
-4 0.1390  0.1356  0.1456 * 0.1498 * 0.1517  0.1726 ** 0.1246  0.1540 * 
-3 0.1307 * 0.1978 ** 0.1240 * 0.1436 ** 0.0675  0.1493 ** 0.1309 * 0.1249 * 
-2 0.0290  0.0876  0.0115  0.0320  0.0522  0.0197  0.0271  0.0417  


















-5 -0.0965  -0.1813  -0.0985  -0.0998  -0.0365  -0.1337  -0.1221  -0.1061  
-4 -0.2460 * -0.2282  -0.2919 ** -0.2467 * -0.3148 ** -0.2892 ** -0.3168 ** -0.3191 ** 
-3 -0.3105 ** -0.4280 ** -0.2995 * -0.3108 ** -0.2477  -0.3652 ** -0.3944 *** -0.3544 ** 
-2 -0.2825 ** -0.3798 ** -0.2883 ** -0.2732 * -0.2926 ** -0.3129 ** -0.3736 *** -0.3390 ** 
-1 -0.2908 * -0.1743  -0.3255 ** -0.2972 * -0.3607 ** -0.3057 ** -0.3561 ** -0.3921 ** 
0 0.0673  0.1029  0.0737  0.0750  0.0454  0.1073  0.0581  0.0325  
1 -1.0800 *** -1.4122 *** -1.0741 *** -1.0688 *** -1.2029 *** -1.8821 *** -1.1245 *** -1.2857 *** 
2 -2.0720 *** -2.4297 *** -2.0056 *** -2.0514 *** -2.2007 *** -3.8922 *** -2.2044 *** -2.1563 *** 
3+ -1.3159 *** -1.4753 *** -1.2964 *** -1.3012 *** -1.5233 *** -3.5426 *** -1.0563 *** -1.5704 *** 
log(gdp) 0.4486 *** 0.4402 *** 0.4480 *** 0.4152 *** 0.3832 *** 0.5617 *** 0.6040 *** 0.8224 *** 
log(cpi) 0.2149  0.2586  0.2099  0.2366  0.5056 *** 0.0808  0.1742  -0.2937 * 
log(price of 
 
0.1027 *** 0.1101 *** 0.0994 *** 0.1032 *** 0.1053 *** 0.1203 *** 0.0903 *** 0.0645 ** 
log(price of oil) -0.0295  -0.0299  -0.0297  -0.0303  -0.0273  -0.0387 * -0.0274  -0.0301  
hydro share -0.3766 ** -0.3805 ** -0.3731 ** -0.3936 *** -0.3404 ** -0.4749 *** -0.3767 *** -0.3669 *** 
nuclear share 0.5777 ** 0.5872 ** 0.6333 ** 0.6013 ** 0.1592  0.0570  0.5209 ** 0.1899  
trend -0.0024  -0.0029  -0.0022  -0.0024  -0.0051 ** -0.0028  -0.0046 ** 0.0015  
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Appendix 7 – Estimation Using Only Countries without Unbundled TSO 
System of 
equations SUR for industry and households 
SUR for industry and households using 
only countries without unbundled TSO 
Equation Industry Households Industry Households 
Customer group Industry Households Industry Households 
R2  0.8355 0.9337 0.8913 0.9644 
Obs  425 425 220 220 








 -6+ 0.3597 *** 0.049 0.0585 ** 0.023 0.3506 *** 0.052 0.0683 *** 0.020 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.051 -0.0249  0.034 0.2743 *** 0.057 0.0288  0.042 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.048 -0.0266  0.034 0.1578 *** 0.057 -0.0131  0.042 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.047 -0.0079  0.037 0.1009 ** 0.050 0.0181  0.036 
-2 0.0858 * 0.048 0.0150  0.031 0.0918 * 0.053 0.0274  0.032 
-1 0.0190  0.049 -0.0017  0.033 0.0178  0.055 -0.0461  0.032 
1 -0.0329  0.044 0.0117  0.036 -0.0401  0.048 -0.0597 * 0.035 
2 -0.0074  0.047 0.0595 * 0.033 -0.1099 ** 0.051 -0.0504  0.037 













 -6+   -0.1117 ** 0.046   -0.1158 *** 0.038 -5   -0.0965  0.066   -0.0633  0.056 
-4 0.0476  0.070 -0.0877  0.065 -0.1082  0.082 -0.0490  0.058 
-3 -0.0063  0.061 -0.0224  0.050 -0.1270 ** 0.065 0.0464  0.046 
-2 0.0010  0.059 0.0421  0.048 -0.1008  0.067 0.0374  0.045 
-1 -0.0238  0.056 -0.0069  0.050 -0.0656  0.064 -0.0255  0.043 
1 -0.0167  0.053 0.4367 *** 0.119 -0.0618  0.061   
2 -0.0016  0.056   -0.1065 * 0.062   



















-5 0.0231  0.111 0.1168  0.102 0.1048  0.132 -0.0473  0.126 
-4 0.1942 * 0.101 0.0742  0.103 0.3954 *** 0.137 0.0106  0.135 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.109 0.0342  0.116 0.5145 *** 0.125 -0.0542  0.119 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.123 0.0098  0.107 0.3948 *** 0.143 -0.0121  0.111 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.133 -0.0547  0.119 0.5107 *** 0.156 0.0243  0.112 
0 0.4750 *** 0.135 0.0386  0.050 0.5465 *** 0.152 -0.0056  0.042 
1 0.4311 *** 0.139 0.0778  0.181 0.5980 *** 0.154 0.5977 *** 0.201 
2 0.2919 ** 0.145 0.0495  0.161 0.7767 *** 0.163 0.5998 *** 0.196 












-6+ -0.1866 *** 0.057 -0.0219  0.026     
-5 -0.0926  0.060 0.0244  0.047     
-4 -0.0466  0.057 0.0958 ** 0.045     
-3 -0.0109  0.065 0.0784 * 0.046     
-2 -0.0171  0.064 0.0915 ** 0.041     
-1 0.0295  0.061 0.1102 ** 0.044     
1 0.1389 *** 0.053 0.2227 *** 0.051     
2 0.0495  0.060 0.3589 *** 0.045     













 -6+ 0.2930 *** 0.088 0.0136  0.056     -5 0.1945 ** 0.088 0.0162  0.082     
-4 0.1914 ** 0.080 0.1390  0.086     
-3 0.1681 ** 0.078 0.1307 * 0.071     
-2 0.1266 * 0.073 0.0290  0.066     
-1 0.0552  0.068 0.0946  0.071     
1 0.1937 *** 0.073       
2 0.4184 *** 0.127       


















-5   -0.0965  0.138     
-4   -0.2460 * 0.142     
-3 -0.1017  0.142 -0.3105 ** 0.153     
-2 -0.0626  0.154 -0.2825 ** 0.139     
-1 -0.0113  0.165 -0.2908 * 0.158     
0 0.1901  0.171 0.0673  0.067     
1 -0.3262  0.207 -1.0800 *** 0.324     
2 -0.3312  0.309 -2.0720 *** 0.263     
3+ -0.6715 ** 0.307 -1.3159 *** 0.251     
log(gdp) 0.4120 *** 0.135 0.4486 *** 0.096 1.1770 *** 0.224 0.5706 *** 0.157 
log(cpi) 0.6179 ** 0.240 0.2149  0.166 -0.3053  0.352 0.5008 ** 0.203 
log(price of gas) 0.1772 *** 0.038 0.1027 *** 0.028 0.1127 *** 0.042 0.0896 *** 0.030 
log(price of oil) 0.0120  0.029 -0.0295  0.021 -0.0381  0.031 -0.0358 * 0.021 
hydro share -0.0197  0.200 -0.3766 ** 0.148 -0.3914 ** 0.174 -0.6135 *** 0.121 
nuclear share 1.0271 ** 0.398 0.5777 ** 0.283 0.5122  0.413 -0.6988 ** 0.290 
trend 0.0014  0.003 -0.0024  0.002 0.0039  0.004 -0.0061 ** 0.002 
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Appendix 8 – Estimation with Ownership Unbundling Classification from 
European Commission Reports 
System of 
equations SUR for industry and households 
SUR for industry and households with EC 
classification 
Equation Industry Households Industry Households 
Customer group Industry Households Industry Households 
R2 0.8355 0.9337 0.8283 0.9300 
Obs 425 425 425 425 








 -6+ 0.3597 *** 0.049 0.0585 ** 0.023 0.3474 *** 0.051 0.0502 ** 0.023 
-5 0.2925 *** 0.051 -0.0249  0.034 0.2801 *** 0.053 -0.0419  0.036 
-4 0.2125 *** 0.048 -0.0266  0.034 0.2015 *** 0.050 -0.0499  0.035 
-3 0.1603 *** 0.047 -0.0079  0.037 0.1431 *** 0.050 -0.0572  0.043 
-2 0.0858 * 0.048 0.0150  0.031 0.0684  0.051 -0.0243  0.036 
-1 0.0190  0.049 -0.0017  0.033 0.0027  0.053 -0.0447  0.041 
1 -0.0329  0.044 0.0117  0.036 -0.0379  0.049 0.0538  0.054 
2 -0.0074  0.047 0.0595 * 0.033 0.0120  0.053 0.1058 ** 0.044 













 -6+   -0.1117 ** 0.046   -0.1061 ** 0.047 -5   -0.0965  0.066   -0.1078  0.067 
-4 0.0476  0.070 -0.0877  0.065 0.0606  0.073 -0.0982  0.067 
-3 -0.0063  0.061 -0.0224  0.050 -0.0003  0.063 0.0028  0.055 
-2 0.0010  0.059 0.0421  0.048 -0.0046  0.061 0.0495  0.054 
-1 -0.0238  0.056 -0.0069  0.050 -0.0479  0.058 -0.0172  0.056 
1 -0.0167  0.053 0.4367 *** 0.119 -0.0387  0.055 0.1737 * 0.103 
2 -0.0016  0.056   -0.0040  0.060   



















-5 0.0231  0.111 0.1168  0.102 0.0205  0.114 0.1580  0.106 
-4 0.1942 * 0.101 0.0742  0.103 0.1782 * 0.103 0.1126  0.107 
-3 0.3323 *** 0.109 0.0342  0.116 0.3272 *** 0.112 0.1224  0.131 
-2 0.3988 *** 0.123 0.0098  0.107 0.3944 *** 0.127 0.0805  0.120 
-1 0.4942 *** 0.133 -0.0547  0.119 0.5012 *** 0.138 0.0218  0.139 
0 0.4750 *** 0.135 0.0386  0.050 0.4383 *** 0.139 0.0079  0.055 
1 0.4311 *** 0.139 0.0778  0.181 0.4171 *** 0.143 -0.1634  0.236 
2 0.2919 ** 0.145 0.0495  0.161 0.2129  0.149 -0.1767  0.196 












-6+ -0.1866 *** 0.057 -0.0219  0.026 -0.1643 *** 0.040 -0.0027  0.024 
-5 -0.0926  0.060 0.0244  0.047 -0.0692 * 0.041 0.0599  0.048 
-4 -0.0466  0.057 0.0958 ** 0.045 -0.0280  0.039 0.1428 *** 0.047 
-3 -0.0109  0.065 0.0784 * 0.046 0.0176  0.057 0.1502 *** 0.048 
-2 -0.0171  0.064 0.0915 ** 0.041 0.0128  0.059 0.1497 *** 0.042 
-1 0.0295  0.061 0.1102 ** 0.044 0.0736  0.059 0.1307 *** 0.047 
1 0.1389 *** 0.053 0.2227 *** 0.051 0.0971 * 0.050 0.0660  0.058 
2 0.0495  0.060 0.3589 *** 0.045 -0.0111  0.057 0.1455 *** 0.050 













 -6+ 0.2930 *** 0.088 0.0136  0.056 0.2652 *** 0.091 -0.0039  0.056 -5 0.1945 ** 0.088 0.0162  0.082 0.1729 * 0.090 0.0218  0.083 
-4 0.1914 ** 0.080 0.1390  0.086 0.1875 ** 0.081 0.1560 * 0.086 
-3 0.1681 ** 0.078 0.1307 * 0.071 0.1835 ** 0.080 0.0682  0.073 
-2 0.1266 * 0.073 0.0290  0.066 0.1247 * 0.074 0.0354  0.068 
-1 0.0552  0.068 0.0946  0.071 0.0883  0.069 0.0913  0.076 
1 0.1937 *** 0.073   0.2082 *** 0.074   
2 0.4184 *** 0.127   0.3543 *** 0.122   



















-5   -0.0965  0.138   -0.1650  0.145 
-4   -0.2460 * 0.142   -0.3332 ** 0.148 
-3 -0.1017  0.142 -0.3105 ** 0.153 -0.1556  0.146 -0.4023 ** 0.162 
-2 -0.0626  0.154 -0.2825 ** 0.139 -0.1026  0.157 -0.4045 *** 0.143 
-1 -0.0113  0.165 -0.2908 * 0.158 -0.1292  0.167 -0.2812  0.174 
0 0.1901  0.171 0.0673  0.067 0.1991  0.135 0.1019  0.069 
1 -0.3262  0.207 -1.0800 *** 0.324 -0.2485  0.200 -0.2269  0.316 
2 -0.3312  0.309 -2.0720 *** 0.263 -0.1855  0.300 -1.0335 *** 0.270 
3+ -0.6715 ** 0.307 -1.3159 *** 0.251 -0.3460  0.293 -0.2625  0.329 
log(gdp) 0.4120 *** 0.135 0.4486 *** 0.096 0.5261 *** 0.138 0.5027 *** 0.099 
log(cpi) 0.6179 ** 0.240 0.2149  0.166 0.4938 ** 0.239 0.0748  0.172 
log(price of gas) 0.1772 *** 0.038 0.1027 *** 0.028 0.1757 *** 0.039 0.0891 *** 0.029 
log(price of oil) 0.0120  0.029 -0.0295  0.021 0.0102  0.030 -0.0286  0.022 
hydro share -0.0197  0.200 -0.3766 ** 0.148 0.0424  0.203 -0.2746 * 0.152 
nuclear share 1.0271 ** 0.398 0.5777 ** 0.283 1.5661 *** 0.390 0.6544 ** 0.290 
trend 0.0014  0.003 -0.0024  0.002 0.0026  0.003 -0.0008  0.003 
 
